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1.0 Democratic institutions and social instability  
Colombia is by most seen as another third world country ripe with violence. The 
news originating from this part of South America seems always to be related to either 
violent death or drugs. Not prevalent in popular media is the fact that Colombia, 
unlike its other Latin American neighbours, has a longstanding democratic tradition. 
Its economy is much more stable than if its neighbours, the level of technological 
development is high, it is a highly multicultural country, free elections have been held 
without interruption since 1958, fundamental human rights are guaranteed by 
constitutional law, political power changes hands in national elections regularly and 
the results are respected. Yet, the level of political violence is higher in Colombia 
than any other country in the western hemisphere. Whereas the current conflict has 
lasted for more than 40 years, violent conflicts have always played central role in the 
creation and moulding of its political institutions. The political system has been 
formed and continuously reformed in an effort to forge peace and stability; something 
giving political scientists a wealth of possibilities in evaluating effects of practical 
institutional engineering.  
Originally divvied in autonomous regions in which the caudillos ruled most 
aspects of life, the numerous regional conflicts resulted in a constitutional reform in 
1886. An adversarial political system with strong centralizing features was introduced 
to bring stability, but continued inter-elite conflict culminated in civil war and in an 
effort to prevent further bloodshed the political system was transformed into a 
consociational regime in 1958. The consociational system proved to be very effective 
initially, but the exclusive system created new divisions in society and new frictions 
came to fore. By the end of the eighties the levels of violence were comparable to 
levels experienced during the civil war. The solution was found in returning to the 
adversarial system and encouraging the existence of political oppositions in 1991. 
However, like the previous attempts to facilitate peaceful solutions though legal 
political institutions the intended result did not last long before violence again 
escalated. This thesis intends to make assessment on whether the specific institutional 
reforms introduced in the 1991 constitution were the cause of the deterioration.  
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This thesis questions whether and why the process of democratization led to an 
augmentation in political violence. In approaching the subject it seemed natural to 
explore the specific intentions with the constitutional reforms. Who participated in 
the process, and what were their motives and aspirations. What was the situation 
before the reforms and how was the situation after the new rules of the game were 
implemented? Two interrelated hypothesis will guide the study: 1) The consociational 
regime excluded the vast majority of Colombians from the political institutions. 2) 
The constitution of 1991 did not alter the balance of political power, rather the 
institutional changes led to an escalation in the conflict. 
1.1 The analytical framework 
The dissertation before you is an attempt to better understand why the institutional 
reform whose goal was to deepen democracy in Colombia resulted in escalation 
violence. What is striking about Colombia is that the conflict dynamic deviates from 
other states in similar situations. Additionally, for those of us interested in the topic of 
institutional design, Colombia has an extensive experience from various different 
designs, and the effect of these designs can be measured in the ongoing conflict. 
Whereas most deal with institutional design after the conflict has been settled, 
Colombian politicians are forced to reform within the context of war. To further 
complicate the efforts to implement change, the democratic nature of the state 
imposes certain restrictions and all reforms must be decided and implemented by and 
within the democratic institutions.  
The theories used in the thesis to explore the reasons why these outcomes were 
observed are divided three main sections; Democratic theory, consociational theory, 
and institutional deign theory. The state of Colombia has since independence been a 
formal democracy, with only a few short periods of democratic rupture. This feature 
makes Colombia different from its neighbours where the military has been actively 
involved in politics. Nevertheless, the nature of its democracy is contested throughout 
its history by various sectors in society. Can a state be perceived as democratic if its 
institutions are mere formalities? Are the democratic institutions democratically 
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designed, meaning representative and responsive to its constituents. Which 
understanding of democracy is used when stating that Colombia is a democratic 
state? Processes of democratization can be applied to two different contexts; a 
transition from undemocratic rule to democratic rule, and from a democratic to a 
‘deeper’ democracy. The former took place in Colombia in 1958 when a power-
sharing regime was introduced, while the latter was introduced in 1991 when an 
adversarial political system was installed to mend the less democratic features of the 
consociational model. Institutional design theory contemplates whether institutions 
are functions of their creators; i.e. political institutions are rationally designed to 
serve the actors involved in making them, or are idealistic constructions intending to 
implement a clear structural rupture; in which new actors will benefit at the expense 
of or with mutual benefits with the existing political actors.  
From the outset, the establishment of the consociational regime fit perfectly 
with the understanding of institutions as functional consequences of their creators, 
while the latter was largely written in a constructivist framework. The actors involved 
in the first were the elites, while the latter the sectors excluded from the 
consociational system. The two different institutional designs implemented in 
Colombia the last half century, consociational and adversarial, present political 
scientists with a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect of these institutional 
designs. 
1.2 Methodology 
Through my interest in political science, and the invaluable assistance from my 
contacts in Colombia, I kept myself updated with international and Colombian 
publications regarding the political system and the internal conflict for the last five 
years. The amount of material produced after 40 years civil war is extensive, but war 
has polarized the society and many truths live side by side. The complexity of the 
conflict, the deeply rooted structures that sustain it and the fear of retribution make 
studies of the conflict both difficult and dangerous. Reliance on government sources 
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means accepting one truth, whereas the adversaries might have their truth, and NGOs 
popular media can represent a third.  
I have therefore made great efforts to use material originating from a wide 
range of sources making triangulation possible. To evaluate of the effect of 
institutional designs, one needs to identify which of the institutions that were 
reformed, and through an analytical framework link the observed variance in the data 
to the reforms. The search for and identification of relevant material is a time-
consuming project. Written material, or secondary material, has been collected with 
the help of internet, and by actively seeking it in various academic book stores in the 
capital Bogotá. Unfortunately, most of the literature written by Colombian scholars is 
only read by Colombians because the majority of material is not published outside of 
the country. Fortunately I had the opportunity to travel to Colombia, and been greatly 
assisted by local contacts who have recommended and helped identify existing 
literature. Primary sources are also used in the study; two groups of actors were 
interviewed; politicians and academics. The former was contacted to inform me on 
how the political actors evaluate new political system, and how they perceive the 
development of the conflict. The latter was contacted due to their unique position of 
working, studying, and living in the unfortunate context of civil war. Colombian 
scholars are responsible for almost all the data produced on the conflict, and possess a 
wealth of information on every aspect and development of the conflict. I hope this 
thesis will in some way contribute to their quest of better understanding the situation 
which makes their lives so unpredictable. 
1.3 The road ahead 
The thesis will commence with a section on how the data was collected and 
disseminated, and will present the reader with the methodological challenges a 
researcher may encounter in these kinds of studies. To understand the dynamic of 
both the conflict and the reforms-processes it is necessary to have knowledge of the 
relevant political actors and their relative position in society. Therefore, I have chosen 
to include a comprehensive section which introduces the reader to these relevant 
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aspects of Colombian history. From this outset I will present the theoretical 
framework in which the institutional reforms are evaluated. Consociational 
democracies are defined by institutional arrangements or ‘rules of the game’ that 
imposes restrictions on the different political actors found in a given society. The 
defining aspects of a consociational regime are Grand Coalitions, Proportionality, 
Mutual Veto and Segmental Autonomy. In the discussion I will use these four 
dimensions of the theory to evaluate if and why consociational regimes contribute to 
political and societal stability. The results of the analysis will be presented in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis in the form of a conclusion.  
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2.0 Research on and in conflicts   
This chapter intends to asses to overall quality of the methodology applied in this 
study. Most research on the internal conflict in Colombia is quantitative. The studies 
predominantly establish statistical correlations between the intensity of the conflict 
and other variables. Consequently the data from such studies are widely available, 
and I will make extensive use of these in this thesis. The predominance of 
quantitative studies has been accompanied with purely descriptive publications 
written in absence of any qualitative or quantitative research designs. Many resemble 
articles form newspapers, in which the personal interpretation of events is obvious 
while neglecting other possible interpretations (Roll 2005).  
Evaluating the effect of political institutions is marred by problems with can 
affect both the validity and the reliability of the study. Studies on institutional design 
confront the inherently problematic task of disconnecting the contextual from the 
hypothetical (Perzeworski 2004). The case of institutional design in Colombia does, 
however, offer a unique opportunity. The state has undergone several institutional 
operations during the last fifty years, all of which were explicitly introduced to induce 
political stability. All designs implemented have failed in ending the conflict, but all 
have affected the dynamics of the war.  
2.1 The single case study 
The choice of research strategy depends on what is being studied.  Each strategy has 
its strengths and weaknesses compared to others depending on the topic being 
studied. The design chosen intend to connect the collected data with the questions 
posed by the study, and the quality of the design used can be assessed by the 
establishing four conditions; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability (Yin: 19). The study at hand aims to analyse the impact of an institutional 
design in a specific contemporary context. In addition to observing what happened, 
this thesis intends to understand how and why the unfolding of events happened.  
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In examining the dynamics between the political reforms and the internal 
conflict, the behaviour of the actors involved is clearly not possible to manipulate. 
The conditions for initiating a ‘pure’ experiment are therefore not present, but the 
case studies make use of some experimental features. In quasi-experimental studies 
control over the variables is not possible to achieve, so a post-test experimental 
design can arguably be applied in which variables introduced into a known context 
can be evaluated by measure the changes in the context. A natural choice of research 
strategy for such a study is the case study. Case studies are defined as inquiries that 
“investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin 2003:13). Moreover the thesis is a single case study of the institutional reform in 
Colombia.  
History is filled with examples of how wars were settled by political 
negotiations and followed with the instalment of new democratic institutions. The 
Colombian conflict is unique in not being based on the cleavages which traditionally 
facilitate political violence such as ethnic, linguistic, or any other demographic 
divides. It is a violent struggle against democratic institutions with the goal of 
providing more representative and responsive democratic institutions.                
2.2 Sources 
To enhance the validity and reliability of the data obtained, the study relies on 
triangulation of sources. Interviews are one of the most important sources of 
information in a case study (Yin: 89). Data from primary sources have been collected 
though semi-structured interviews, while secondary sources consist of written 
literature found in the form of government reports, scientific publications, and 
information presented in written media.  
2.2.1 Primary sources 
Colombia is war with itself, and this context imposes certain legal and practical 
restrictions; the ramifications of which makes it impossible to contact all actors 
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involved in the conflict. Insurgent organizations are located in the shadows of society 
and are both difficult and dangerous to locate. Additionally, making contact with 
these the actors is prohibited by law in Colombia, and has consequently not been 
sought after. One the brighter side, the other part in the conflict is the government; in 
the study defined as the cohort of political and administrative institutions, and 
naturally no restrictions on contact with elected representatives are in place. The 
responses from political figures are tied to both their perception if the situation, their 
personal interest in it, and the ‘political’ position they take to capture an electorate. 
Their perspectives are naturally coloured by the position they are in as well as how 
they got to be in this position. An attempt to balance the political actors was done 
through interviews with elected representatives in Congress representing and 
originating different sectors in society who are both in the governmental position and 
opposition. These actors are identified as being ‘rural elites’, ‘national elites’ and the 
so-called ‘third alternatives’.    
The interviews conducted were designed as semi-structural. The intention of 
the interviews was to receive data on certain topics, and I needed a structure to ensure 
that the answers were related to these. But also I gave the subjects great freedom to 
express what they perceived as the underlying dynamics of the conflict. To a great 
extent the same questions were asked all objects making comparisons of the 
responses possible, and I hoped to be able to identify some distinguishing features in 
understanding the conflict1. The carrying through of the interviews was done by 
presenting the topic in ‘main questions’, ‘following up questions’ to clarify and 
understand and elaborate what the conversational partner has brought up in answering 
the main question and use of ‘probes’ to further ensure the desired depth of the 
answers (Rubin & Rubin 2005: 135 – 137). The interviews were all conducted in 
Spanish, lasted for approximately one hour and were all taped. The language did pose 
some restrictions. I do speak Spanish fluently, but in Colombia certain variations in 
the language makes it difficult to understand certain expressions. Having extensive 
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experience from speaking with Colombians, and being able to double check the 
responses by listening to the recordings, I am quite certain that the responses have 
been correctly interpreted. Taping the questions does in itself also pose some 
methodological problems, in that the subjects may impose some restrictions on what 
is being said. Nevertheless I found the answers to be very open and diverse.  
Two separate groups were identified as crucial for this study. First, the 
domestic scholars who have intimate knowledge of all actors involved, and have 
extensive experience from continuous research of the institutional reforms and the 
internal conflict. As the rest of the population ion Colombia, these scholars have all 
been directly affected by the war, and some have been involved in the forming the 
political reform implemented. The second group identified is the domestic politicians, 
who have voted for or against the reforms, contributing to change in the state as a 
whole and for their own political future. A possible third group that was not contacted 
was the multiple NGOs working on this topic; including journalists, victims groups, 
and lawyers etc. However, the NGOs in Colombia are difficult to evaluate as all 
parties to the conflict have their own civil society, and distinguishing one from the 
other is quite a task as the independence of the NGOs are difficult to evaluate. 
 2.2.1.1 Academics from leading research institutions in Colombia 
Higher education in Colombia is difficult to obtain, a distinction is made between the 
public and private universities. Two universities are in the forefront of this line of 
research; the public Universidad Nacional and the private Universidad de Los Andes. 
The first is known as the ideological breeding-ground for several of the country’s 
guerrillas, while the second is by some called the ‘university of the presidents’ 
because almost all presidents and their heirs have attended this institution. I found it 
necessary to visit both in order to compare the information presented, and thereby 
enhance the validity of the data collected.  
Interviews with the academic circles in Colombia had mainly two purposes. 
First, I wanted to gather information on the political developments from the end of 
the consociational regime until today thereby acquire a better understanding of the 
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relationship between the political elites and the political parties and their 
representatives. The second purpose was to identify literature which could be useful. 
As noted a vast body of knowledge has been produced, but is not easily available 
outside of Colombia. To write a thesis on this subject without recognizing the existent 
literature would greatly inhibit the quality of the study.  
The academics interviewed were; Juan Carlos Rodriguez – Raga from the 
University of Los Andes whose research interest is political parties and institutional 
reforms; Fransisco Gutierrez Sanín from the Universidad Nacional who has a very 
extensive experience from research related to the political and armed actors in 
Colombia; and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, former professor from the Universidad 
Nacional who has published numerous books and papers on the subject. Currently he 
is appointed by the president to head the Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación, an office established during peace negotiations with the 
paramilitaries and whose task is to compensate the victims of the ongoing civil war. 
He is also the brother of the former leader of the guerrilla M-19 and presidential 
candidate, Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, who was assassinated while campaigning in 
1990.                     
2.2.1.2 Politicians in position and opposition   
Three interviews were carried out with the second group of subjects. It would 
certainly have been preferable to rely on a greater universe of subjects, but time and 
resources did not permit this. The subjects in this group were selected on the basis of 
their position in Congress. All are members of the first congressional commission 
whose areas of expertise are, among others, constitutional reform and development of 
strategies and politics favouring peace2; hence, a natural choice for the purpose of 
this study. Several interviews were planned, contacts identified, and agreements to 
conduct the interviews were obtained. The hope was to meet with one member from 
                                              
2 Information on the commission is available at the official website for the ‘Camera de Representantes’: 
http://abc.camara.gov.co/camara/site/artic/20060510/pags/20060510113732.html  
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each of the important political parties3. Upon arrival, however, it was impossible to 
get in touch with the same subjects. I can only speculate on the reasons why did 
agreements were not respected. On the positive note, the three interviews that were 
carried out were with three of the ‘new’ political parties which have been established 
in the wake of the new constitution. The interviewees were; Dr. Roy Barreras from 
the political party Cambio Radical (CR); Sr. David Luna from the Por el Pais Que 
Soñamos (PPQS); and Sr. Germán Navas-Talero from the Polo Democratico 
Alternativo (PDA).  
2.2.2 Secondary sources 
The literature identified provides the fundamental base of this study. Relevant 
literature was identified by recommendation and actively searching for publications 
on specific topics.  The written documentation can be divided in three blocs from 
where data was derived; theoretical assessment of the political history of Colombia; 
empirical evaluations of the political system and the conflict; and data from 
government reports, media and non-governmental organizations. The literature is 
predominantly published in Colombia, and a great amount of literature regarding; the 
consociational regime in Colombia; the diverse understandings of the political 
conflict in Colombia; and historical and contemporary research on the political 
institutions was found and read during my fieldwork. The divergence in what is being 
published makes it important to read material that is recommended by several 
different sources. This would make the researcher able to assess the differences, and 
link them up to the sources who recommended them.     
  
                                              
3 A list of parties with short descriptions of each is found in Appendix I 
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2.3 Assessment of the research design applied. 
Only recently were statistical measures of the intensity of the conflict presented 
(Restrepo et al. 2003). Internal conflicts are difficult to analyse, and finding 
trustworthy information is challenging. The use of government figures is not 
unproblematic, and seeking out alternative sources of information can be logistically 
difficult and at times dangerous. Having academic freedom, Colombia has developed 
an extensive academic network which has been able to observe the conflict first hand. 
This has been a great asset for the study of the conflict, but by living in the middle of 
it, it may also define the focus and thereby restrict the scope of these studies. Adding 
to this problem is the ever changing context found in a country in which the balance 
of power has continuously shifted.   
The condition of the study’s reliability shows to whether the mode of 
operations applied in the research can be repeated and yield the same results. An 
extensive body of secondary sources has been used, and the references are found 
throughout the text. This will make it possible for other researchers to confirm the 
theoretical and empirical quality of the material used. Anyone interested do have the 
possibility to trace the references to the literature, and are free to draw independent 
inferences from the same material.  The primary sources used in this thesis are people 
interviewed in semi-structural interviews. Following this kind of interview the 
conversation between the subject and researcher is quite unregulated. One hopes to be 
structured enough to get answers related to certain themes, yet not inhibiting the 
emergence of other themes not previously contemplated on by the researcher. The 
informal manner of this kind of interview facilitates the conversation, but makes the 
identical replication impossible. The interviews were however recorded in order to 
both minimize bias and prevent errors of interpretation. The recordings are available 
upon request.    
With regards to the external validity, the general objection to the case-study 
design is the lack of ability to produce general knowledge. Statistical generalisation, 
that is “an inference made about a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical 
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data colleted about a sample” (Yin 2003: 32) is not possible to make based on a case-
study, and indeed not the aim. Cases can not be seen as ‘sampling units’, rather they 
are unique categories, and due to this the mode of generalisation is restricted. The 
study presented here aims to make an analytical generalization, i.e. expand and 
generalize on the theories of institutional design, not draw statistical generalizations 
(Yin: 10). Case studies are characterized by a small number of units, and an 
abundance of undetermined variables. Drawing causal inferences, when the material 
is so limited, is problematic, and it is difficult to determine the direction of the causal 
connections (Smelser 1973). The data and analyses from this study are only meant to 
provide information about these particular empirical situations. The complexity of the 
conflict and its continued evolvement makes generalisations difficult, but the results 
might indicate some of the possible problems in certain established theories on 
democratization and institutional design in similar circumstances.     
This relates to the internal validity of the study. Development of events in the 
internal conflict in Colombia has resulted in statistical evidence that indicates an 
escalation of the violence after the inauguration of the new Constitutions, and the 
thesis intends to answer if this is a causal relationship. The study at hand is 
predominantly descriptive, but explanatory inferences are made. In order to increase 
the internal validity the researcher has followed an analytical framework, the events 
described have been organized chronologically, and material revealing the frequency 
of relevant events has been collected and variations evaluated. Theoretical 
propositions have been followed throughout the study, and have guided the collection 
of the research data.  
Assessing the construct validity of case studies has been the object of criticism 
due to the inherit potential of subjectivity by the researcher. Construct validity is 
linked to the external validity given its purpose to enhance the legitimacy of the 
inferences made in the study to theoretical constructs on which the operationalisation 
of the variables are based. There are difficulties in collecting data due to the problems 
of operationalisation of the concepts and variables. Use of multiple sources of 
information aims to compensate for this problem; all of which have been deemed 
reliable and relevant for the research here presented (Kvale 1997). The interviews 
 21
conducted, and extensive use of various sources of material augment the validity, but 
the difficulties in separating the identified variables from the context are nevertheless 
not to be underestimated. The primary sources identified were selected on the basis of 
the theoretical foundation of the thesis, but the practical limitations on the study left 
out many alternative sources and this does reduce the arguments’ construct validity. 
Secondary literature is extensively used to compensate for this exclusion of other 
possible relevant sources.  
 Operational validity refers to the extent the variables chosen in the study are 
representative for the theory investigated. I will return to this in chapter four where 
the variables are operationalised and defended.  
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3.0 Background 
Ever since Colombia became a sovereign state, the country has been engulfed in 
some sort of civil conflict, but at the same time also upheld democratic institutions. In 
Colombia, democracy has never contributed to peace, and many see the various 
democratic regimes as the enabling cause of the conflict. The current conflict can be 
understood as an indirect result of the conflict between the traditional elites and 
consociational arrangements introduced in 1958, with the purpose of ending the 
devastating civil war known as La Violencia. Today the conflict is no longer between 
the traditional elites themselves; rather between a conglomerate of elites who controls 
the democratic institutions and anti-systemic communist guerrillas. Nevertheless, the 
conflict today still shares some of the same characteristics as did the civil war which 
lasted from 1946 – 1957, and some of the actors are still the same. To understand this 
complexity one needs to study the social and institutional history of Colombia. But 
before I venture into history, a description of the multiple and changing actors is 
presented to give an overview of the actors place and involvement in the current 
conflict.       
3.1 The multiple actors in the Colombia Conflict 
The internal conflict in Colombia is by no means linear. Over time the adversaries 
have changed, new actors entered and been joined by yet another set of different 
actors. The myriad of armed and political groups observed during the last 100 years 
are not all easy to distinguish. I will however give a very brief description blow, 
which will be useful for understanding the next section of this chapter.  
3.1.1 The traditional elites  
The traditional elites were formed during the wars of independence against colonial 
Spain. Consisting of landlords who were operating as all powerful kings in their 
largely autonomous regions, they turned into renowned generals in the struggle for 
independence. When the state of Colombia was created, these landlords were the 
 23
founding fathers who subsequently entered national politics (Hartlyn 1993). Forming 
two parties in 1849, the traditional elites were spread all over the country, and 
constantly found themselves in conflict with other traditional elites from the opposite 
party; a situation reminiscent of the wars in feudal Europe. At one end the elites 
which made up the Conservative party favoured a strong and formal relationship 
between the church and state, a strong central government, and a protectionist 
economic scheme. The Liberals on their end, influenced by the liberal and 
industrialized democracies favoured a separation between church and state, a federal 
republic and a free marked economy.  
The manner in which these conflicts were transferred downwards to the 
“common” people is explained by lines of dependency. The connection between large 
landowners, the “patrons”, and their subjects; farmers and other personnel have been 
described as close to a feudal relationship (Hartlyn, 1993:40). The relationship 
between these two elites has been described as ‘hereditary hatred’, and the feudal 
bonds transferred this hatred to their clientele. As rural violence escalated the 
traditional elites increasingly migrated to the cities; predominantly the Liberal elites 
who at the time found themselves in the political opposition, but also Conservative 
affected by the Liberal guerrillas or other aggressive neighbours. Violence came out 
of control and the military intervened in 1953. Most of the Liberal elite and large 
parts of the Conservative elite were forced into exile. The violence, however, 
continued and in 1958 a power-sharing agreement, named the National Front, 
between the traditional elites was agreed upon to stem the violence, allowing the 
return of the exiled elites.  
The traditional elites returned only to find new rural elites had partially 
displaced them from their traditional areas. Their clientele had been killed, displaced 
to the cities, or scattered to other parts in Colombia. Through the National Front the 
traditional elites tried to mould a coherent state, and in the process recapture their 
clientele by tying them to state institutions that they controlled (Gutierrez 2007). 
Their success was limited. From the end of the power-sharing agreement the 
traditional elites have uninterruptedly been loosing power in local, regional and even 
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national politics; a trend that culminated during the first years of the new millennia. 
They still constitute a force in national politics, but their power has increasingly been 
conditioned by regional interests forwarded by the rural elite.  
3.1.2 The new rural elite  
The new rural elite or the ‘new business elite’ came from the cities to the rural areas 
in the 1930s 1940s when the state went through a economic and social development 
process; a period known as the Liberal Republic. Located in the emerging centres of 
the rural municipalities, they came in contact with all surrounding population coming 
into the markets with their products, and over time formed a bond of trust with them. 
When the traditional elites left the rural areas due to the violence the local population 
were left patron-less and open for attack by rivalling municipalities. The businessmen 
were transformed into commanders of self-defence militias and provided protection 
to the local population and constituted themselves as the new rural elite. During the 
last half of the civil-war they had over taken most of the traditional elite’s remaining 
clientele (Duncan 2005). 
The National Front created state institutions to retake the power from these 
business elites, and created a comprehensive system for redistribution of resources to 
the areas most affected by the civil war. But the institutions were abandoned as the 
new rural elites gained increased control over them and used them to forward 
personal interests. Economically, rural Colombia went into a serious recession in the 
late seventies and mid-eighties. The formation of the guerrillas had commenced in the 
mid sixties, but had until the early eighties been in hibernation. The guerrilla, 
reinforced by the disastrous rural situation gained force, and initiated a new phase of 
the conflict when they targeted and expanded into rich and already cultivated areas. 
As a consequence of the increasing guerrilla attacks, the local business elites, the 
cattle ranchers, and the remaining landlords formed self-defence militias; the first 
formation of the modern paramilitaries (Richani 2007).  
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3.1.3 The professional politicians  
This group emerged during the National Front and consisted predominantly of 
educated civil servants, who built networks of influence through the community 
projects intending to re-establish the link the traditional elites and their clientele. By 
cultivating personal ties between the several members of the local rural elite and 
connecting them to the traditional elites, these actors functioned as ‘brokers’ able to 
secure state benefits like administrative posts and other goods and services to the 
local elites. Being largely representatives of the rural elite these professional 
politicians became inserted in regional and national assemblies in the last period of 
the National Front. Their entry into national and regional politics controlled by the 
traditional elites was at first one of subordination, but the number of votes they could 
secure through their networks gave them an increasingly independent role in politics. 
Their financial capability grew as more resources were drawn from the state and 
distributed among their locally based clients; the rural elite. By the 1980s the 
presence of these ‘brokers’ in national politics was seen by the increasing 
fragmentation of the traditional parties. Having developed into regional 
representatives, their financial capability made them able to enter politics without 
funding or support from the traditional elites. The volatility within this group was 
high, as the representatives were mostly spokesmen for rural elites, and with the 
decentralization in the late 1980s throughout the 1990s their control were 
significantly diminished, but not vanquished. When politics became localized some 
of these were well established in their regions and could assert a great amount of 
political influence, while other depended on more ad-hoc arrangement with the rural 
elites (Archer 1990).  
3.1.4 The first wave of guerrillas  
The first wave of guerrillas declared their war against the Colombian government in 
1964. Some of the rural commanders, who had formed self-defence groups under La 
Violencia, did not return to the cultivated land.  Rather, they opened new areas of 
colonization for peasants driven from their landlord’s or their own small parcels of 
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land during La Violencia. Organized in largely autonomous communities with their 
own self-defence militias, they became an easy and symbolic target for the returned 
traditional elite. Being in the midst of a nation-building project, in which the state 
was to penetrate all of society in the entire country, these ‘Free Republics’ were seen 
as a threat to the sovereignty of the government. The attack of the Armed Forces on 
the autonomous community located in the municipality Marquetalia in the Tolima 
department gave rise to the largest guerrilla in contemporary Colombia; the Fuerzas 
Armadas  Revelutionarias de Colombia- Ejecito del Pueblo (FARC-EP). Two other 
guerrillas were created in the same period; the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) 
and the Ejercito Polular de Liberación (EPL). The former was headed by students 
from the city inspired by the Cuban revolution. In a context of rising rural poverty, 
they capitalized on the misery and with local help from the peasants in their area of 
operation they conducted several small attacks on local police and army stations. The 
EPL is still a part of the Colombian conflicts, but never reached the level of the 
formerly mentioned guerrillas. Founded by dissenting members of the Communist 
party, these Maoist inspired guerrilla started their operations in the late 1960s 
(Palacios 1995). 
All guerrillas were very much contained in distant regions and their numbers 
were insignificant until the mid 1980s when a period of rapid expansion commenced; 
especially for the FARC-EP and the ELN. When the FARC-EP entered peace-
negotiation with the Betancourt government (1982 – 1986) they only numbered about 
1000 soldiers (Pizarro 2007i). Some advances were made in the talks, and an effort to 
divert the struggle onto the political arena was made. A political party was created, 
the Unión Patriótica (UP), but by the first elections 1988 this party had been all but 
annihilated. A shift from being present in the distant areas of newly colonized land, 
they entered the turf of the new rural elite in the cultivated areas and the conflict 
entered a new and intensified phase. The focus have been shifted from creating a 
local base in the poor regions who would ultimate descend on the cities, to actively 
seeking revenue to increase their strength and autonomy. Their collective expansion 
was continuous until the turn of the millennia.      
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3.1.5 The drugs-elite  
The drugs-elite joined the new rural elites from the late seventies to mid-eighties as 
the guerrillas were infringing on their territory. Having bought large swaths of 
productive land in the traditional elites’ areas, their interest became tied to control of 
land, and their presence signified an economic boom to rural Colombia. Enjoying a 
working relationship with the guerrilla in the guerrillas’ traditional areas, their 
relationship in the rich agricultural areas was one of conflict. The drugs-elite was, 
thus, placed somewhere in between the guerrillas and the new rural elites and the 
remaining traditional elites (Richani 1997). The guerrilla expansion made a great 
impact on the drugs-elite who along with the rural elite and remaining traditional elite 
were extorted, robbed and kidnapped by the guerrillas. The drugs-elites created their 
own militias to protect them from the kidnappers, and who cooperated with the self-
defence groups created by other rural elites. These first paramilitary formations 
sponsored and controlled by the cartels came to life in the second half of the 1980s, 
and continued to expand throughout the 1990s. With decentralization the drugs-elite 
faced the same opportunities as the rural elites to politically control their local 
environment, and used this to provide greater security from persecution. From the late 
1970s to the first half of the 1990s the drugs-industry was centrally controlled by 
large cartels located in the cities. Their status in poor urban areas and in rural 
Colombia was perceived by many as positive, and the first effort to enter in national 
politics was made. The government assault on the cartels in the beginning of the 
1990s led to their destruction, but the industry was not vanquished; rather atomized 
and spread in rural areas where the state presence was low or not existent.  
The drugs-elite were still somewhat different from the rural elites, but they 
were increasingly tasking the leading role by co-opting or pushing out the other rural 
elites. Through their financial capacity they had headed a substantial process of 
modernization in the rural areas, diversified into legal business, but also acted in 
more sinister ways to gain control. The process of assassinating members of labour 
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unions, dissenting politicians, journalists and Human Rights workers among others 
who raised objections commenced in the late 1980s, and augmented throughout the 
1990s. The atomization of the drugs-elite spread them for all winds, increased their 
physical control over coca-producing areas, monopolized the political control over 
the democratic institutions in these areas, and enabled them to re-enter at every level 
of society including national politics (Gutiérrez & Barón 2005). In 1996, just before 
the capture of their capos, the Cali cartel funded large parts of the presidential 
campaign for President to be Ernest Samper. In a process called ‘Proceso 8000’, it 
was found the cartels had gained a huge amount of local and regional political power 
especially in the areas traditionally adherent to the Liberal party.         
3.1.6 The second wave of guerrillas  
The second wave of guerrillas grew out of the dissatisfaction with the traditional 
elites, and the growing urban/rural discrepancies observed. Several organizations 
were created in the mid seventies, but for the purpose of this paper only one is worth 
mentioning; Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). Former members the FARC-EP in 
cooperation with students from the cities formed part of the guerrilla movement; but 
this time on a different or more inclusive ideological background. Presenting 
themselves as a nationalistic Bolivarian force they entered the struggle by stealing the 
sword of the Simón Bolívar from the house in which the Liberator lived and worked 
during his time in the capital Bogotá; la Quinta de Bolivar. From symbolic actions to 
fierce armed battles, the M-19, whose name was derived from the election date in 
which former General Rojas was defeated in 1970. This election was widely seen as 
fraudulent. Thus, there was a certain conservative element to the guerrilla that 
favoured the regional and local interests even though its presence was predominantly 
found in the cities.  
This M-19 guerrilla gained fame for their very visible actions, highlighted by 
the storming and occupation of the Palace of Justice in 1985. Located in the middle 
the central plaza in the capital, surrounded by the Senate and less than one city block 
from to the presidential palace, and the House of Representatives, the army had to 
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send in tanks to defeat them. All of the participating guerrillas died along with half of 
the judges of the Supreme Court and numerous innocent civilians present in the 
building at the time. From 1985 until 1989 the M-19 suffered a series of defeats, but 
was still very much active. The M-19 entered peace-talks with the government of 
Virgilio Barco (1986 – 1990), and by the end of his term an agreement had been 
signed. The guerrilla immediately entered politics under the name Alianza 
Democrática Movimiento 19 de Abril (ADM-19), and when the election for the 
National Constituent Assembly was held they obtained close to one-third of the votes. 
Less then four year after demobilization, the former guerrillas had entered into the 
executive branch of government (Boudon 2001) (Peñaranda & Guerrero 1999).     
3.1.7 The paramilitaries 
The paramilitaries or self-defence groups have existed in Colombia since before its 
inception, and have at times been the only armed forces of the state. The traditional 
elites had their irregular, armies, the new regional and local elites had their armed 
forces, so have the drugs-elites and several communities of peasants. Since the mid-
1980s the paramilitaries have been a mixture of hired soldiers employed by the rural 
and regional elites, and the drugs-elite. When the two forces together fought the 
guerrillas before the Constitution of 1991, the rural elites were dominant. This feature 
changed in the mid-1990s when the drugs-cartels were atomized, and located their 
base of operations in the rural areas. The distant regions hidden in Colombia’s 
complex geography made asserting control over political institutions, the local 
judicial system and security forces an easy task for the well funded drugs-elite.  
The contemporary paramilitaries, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC), can be dated back to 1986 when the Castaño brothers began a campaign of 
aggressive ‘self-defence’ with the total number of 93 soldiers (Richani 2007). A few 
years after the legalization of the self-defence groups, and the fall of the drugs cartels 
in 1995 the AUC numbered between 4000 and 5000. The rise in number was greatly 
helped by the creation of the Convivir; the re-legalization of private self-defence 
armies, which generated an expansion in the forces controlled by the newly arrived 
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drugs-elite. From originally being located to certain municipalities these newly 
authorized militias consolidated control in the rural areas, and started to push the 
guerrillas out from the cultivated lands. The numerous local and regional militias 
enjoyed great support from the army, and their founders in local government; the 
drugs-elite and the rural elites. The balance of power over this rather fragmented 
militia, shifted from the original leadership asserted by the rural elites to the 
commanders creating most revenue finance their fighting force. By filling the void 
created by the fall of the drug-lords, the assimilation or cooptation of their armies into 
the paramilitary rank and file, the paramilitaries effectively controlled a large 
percentage of the drugs-trade. This was done by taking over the areas controlled by 
the drug-lords, co-opting remnants of the cartels, co-optation or expulsion of the rural 
elites, and taking control over land cultivated with coca from the guerrilla. Their 
military expansion was paralleled only with their expansion into politics. The areas 
under their control became strictly regulated, and the process of decentralization 
meant that their grip on local and regional institutions was made easy, something that 
gave them access into national politics. In 2002 they claimed to control 35% of the 
Colombian national congress, and one third of Colombia’s municipalities (ibid) 
(Gutiérrez & Barón 2005) (Castaño & Aranguren 2001).  
3.2 Social and institutional development in Colombia 
Colombia had always been in turmoil. From independence until today some sort of 
internal conflict has coincided with democratic institutions. Regular elections had 
been conducted almost without interruption from 1854, yet no democratic institutions 
have been consolidated. The social and geographical makeup has defined how 
politics have been carried out, and democratic institutions have always been used by 
the powerful to remain in power. With more than 100 years of internal conflict the 
state of Colombia has managed to keep certain equilibrium between national interest, 
regional interest and local interest, negotiated between several different actors, at the 
expense of the majority of its inhabitants who simply try to survive and sustain 
themselves.    
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3.2.1 The formative years 
Both the weak structures of the state and the predominance of the elites in Colombia 
is a direct consequence of the wars of independence. A charismatic Venezuelan 
named Simón Bolívar formed an army which originated in Venezuela and liberated 
today’s Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia from the Spanish 
colonial regime and created Grand Colombia. The project collapsed in 1830 due to 
tensions between the multiple regional interests. In the fragmented new state of 
Colombia, the landowners who became generals possessed complete control over 
their subordinates by controlling all the local populations’ security, access to salaries, 
and access to the markets. After Bolivar’s death in 1830 large segments of the 
Venezuelan liberation army were expulsed. The landlords became organized in two 
political parties who on local level were in constant conflict, often economically 
rather than ideologically based. By the mid 1850s the remains of the Venezuelan 
liberation army intervened and staged a coup d’état under the General Jose Maria 
Melo, but his reign came to an end when the first consociational regime including the 
Liberal- and the Conservative elite was formed. The anti-military legacy in Colombia 
has been formed by these events and the role of the irregular military forces created 
by the Colombian elites greatly outnumbered the official army. By the end of the 
1850s the military institutions were virtually extinct (Davila 1998). Monopoly on use 
of violence was, thus, never established in Colombia. Neither was a national police 
force, a judiciary, a central fiscal policy or any other central institutions. Before 1886 
the landlords even printed their own money (Hartlyn 1993).     
After the military lost its importance, the ensuing armed confrontations have 
been between these irregular armies of the two political parties. Apart form La 
Violencia, the most ferocious took place in 1861 – 1863, 1876 – 1877, 1885, 1895 
and the war of a thousand days which lasted from 1899 – 1902. In addition a large 
number of regional conflicts of a lesser scale have been reported (ibid: 41). During 
this entire period periodic elections were held (ibid: 41). 
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3.2.2 The effort to build a nation with the Constitution of 1886 
To solve the crisis the parties, as they had done before to oust the military 
government, the two elites formed a new consociational bipartisan coalition. This 
coalition, known as the Regeneration, was headed by the Conservative president 
Raphael Nuñez. The result was the Constitution of 1886 which drastically increased 
the central state power, and concentrated the fiscal and administrative power to the 
executive. The coalition came to an end when the Liberal party was excluded from 
power, resulting in a new civil war in 1895 and again in 1899 – 1903. However, by 
the end of the 18th century and in the beginning of the 19th, the economic prospects in 
Colombia were favourable to both traditional elites; mainly due to the augmented 
prices of coffee. This in turn forged a relative calm in which neither of the elites felt 
economically threatened by the other. Politically however the tensions were clear, 
and even though the democratic arrangements were in place, elections were often 
held with only one participating party.  
By the end of the 1920s the economy was in free fall, and tensions again began 
to be expressed violently. In 1930 the Liberal candidate, Enrique Olaya Herrera, 
presented Colombia’s third consociational regime to find a solution to the crisis. The 
consociacionalist promises were, true to tradition, short lived, and the Liberal 
government soon appointed governors and mayors exclusively from the Liberal party. 
The Conservatives were ousted from most public offices and violence resulted.  
The rule of the liberals was strongly defined by their ideological influences 
especially after the elections in 1934, in which Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo came into 
power. The Liberal party had by now introduced a socialist inspired programme 
called the Liberal Republic, which was forwarded by an internal party fraction led by 
the upcoming politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Lopez used his presidency in an effort 
to impose a more liberal oriented policy which included more rights for farmers and 
workers. This was strongly opposed by the landowners and industrialists who along 
with the conservative party tired to oust him in a military coup in 1944. This attempt 
did fail, but the now internal divisions within the Liberal party brought to fore by the 
ever more popular and radical Gaitán. The strong tensions with both Conservatives 
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and elements within the Liberal party led to Lopez’s resignation in 1945. During his 
tenure the Liberal Republic had managed to extend the infrastructure of the economy, 
so more municipalities could be integrated in a national market. As a consequence an 
exodus of businessmen from the city established themselves in the new markets and 
the newly arrived soon developed ties confidence with the local population 
surrounding the village in which they were operating (Archer 1990). Lopez’s Liberal 
successor, Alberto Lleras Camarago, formed yet another bipartisan government. This 
fourth attempt to share the power between the traditional elites was called the 
National Union, but like the former was not to last (Hartlyn 1993) (Roll 2001).  
3.2.3 Civil war, democratic rupture and elite restructuring 
In 1946 the Liberal party was divided between the followers of Gaitán and Lleras 
who both presented candidatures and ran for office. This in turn led to the victory of 
the Conservative candidate Mariano Ospina Pérez by plurality vote. The government 
led by Ospina, initially with limited participation from the Lleras fraction of the 
Liberal party, once again copied the custom of removing all Liberals from public 
offices.        
The liberals remained divided, and in 1947 Gaitán became the party leader, 
and withdrew the party from the Ospina government. The Liberals had a majority the 
Congress, so the tensions between the two parties were reflected in the relationship 
between the legislature and the executive. The Liberal Congress impeded the 
executive at every corner and new initiatives to form a consociational bipartisan 
government failed. In response to this legislative deadlock, president Ospina used his 
executive powers and declared a state of emergency enabling him to rule be decree. 
The violence in the rural areas started to resurface. When the Liberal leader Gaitán 
was murdered on April 9th 1948 riots broke out in the capital.  
The Conservatives were also divided internally and the more radical part who 
opposed the power-sharing arrangements was led by the Alvaro Gómez, who by 1948 
had been elected as leader of the Conservative party. He urged and succeeded in 
convincing his fellow party member and president to close down the congress on the 
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same day to restore order. Ospina declared an extensive state of emergency, outlawed 
public gatherings, and imposed a censorship on all radio and newspapers. The 
oligarchic adversarial democracy had come to an end and was not to be revived.  
The period from 1946 – 1957 was a time of unprecedented violence in 
Colombia, hence known simply as La Violencia. In the midst of civil war President 
Gomez was, without opposition, elected president in 1950 and during his presidency 
the censorship was strengthened, repression against workers heightened and violence 
against supporters of the Liberal party intensified. The exodus of rural patrons 
intensified, and by 1953 most were gone, although some Conservative patrons had 
created private armies strong enough to remain and resist both the criminal gangs 
ravaging the country and the guerrillas formed by the new rural elite that had 
emerged (Archer 1990). Before the military coup led by Gen. Rojas Pinilla in 1953 an 
estimated 145 0004 lives were lost. The traditional elites from both parties who had, 
or were migrating to the city due to the increasing violence lost increasing control 
over their clientele who accordingly became patron-less. In their place the new rural 
elites became the new war-lords. They took over the control of the traditional elite’s 
self-defence groups in order to protect the peasants from attacks from neighbouring 
communities; often but not necessarily of opposite party adherence. These war lords 
were initially financed by the national patrons, i.e. the traditional elite, but grew 
increasingly autonomous and uncontrollable. Their quest for resources later turned to 
robbery of goods, land and extortion (Duncan 2005). Thus the Liberal guerrillas and 
the Conservative self-defence groups were established on a largely equal basis, and 
were increasingly controlled by new elites who had limited ties to the traditional 
elites and their political parties.  
The violence was predominantly concentrated in the rural areas, and the cities 
remained largely untouched. The difference in the scale of the violence also helps 
explain why the national leaders did not really address the problem, given they were 
                                              
4 The exact numbers are disputed. Oquist (1980) operates with 145 000 deaths between 1946 – 1953 and 
24 000 between 1954 – 1960. Others use different numbers ranging from 250 000 – 300 000 from 1946 – 1957 
(Watson 2000).   
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located in the cities where the violence was not visible. Violence was also most 
prominent in the areas of special economic interest; more specifically the coffee 
growing regions. It was a fight for control of land as much as anything, in which the 
poor peasant classes were driven from their land. In all this turmoil, surprisingly but 
underlining the mixed interests involved in the conflict, the national economy 
improved (Tirado 1971) (Hartlyn 1993).   
3.2.4 Traditional elites’ attempt to form a coherent state meets rural 
opposition 
After the coup d’état the situation did not stabilise, and large segments of the military 
forces formed an alliance with the exiled traditional parties, and helped to ouster Gen. 
Rojas. The counter coup d’état was conducted on May 19th 1957. A temporary 
military junta was installed, and remained in place until 7th of August when the fifth 
power-sharing regime in Colombia, the National Front, was inaugurated. The 
consociational regime received overwhelming support in a plebiscite on December 1st 
1957. The pact was intended to last for three consecutive electoral terms, counting 12 
years, but was extended in the constitutional reform of 1968 to 16 years (Dix 1980).  
Before the formation of the National Front, Colombia had no real state 
institutions, no territorial control, and security was provided by the local patrons. A 
process of nation-building ensued in which the remaining most independent insurgent 
groups were forced into submission. However, some of the insurgent groups, 
predominantly Liberal socialist guerrillas, did not submit to the central power, and 
were to be central for the ensuing conflict which arose during the National Front. 
Hence, the communist guerrilla groups that were formed in the mid 1960s were as 
much an expression of the revolutionary left seen in Cuba, as a side-effect of the 
bipartisan violence (Leal 1995).  
 The new rural elite remained loyal or at least in the background during the 
first part of the 1960s, and state institutions were spread into rural areas most affected 
by the war and urban areas where the many refugees had settled. The presence of the 
state was organized through small community project groups called Juntas de Acción 
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Comunitaria (JAC), linking the electorate directly to the state, and bypassing the new 
rural elites. The community projects were centrally funded and directed by local 
organizers in the state bureaucracy who connected the community to the state. These 
civil servants acted as ‘brokers’ who specialized in capturing funds from the state and 
distribute them to certain neighbourhoods or for certain projects in rural regions. 
Some of these ‘brokers’ managed to create a rather autonomous network which 
consisted of a constellation of the new local elites. During the National Front these 
increasingly autonomous JACs demanded an ever expanding part of the national 
revenue, and began staging protests to get their demands through (Gutierrez 2007). 
The community programs were closed down, and the constituents again became 
patron-less. The population then returned to the war-lords who were able to provide 
protection, social services, legal help etc. in the absence of state presence. The 
constituent’s wishes were forwarded by the local patron to the broker who had 
knowledge on how to access state funds. These ‘brokers’ were to become the 
‘professional politicians’ who forwarded regional interests in Colombia, and made 
deal between the central state and the clientilistic networks on local levels, and who 
were to become members of regional assemblies and later national assemblies 
(Archer 1990).  
3.2.5 The regional elites assert control over legislative institutions  
The reforms of 1968 came in an attempt to define the future political system in 
Colombia after the end of the power-sharing agreement. Power was kept centrally, 
but the members of Congress managed to find some ways to allocate funds for their 
constituents. Two institutions were created; the ‘pork-barrel funds’ and the 
‘congressional supplant’. The ‘brokers’ made use of the funds and managed to divert 
funds to the municipalities, and also enter into national assemblies. Their dependency 
on the traditional elites were that the executive branch of government was controlled 
by the traditional elites who according to the 1886 Constitution controlled the 
distribution of the state’s resources, and had the power to  appointment people to 
positions in the administrative system. Congress became increasingly controlled by 
the regional elites. The Liberal party was especially affected by the regional 
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fragmentation, and control over the party label became impossible. The regional 
politicians ran and financed their campaigns alone, and were responsible only to their 
local support-group made up of the new rural elites. During the National Front the 
relationship between the traditional elite and the regional interests were at heads; 
almost leading to a collapse of the power-sharing agreement in 1970 (Roll 2001).              
3.2.6 Reforms of 1988 
The constitution of 1886 had delegated the power to appoint governors who again 
were empowered to appoint the mayors of all of Colombia’s municipalities. This 
arrangement gave the national elites some leverage over the rural elites, but the 
relationship between the centrally appointed mayors was tense. Services provided by 
the state were seen as rights rather than a good provided by the national elites, and the 
traditional parties were increasingly fragmented into a fraction of the national elite on 
one side, and an incoherent constellation of local and regional elites on the other 
(Gutierrez 2007).  
Having been an insignificant force contained in poorer regions of the rural 
areas, the FARC-EP guerrilla held its seventh conference in which a new more 
offensive strategy of war was agreed upon. From 1982 they began to expand with an 
alarming paste, and opened a series of new fronts in the economically powerful 
agrarian municipalities. The other guerrillas soon adapted the same tactics. The ELN 
ventured into regions of great natural resources derives from oil or mining, and were 
able to rapidly expand to new areas. But not all communities were receptive to the 
guerrillas who extorted local business, kidnapped people and robbed people of their 
belongings (Richani 2007). Several local patrons consequently created small self-
defence groups to protect themselves from the guerrilla and criminal gangs who were 
scavenging the rural communities in the absence of a state power.  
Another development is also of crucial importance and coincided with the 
guerrilla expansion; the industry of illicit drugs was entering the local economy. 
Beginning with the trade of marijuana in the seventies, and turning into the business 
of cultivating, processing, and selling cocaine in the early eighties the trade made a 
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huge impact. An emerging modern urban society driven by the change from a rural to 
a service based economy was paralleled by an unbearable situation in the Colombian 
rural communities who increasingly lost out to the development in the cities (Duncan 
2005). The introduction of the drugs-trade led to desperately needed development in 
rural Colombia and gave the drugs-elite a high standing among all societal sectors in 
the impoverished regions. In the south and parts in the east in the elites had not been 
established and the guerrillas have become the protectors of the areas. When these 
areas were cultivated with the coca, the guerrillas were incorporated into the drugs-
economy by receiving protection money from small farmers, placing taxes on 
transactions, and securing the drug cartels’ laboratories. By 1987 the drugs-trade 
amounted to 6.7% of Colombia’s Gross national Product (GDP), and by 1989 an 
estimated 10% of the GDP came from this trade. All aspects of the Colombia society 
were affected by the bonanza, as the conflict was spiralling out of control (Thoumi 
2002).  
All of the local actors demanded a process of political decentralization. The 
FARC-EP made this clear as early as during the Turbay government (1978 – 1982), 
which was the first government lead by the ‘professional politicians’, but he declined 
to enter any kinds of talks with the guerrilla; and instead stepped up the use of state 
sponsored violent repression. Loosing the next elections to the Conservative Belisario 
Betancourt, the decentralization was initiated, and mayoral elections were prepared 
for 1988. As the power of the guerrilla became ever more present and the state more 
absent, the most affected by the growth; the landowners and the cartels, acted to 
counter the offensive. Their two irregular forces formed an increasingly unified front 
together against the guerrillas. Enjoying control over security and the economy in 
their communities, the decentralization would also mean political control. So the 
guerrillas, the local elites with their paramilitaries, and the drug-lords would all 
benefit from decentralization. 
The new rural elite, the remaining landowners and cattle ranchers who 
belonged to the traditional elites, and the drugs-elite who had bought vast areas of 
productive land designated for cultivation of coca, systematically began to enter the 
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newly empowered local institutions. In the areas where the guerrilla had been able to 
establish themselves the decentralization was met with violent resistance from this 
elite triangle. In 1988 the first local elections were help, and before the elections were 
held more than 3000 leaders and sympathisers of the guerrilla party, UP, are 
assassinated. The extermination of the political opposition resulted in a marked 
escalation in violence (Rubio 1998).  
3.2.7 Complete breakdown and constitutional restructuring; the reforms 
of 1991 
President Virgilio Barco (1986 – 1990) was the first president since the National 
Front who did not include the adversary traditional party into his administration 
(Hartlyn 1993). By 1989 levels of violence were again slipping out of control, and 
had reached all the mayor cities. The rural guerrillas were making strong advances, 
and the urban guerrillas continued their urban assault. Numerically weak but 
symbolically powerful the M-19 guerrilla entered peace-talks with the government. 
Unlike the FARC-EP, the M-19 promptly laid down their weapons was not perceived 
as a threat by the Armed Forces and their mandated constitutional monopoly on use 
of violence. 
Elections for a National Constituent Assembly showed the popular strength for 
the new political movement and they allocated almost one-third of the seat in the 
assembly. Less than half of the representatives came from the traditional parties, and 
within this delegation the regional and national interests were diverse; making their 
collective strength even weaker (Boudon 2001). The untraditional composition of the 
Assembly drafted a document clearly influenced by constructivist theory, and the 
final result was intended to brake the cycle of coalitional governments which 
effectively excluded all other political alternative from having influence. The 
exclusive consociational democracy was to be changed into an adversarial, 
participatory and ‘deeper’ democracy. The elites were outnumbered, and the new 
Constitution also intended to undermine their influence outside of the Constituent 
assembly. The stated goal of the Constitutional reform was to foster a political 
culture; based on the rule of law and fundamental rights of every citizen; in which the 
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power came closer to the constituents; and that the constituents were able to choose 
from or openly participate in distinct different political alternatives. The goals were to 
be reached by a strengthening of civil-, political-, economic-, cultural-, and social 
rights, and a comprehensive effort to decentralize power from the capital to the 
regions and municipalities (Davila 2002).  
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4.0 The democratic continuum.   
The famous expression by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz: “war is the 
continuation of politics by other means”, is a god description of the last hundred 
years of Colombia’s political history. Violence has been, and still is a mean to bring 
about political change, and being politically involved automatically implies the risk 
of violence. Separating the two has never really been successful. Nevertheless, from 
1974 to 1991 Colombia was considered a free i.e democratic country according to the 
organization Freedom House. After the process of deepening the democracy 
Colombia became regarded as partial free, i.e. a partial democracy 
(freedomhouse.org). Lifting restrictions on democratic participation, enhancement of 
civil and political rights, codified guarantees of public accountability and 
responsiveness unintentionally made the state less democratic.  
Since the first theories on democratic regimes emerged, a number of 
limitations have been forwarded to counter the inherent dangers of this kind of 
political system. Both Plato and Aristotle recognized that what is considered good 
does not necessarily include all citizens in the decision-making, but that the decisions 
should reflect the need and wishes of all members of society. For these philosophers 
the best possible regime is measured by the outcome of its decisions, not by who 
participates in making the decision (Malnes & Midgaard 1993). Democratic deficits 
can thus be perceived as twofold; a lack of redistribution of political power, and a 
lack of redistribution of resources. Democratic legitimacy is understood as the 
aggregate of these two. Political inclusion enables participation of all sectors through 
processes of political identification within democratic institutions, while 
redistribution perceived as just, open for review, and entails institutions of 
accountability creates a direct and predictable linkage between the population and its 
representatives and elected leaders. 
There have been many attempts to define what a democratic regime is, but for 
the purpose of thesis the institutionally descriptive model articulated by Prof. Robert 
A. Dahl is the most useful. In his much revered book from 1971, Polyarchy: 
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Participation and Opposition, political regimes considered polyarchies, an 
operationalised democracy, have the following institutional characteristics:  
Government decisions must be decided and controlled by elected officials; Elected 
officials are freely chosen in peaceful periodic elections; Universal suffrage; all 
members of the state have the right to stand for elections; Freedom of expression; 
Access to alternative sources of information; and, freedom of association (Dahl 
1971). A state containing these aspects can be considered a polyarchy. In these terms 
Colombia can be described as a democracy. The political institutions of the state do 
coincide with the characteristics presented by Dahl. Notwithstanding, some of the 
political actors in Colombia would prefer to describe it as an oligarchy, claiming 
these political institutions are designed, controlled and serves only a miniscule 
portion if the population. Colombia is according to this classification a polyarchy, but 
is only considered a partial democracy. The two terms should not be considered 
equal, and Dahl himself would prefer to use the term polyarchy for scientific 
purposes. The characteristics of the polyarchy are measurable, whereas the idea of 
democracy is much more diffuse (Lijphart 2000). Democracy is measured not only in 
distribution of power, but also the responsiveness of the elected to meet the need of 
all citizens as highlighted by the Greek philosophers. 
From this discussion rise the question of democratic quality and the difference 
between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ democracies; Colombia being the former, clearly 
not the latter. Formal democracies refer to the institutions and procedures of 
democratic systems as in Dahl’s Polyarchy, whereas the substantive democracy refers 
to the political system’s capability of securing a just redistribution of resources, and 
ensuring extensive participation in political decisions that effect one self (Luckham 
et. al 2003). Not one state fits the ideal democratic model, and what is understood as 
a true consolidated democracy varies both in cultures and in time. Absence of one 
universally accepted democratic model has lead to a proliferation of descriptive and 
theoretical models which are culturally and socially derived. Despite the durable 
electoral tradition of Colombia, many scholars use a hedged version of the concept. 
The Colombian democracy is often described with ‘supplementary adjectives’ 
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(Collier and Levitsky 1997), such as ‘limited’, ‘quasi’, ‘restricted’, ‘oligarchic’ 
(Davila 2002).  
Assuming there is a correlation between democratic institutions and peaceful 
coexistence; we must look at the specific institutional arrangements to see where the 
Colombian democracy quite obviously failed. This particular case is of special 
interest as several political systems have been effective. Continued conflict has led to 
the development if several stabilizing strategies; temporary return to undemocratic 
rule (1953 – 1957); narrowing of democracy (1958 – 1974); and a deepening of 
democracy (1991 - ). The Colombian case highlights the difficulties of changing the 
political culture; all strategies above have been tried and all have failed.  
4.1 Conflicts; democratic premise and expression of democratic 
deficit 
Civil war is defined by four criteria. First, there must be a national government at the 
initiation of the conflict, and this government is militarily engaged in the conflict. 
Second, each of the fractions has the capacity to inflict a significant amount of 
casualties upon their adversaries. Thirdly, large scale military confrontations must 
take place, and the number of casualties from these engagements must be greater than 
1000 every year. And finally the conflict must be internal (Collier& Hoeffler 1998) 
(Singer & Small 1982). Colombia meets these criteria and can the current conflict can 
henceforth be described as a civil war. 
Theory on internal conflict is largely derived from post-colonial countries in 
which the internal divides, suppressed by colonial power, resurfaced after liberation. 
Luckham et. al. (2003) identifies three contextually distinct situations in which these 
‘new wars’ have materialized and led to processes of democratization. 1) Conflict as 
response to incompetent, fragile and authoritarian regimes that failed to satisfy basic 
needs of the population have come into conflict, and lost power to oppositional 
forces. The conflict is here found both in the political transition leading to the 
overthrow of government, and afterwards by the retreating elites and those who 
gained under their rule. 2) Façade democracies where the government is not able to 
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respond to the needs, or protect the citizens from violence. The source of conflict is 
not the democratic institutions as such, but the lack of democratic policies derived 
from these. Politics is in such situations defined by special interest, patron-client 
relationships, mafia involvement in politics etc. The conflicts in Sri Lanka and 
Colombia can bee seen as consequences of such flawed democratic institutions. 3) 
Situations in which violence has been politically and socially embedded. Political 
violence, even in democratic societies, change the rules and practises of politics by 
normalising physical force as a means to allocate resources and power, and 
undermines the democratic institutions and the legitimacy of the state. In such 
countries violence is characterized by the tendency of always returning (Luckham 
et.al 2003). In the theories of origin of conflict two main causes are held; ‘grievance’ 
and ‘greed’ (Collier & Hoeffler 2000). Though not being one of these post-colonial 
countries, the conflict in Colombia entails aspects from all these three ‘situations’ that 
are linked to the grievance category. The ferocious fight for strategic economic 
interest does blur this picture, and dependence on specific economic resources to 
fight a war can easily corrupt the original cause of the conflict. The elites have not 
been able to respond to needs of the poorer sectors in society, but the elites have 
never been overthrown or ceded much power. The next is related to the former but 
maybe more relevant for the fragmented nature of the country in question in which 
patron-client relationships have been a defining feature. Last, the conflict has varied 
in intensity but violence has constantly been a part of the politics and has continued 
to define the democratic institutions.   
4.2 Institutional design; can viable solutions be designed? 
Democracy is defined by the nature of its institutions, and these are understood as “a 
set of arrangements for organizing political competition, legitimating ruler and 
ensuring accountable governance, typically though free elections to determine the 
composition of the legislature and the government” (Luckham et. al 2003: 18). No 
state can function without institutions, and their existence is commonly understood as 
the “functional consequences for those who create them” (Pierson 2000:475).  In 
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other words, institutional reforms will always reflect the wishes of those with power 
in any given society. The consociational National Front in Colombia is a clear 
example of how the creators of the institutions were benefiting from this particular 
regime.  
Democratic institutional arrangements constituting a consociational democracy 
include specific structural features. The rules of the game are agreed upon by the 
different elites after a comprehensive task of institutional engineering, resulting in a 
new political system. Unlike in most consociational democracies Colombia inscribed 
the new rules in written law, and detailed the processes that should define political 
order in the next 16 years. Traditional elites defined the political rules, and a 
relatively stable political system followed. With the untraditional makeup of the 
Constituent Assembly in 1991 the new rules agreed upon by the authors threatened 
the status quo, and the political regime that ensued became unstable. The relationship 
between the social power found in society and the political makeup of the institutions 
normally correlate, resulting in institutional arrangements which can be seen as 
functional consequences of who made them. The rules within the Colombian 
consociational regime favoured the elites, while the new system intended to include 
all sectors of society.  
The power inherited in the institutions is, however, contested by several 
scholars who point to the apparently diverging results stemming from similar 
institutions (Prezeworski 2004). Although political scientists have devoted much time 
to the study of the effect of institutions, not much has been written about the 
institution’s origins and change. Theories on institutional design can generally be 
separated in two camps; the neo-institutional theory professed by G. Satori, and the 
path-dependent empirical-historical perspective favoured by D. Nohlen (Roll 2001). 
The former professes the centrality of the rules of the game, and how these in turn 
affect the behaviour of political actors. The latter, claim that institutions are a product 
of social and political history, and need to be approached in the context in which they 
are found, not as abstract notions of rules. Path-dependence is a theory that offers an 
analytical framework for the study of institutional evolvement and durability (Pierson 
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2004). The “critical juncture" framework presented by Pierson indicate a specified 
break where the institutions are introduced, and can be seen as somewhere in the 
middle of the two former camps. The institutions are understood as a result of the 
negotiations between actors in a pre-existing condition, in which they make rational 
and contingent choices that intend to direct the trajectory of institutional development 
that is difficult to reverse. The focus here is on co-operation between the implicated 
actors, and the strategic exercise of power gives rise to, maintain, and transform 
institutions.   
Improving institutions to better be able to respond to the needs of the 
population may be perceived as a threat to the existing benefactors of these 
institutions. To this regards, deliberations should be restrained to the making of the 
institutions in which political actors co-operate or compete, but how the institutions 
are received and can be manipulated in post-reform contextual setting. The elites in 
Colombia were benefiting from the former regime, but did not simply disappear from 
the political scene overnight; rather adapted to the new situation imposed on them. 
Development of institutions must be seen in a context. Political actors negotiate, co-
operate and compete to forward their own personal, as well as collective and mutually 
beneficial outcomes. Collectively beneficial outcomes may also have positive 
personal ramifications in which re-election are one possible result of content citizens. 
Control over the resources means control over the electorate through being able to 
redistribute.  Political scientists have a tendency to focus their attention on the 
authoritative institutions; the judicial, legislative and the executive. However, the 
great bulk of government is composed of bureaucratic agencies, and are designed and 
adopted by public officials who make decision under the prevailing rules of the game. 
Irrelevant of their democratic creation these administrative institutions are often not 
co-operative or mutually beneficial for the one affected by them, and they involve the 
exercise of power (Moe 2005). The distinction between the political and the 
administrative is fluid in Colombia. Before the National Front the administration was 
systematically used by the government to increase the influence of their political 
party in all sectors of society. Still today, the administration by large consist of 
personnel appointed by the political actors. Bureaucracy as a mediating factor 
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between the political decisions and the effectuation of these does not really exist in 
Colombia. The process from political decisions in initiating development programs 
until the controlling the contracting of firms is controlled politically, and a practise of 
clientelism has been intertwined with the representative institutions. Independent 
political actors must as a consequence encounter the existing actors at every level of 
government and administration. For example an elected mayor may initiate projects. 
However, the program must first be approved in the correct committees in the local 
assembly controlled by the traditional actors, then effectuate the legislative bill 
through an administrative system which is appointed and controlled by individual 
members of the assembly. Finally when all is arranged it is the administration 
controlled by the vested interest who decides who will receive the contract, and as 
these elites are economically powerful the only firms available is their own or 
someone in their circle.  
The constitutional reform in Colombia may give some new insights to the 
study of democratization and institutional change for two reasons. First the 
democratic transition in Colombia which took place in 1991 was not a reintroduction 
of democracy, rather a deepening of democracy which included reforming already 
existing democratic institutions. Second, the context in which these reforms were 
introduced involved a set of new actors; leaving the traditional actors marginalized. 
The composition of the National Constituent Assembly gave the best possible basis 
for creating new democratic rules in line with neo-institutional theory. But the new 
rules introduced have fallen short of ending the conflict; rather deterioration in 
political violence can be observed.  
4.3 Consociational democracy: the ‘only feasible solution’   
Consociational theory has undergone continuous change from the original scheme 
proposed by Lijphart in the late 1960s, and compiled in 1977 with the publication 
Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration. From including five 
central characteristics describing the institutional arrangements and societal make-up, 
four are remaining. The central aspect of being only valid for plural societies was 
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removed, and the conceptual stretching made it possible to expand the theory to other 
societies as well. The four remaining characteristics shared by the consociational 
regimes are: ‘Grand Coalitions’ in government where the respective elites share the 
political power; ‘Mutual Veto’ so neither elite, or fraction of the elite, can rule 
without the consent of the other(s); ‘Proportionality’ in the sense that the divisions in 
society shall reflect the participation in the political institutions; and ‘Segmental 
Autonomy’ to the effect that each community participating in government have a 
degree of self-determinacy in certain areas of special interest (Lijphart 1977).  
In the effort of defining and measuring the consociational regime more 
precisely, a new concept was created in 1999 and presented in the publication 
Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries; the consensus democracy (Lijphart 2000: 427). The characteristics were 
expanded to include six additional traits, and the project were somewhat moved from 
considering societies in conflict to a more general evaluation of democratic regimes. 
Whereas the original concept of consociational regimes remain largely unchanged, 
the new concept of consensus democracies is both an expansion of, but also different 
from the original concept. Consociational regimes are presented as an institutional 
solution to deeply rooted conflicts. Consensus regimes are envisioned to deepen and 
stabilize the democratic nature of any given state.  
The power-sharing arrangement in Colombia had been introduced, been 
successful, and formally dissolved before Lijphart presented his much revered and 
criticised theory. The specific institutional arrangement known as consociational 
democracy is defined as “…government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy 
with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1969:216). It is 
a theory which is descriptively derived, and draws the distinction between adversarial 
and coalescent behaviour in plural societies. Arendt Lijphart published his seminal 
work in 1977, in which he elaborated on the concept of consociational regimes. By 
examining the political arrangements in a variety of states, Lijphart meant to have 
found an institutional construction that provided both peace and stability. He was not 
the first social scientist who had dealt with the issue. Several scholars such as 
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Almond (1956), Lembruch (1968) Ake (1967) and Lewis (1965) had touched upon 
the consociational idea in previous works, but Lijphart definitely expanded and 
clarified the previous contributions; to such an extent that such categorization of 
democratic regimes is forever linked to his name.  
Focusing on societies that are ‘deeply divided’ by ethnic, religious, or other 
strong and durable identity markers, he found that democratic institutions can 
encounter very real challenges if any of the groups found in society constitute a 
numerical majority. Groups that are defined along inherit characteristics are not easily 
changeable, and political volatility is dependent more on fertility than changing 
political convictions. In democratic institutions, in which the majority decides, the 
minority group will be doomed into eternal opposition. Peaceful solutions with 
adversarial democratic institutions, thus, include no incentives for the minority. For 
Lijphart then “In such deeply divided societies the interest and demands of communal 
groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power-sharing” (Lijphart 
2004:1 my underlining). The power-sharing is thus an institutional tool to end 
conflict, and introduce a stable democratic regime. In fact he writes that 
consociationalism “…is not only the optimal form of democracy for deeply divided 
societies but also, for the most deeply divided countries, the only feasible solution” 
(Lijphart 2000:1 my underlining). The only feasible solution was introduced in 
Colombia in 1958, and the violence between the traditional elites was never to 
surface again. The consociational regime was thus an unprecedented success (Dix 
1980). In Colombia, the consociational arrangement did reintroduce democracy after 
the traditional elites lost control over the political institutions to the Armed Forces. 
But it was the previous adversarial democratic regime that had enabled the situation 
to come out of control which finally led to the military coup d’état in the first place as 
described in the previous chapter.  
The theory of consociational regimes is derived from observations of 
institutional designs in plural societies. Lijphart transforms the descriptive 
characteristics into a normative ideal model of democracy. Not only has the power-
sharing been implemented and been shown successful, but it should also be 
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recommended to states still in conflict. Such institutional arrangement can not only 
bring democracy and peace, but also positively affect individual members of society. 
By being forced to work and compromise on a daily basis, the inherit identities will 
be reduced in significance, and other cross cutting cleavages will become more 
decisive. He writes: "the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are 
counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the leaders of the different 
segments of the population" (Lijphart 1977: 1). Guarantees of mutual freedom, 
guarantees of influence, and regulated cooperation for a future for all, create a 
democratic society free from violence. Consociational regimes effectively force all 
relevant fractions in society to cooperate in government, and share the responsibility 
for the outcomes. Proximity and practical cooperation will in turn result in respect 
and recognition for ‘the other’.  
4.3.1 Favorable conditions for consociational success 
The cases from which the consociational theory was drawn shared many 
characteristics; especially the defining characteristic ‘Grand Coalition’. In order to be 
successful in implementing the consociational regime Lijphart identified six 
favorable conditions. 1) A multiple balance of power among the subcultures; meaning 
a guard against one dominating actor. In Colombia the struggle was between only two 
actors, and consequently fails to meet this condition 2) Small size; the elites are 
numerically small, thereby facilitating personal relations between members. 
Geographically the country is large, but its population was only slightly larger than 
that of The Netherlands when the national Front was introduced. Colombia, thus, met 
this condition in 1958. 3) Overarching loyalties, nationalism in particular. 
Nationalism was probably weaker than it is in the European cases of 
consociationalism. The notion of the state has failed to penetrate society in large parts 
of the developing world, including Colombia. Earlier regional and local attachments 
were more prevalent. Nonetheless, nation and state have been coterminous, and no 
cleavage on defining who is a Colombian is found. The overwhelming majority of 
Colombians are also proud to be Colombian in spite of the widespread negative 
perceptions found internationally. This notion of nationality is perhaps best 
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exemplified by the obligatory presentation of the national anthem, popularly claimed 
to be the second best in the world, every morning and evening at six o’clock. 4) 
Segmental isolation of the subcultures; physically reducing contacts among them and 
minimizing mutual antagonisms. The Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia 
mingled together in all parts of Colombia at all levels of society, but certain isolation 
existed in the form of innumerable small communities such as unions, clubs, 
universities, including partisan nationwide newspapers. Compared to societies based 
on ethnic and\or religious divided, the Colombian society was not significantly 
segmented and henceforth do not meet this condition either. 5) Prior traditions of 
elite accommodation. Thorndike (1911) introduced the law of effect in the field of 
psychology, meaning that posed before the same problem several times, the response 
will improve by each attempt to solve it; i.e. trial and error. At every increase in 
crisis, a coalitional regime has been forwarded as the solution. Until the fifth serious 
attempt, the National Front, all had failed. Colombia clearly meets this condition. 6) 
Crosscutting cleavages; the adversaries are linked and separated on other grounds 
than the inherent division. Indeed, in Colombia partisan loyalties cut across all social 
strata rather than coincide with them, but the cleavages never reached the level of 
importance to prevent violence (Dix 1980).  
The conditions facilitate the introduction of the regime, but do not guarantee a 
positive outcome. Colombia clearly meets the characteristic of what constitutes a 
consociational regime, but the favourable conditions are absent or only vaguely 
present; with the exception of ‘prior traditions of elite accommodation’. The 
conditions are according to Lijphart only favourable and helpful, not necessary or 
sufficient (Lijphart 1977). Several states have been used as examples for ‘successful’ 
consociational regimes such as Austria, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. Some 
‘contentious’ like Lebanon, which in spite of the civil war does not affect the validity 
of the theory, and ‘controversial’ cases as Colombia can also support the theory 
(Lijphart 2000).  In the case of Lebanon the regime failed due to external pressure 
and internal demographic change, whilst in Colombia it is the democratic nature of 
the regime that is disputed.   
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4.4 Consociational theory criticised 
Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracies has been criticized on many 
occasions and on different grounds. The critique is twofold; based on inherit 
methodological problems in the theory; and the democratic nature of such regimes. 
The institutional makeup of the consociational states is diverse, and not one state has 
the exact same arrangements. At least one or more of the four principle characteristics 
must be found to label state consociational, but how these are interpreted and applied 
varies.       
4.4.1 Methodological criticism; theoretical and empirical concepts 
The concept of consociational democracy has undergone several changes, and 
even given rise to an entirely new concept. Not surprisingly then, there is some 
conceptual confusion with regards to Lijphart’s democratic types. One line of this 
criticism relates to the empirical validity of the concept(s); the other on the normative 
and theoretic aspects derived from the empirical findings.  
Regarding the first, the conceptual stretching of the concept has served to ad 
hoc validate the theory (Bogaard 2000). The problem in expanding the theory to 
better correlate with the cases makes the concept diffuse and also difficult to measure. 
What does the ‘grand coalition’ entail? How can one define and measure segmental 
autonomy? What constitutes mutual veto? How is the proportionality defined? The 
characteristics are all quite broad, and could include many very different political 
regimes. By leaving one characteristic behind, divided societies, the theory applies to 
more cases, and does broaden the concept, but makes the concept difficult to 
analytically analyse (ibid). This is however defended by the need to broaden if the 
original theory was too narrow (Lijphart 2000). Lijphart distinguishes between four 
divergent democratic regimes based on two variables; adversarial vs. coalescent and 
homogenous vs. plural societies. The four political systems are: depoliticized 
democracy: homogenous society with coalescent elites; centrifugal democracy: plural 
society with adversarial elites; centripetal democracy: homogenous democracy with 
adversarial elites; consociational democracy: plural society with coalescent elites 
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(Bogaard 2000). Of these four the two latter are stable or enhance and maintains 
‘peace and democracy’. The first would be regarded as oligarchic without much 
legitimacy; the second is inherently prone to conflict. The distinctions seem to 
indicate that consociational democracies are somehow less democratic than the 
adversarial model in which fewer institutional restrictions are applied. In later works 
Lijphart firmly reject the democratic deficits in consociational systems, and in his 
new concept of consensus democracy he expresses the opposite stance. These 
descriptive concepts have been shown be by difficult to encounter, but the theoretical 
implication of the theory, the subsequent normative type of democracy, is where most 
criticism is targeted.  
More serious and more relevant for this thesis is the apparent confusion 
between the theoretical and empirical nature of the concept. A concept is theoretical 
when it has a meaning, and empirical when it has a meaning and empirical referents 
(Satori 1984). By the same token there are theoretical, ideal types (like Weber’s ideal 
type), and empirical, extracted types. The empirical will never fully correspond to the 
ideal, merely approximate the ideal poles. Consociational theory employs a mixture 
of theoretical polar and empirical types, and the relationship between them is difficult 
to distinguish (Bogaard 2000). The two poles found at each end of the institutional 
continuum are the adversarial majoritarian at one extreme and the coalescent 
consociational at the other. Facing problems in defining the consociational system is 
followed with the same problem for majoritarian systems. By using examples such as 
France, United States of America, and Great Britain Lijphart merged vastly different 
institutional arrangements, such as government, legislative, electoral and federalist 
differences, into the same category. The behavioural characteristic in adversarial 
systems defines majoritarianism better than the institutional make-up, and makes it 
empirically unfeasible to find examples of failed majoritarian political systems 
(Andeweg 2000). The problems of definitions manifest themselves in the areas of 
institutional design, and it is claimed that if the empirical and normative typologies 
do not completely overlap, there are no grounds for policy recommendations 
(Bogaard 2000). The problems with normative and empirical types do not concern 
Lijphart, and he does indeed state that consocialism is both and ideal type and an 
 54
empirical category. The categories are defined in exactly the same terms, making 
distinctions between them futile, and Lijphart compares this to Dahl’s use of the 
concept polyarchy as an empirical model, and democracy as the theoretical ideal type 
(Lijphart 2000).  
Not only the defining characteristics, but also the favourable conditions have 
been criticized; the contextual realities in which a consociational democracy can be 
successful. Claiming to be helpful rather than necessary, Lijphart does undercut any 
possible criticism, but the conditions were empirically discovered and henceforth 
affect the normative value of the theory. The criticism has two main points of 
departure; the vagueness in defining the conditions and the relevancy of the 
conditions.  Several scholars have pointed out that A multiple balance of power 
among the subcultures; Small size; Overarching loyalties, nationalism in particular; 
Segmental isolation of the subcultures; Prior traditions of elite accommodation; and 
Crosscutting cleavages are all difficult to define, difficult to measure, and it is 
difficult to assert the relevancy and logic of the conditions presence in a given society 
(Andeweg 2000).  
The first implies two things; ‘absence of a near majority’ and ‘stable 
subcultures’. If one group is in majority, there is little incentive in making 
concessions to the minority. Furthermore, traditional democratic norms do not require 
them to make these concessions. However, in plural societies with near majorities, 
the fear of casualties in conflict may reduce the benefits of controlling the legislative 
and executive majority. The majority may very well decide to cede some power in 
order to bring back stability. The benefits of cooperation will thus outweigh the costs 
of not cooperating. In Colombia the Liberal party have almost without interruption 
held the legislative majority, but concessions were made to the Conservative minority 
so that both elites could prosper. The stability of the subgroups is implied in the 
theory by use of concepts such as ‘deeply divided’. Shifting membership is not 
touched upon, but can be interpreted as the goal of consociationalism, given the other 
cleavages in society will increase in importance. I will return to this with below in 
presenting the criticism of the condition of cross-cutting cleavages.        
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What does the ‘small size’ mean?  Does it relate to the size of the elites, the 
population, or the territory? And what is the threshold if one finds a group to 
measure? Being favourable conditions, the leap to labelling them the contextual 
causes of consociational democracy is not great. The condition of small size enhances 
the elites’ ability to foster personal relationship across the divide that causes 
instability, and thereby redefining their relationship through learning about ‘the 
other’. Lijphart writes that the essential characteristic is “…not so much any 
particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to 
stabilize the system” (Lijphart 1969: 213). When the elites realize the risk posed by 
centrifugal tendencies, they counteract these by deliberate cooperation. That some 
divided societies are still in conflict does seem to contradict this. If the system is 
breaking down any thinking person would see the need to bury the hatchet, the 
question is why this has to happen on elite level and not at mass level. It is a 
description of what happens not why it happens, making causal explanations of the 
creation of consociational democracy problematic to assert. 
‘Overarching loyalties, nationalism in particular’ implies a notion of some 
common denominator among the different subcultures, while ‘segmental autonomy’ 
can lead to the reduction of overarching loyalties and favour territorial secession. 
Nationalism is easier fostered in a unitary state, than in the regionally divided federal 
arrangement, yet Lijphart sees both as favourable. In the case of Colombia the 
nationalist perspective was central to the traditional elites who through a unitary state 
tried to foster national cohesion, while the new rural elites, formally within both 
parties, favoured as much autonomy as possible. In countries where the divisions are 
deep the question is not how the country should be run, but if it should be a country 
in the first place (Barry 1975). The criticism, however, does not apply for Colombia 
for primarily two reasons; the increasingly disputed nature of the division, and that no 
dispute is found with regards to the territorial integrity of the state. The condition of 
segmental autonomy was not prevalent within the national Front, but subsequent 
efforts to improve the democratic nature of the system unintentionally led to it.       
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‘Tradition of elite accommodation’ transforms the question of the origins of 
consociationalism into a question of the origins of the tradition of consociationalism. 
If the latter is answered in sociological terms the condition is still problematic. It 
implies a continuance of elite cultures, even if the elites have changed, and also a 
passive public who do not affect elite behaviour. The continuation of power-sharing 
traditions may shed more light on explaining consociational regimes, more than the 
origin of the tradition (Andeweg 2000).        
The ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ have also led to some scholarly confusion. The 
essence of consociationalism is to foster stabile democracies in societies where the 
cleavages do not cross-cut. This leads to the polarization and conflict in the first 
place. If a favourable condition is that several cleavages cross-cut, then these would 
diminish the strength of the defining deep division, shortcutting the reason for the 
conflict in the first place. If cross-cutting cleavages exist, will the defining division in 
society cause the conflict which the consociational democracy is designed to solve? 
(ibid). As described in the past chapter, the ‘deep division’ was at first quite easily 
definable, but at the time of introducing a consociational regime cross-cutting 
cleavages were found in the new distinction between national and rural elites. In the 
discussion of this paper I will argue that this condition not favourable at all in either 
implementing the system or maintaining the democratic stability.       
4.4.2 Consequences democratic quality; another quasi-democracy? 
By the mid 1990s the third wave of democratization was receding. In its wake, a rich 
conceptual innovation was found. Collier and Levitsky (1997) identified more than a 
dozen democratic types such as ‘restricted democracy’, ‘guided democracy’, 
‘oligarchic democracy’ etc. The conceptual stretching of the concept led them to label 
this phenomenon as ‘democracies with adjectives’. The consociational democracy 
can be considered as one of these subtypes of democracy, in which limits on 
democratic majority is imposed to prevent instability. 
Is the consociational democracy the best democratic regime, or the just best 
kind that can be expected in certain contexts? In his earlier works Lijphart identified 
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four possible problematic outcomes with the consociational democracy; inefficiency; 
immobilisim; strengthening of cleavages; and democratic deficits. Inefficiency results 
from the elite negotiations and the difficulties of finding solutions favourable to all; 
immobilism can define the political agenda if ‘emotional’ zero-sum decisions are 
forwarded; strengthening the cleavages by further segmenting the groups and 
favouring voting along existing divides; and lastly democratic deficiency: where he 
himself writes “…..though far from the abstract ideal, it is the best kind of democracy 
that can be expected” (Lijphart 1977:48).  
The consequences for the quality of the democracy can be view as threefold; 
absence of opposition, predominance of elites, and mass political apathy (Andeweg 
2000). From the outset of the theory Lijphart is quite defensive of the democratic 
deficits inherit in consociational societies, as exemplified by the quote above. 
However, in later works he changes this perception and writes “There is nothing in 
consociationalism that true democrats have to be ashamed of” (Lijphart 1985:109). 
The change of mind is based on Dahl’s (1971) ranking of democratic states, in which 
the consociational democracies figure in the highest categories. Critics, like Van 
Schendelen (1985), find this assertion problematic, because above all competitiveness 
is the essence in the polyarchic theory. However, competition is not the only central 
aspect of Dahl’s theory; inclusiveness is also paramount for any democratic state. To 
this respect the consociational democracy may very well outperform adversarial 
systems of politics, and create a ‘kinder and gentler’ democracy (Lijphart 1999).  
Inclusiveness in political decision-making is crucial to any democratic society, 
but who are to be included is more problematic. The common answer is as many as 
possible, and is materialized in grand executive coalitions, as opposed to the fifty 
percent majority in adversarial systems which opens up for the tyranny of the many. 
In consociational theory however, as many as possible means as many elites as 
possible. This has some ramifications for other aspects in the polyarchic concept; 
namely the responsiveness and accountability to the people. Why vote when the 
political system guarantees that nothing will change? The democratic problem here is 
not the relationship between the elites, but between the elites and the masses. The 
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absence clear-cut alternatives in democratic elections have been forwarded as one of 
the problems facing the well established ‘western’ democracies, and this also affects 
the premises for the consociational theory. The lack of opportunities to effectively 
participate in democratic decisions is another. Both of these democratic deficits can 
be reinforced be consociational systems where the elites are destined to rule 
(Andeweg 2000), either through an implicit or like in Colombia explicit arrangement. 
The state is governed by coalescent elites which favour democratic stability, but 
through this arrangement the ability of the masses to influence the elite’s decisions, 
not to say participate in the decisions is restricted. 
Brian Barry (1975) and Donald L. Horowitz (1991) are two vocal critics of 
inherit democratic problems facing the theory. Elite cooperation and lack of electoral 
competition are consociational premises that have problematic ties to the common 
understanding of democracy, and can easily be interpreted as the cause of political 
apathy. The competitive element in democratic theory is essential, and these two 
critics propose methods that would moderate the vote, not extinguish it. Lijphart, 
however, reject the proposals on the basis that in ‘deeply divided societies’ 
moderation will not be sufficient or even probable. The ‘eternal minority’ would have 
to rely on the moderation of the majority, and hope that this is a stable moderation. 
Exposed to the will of the majority, moderate or not, the minority would opt for an 
opportunity to influence; either within a consociational democratic system, or outside 
of the democratic system. Using the conflict in Northern Ireland as an example, he 
finds it difficult for the Catholic minority to except the decisions made by the 
Protestant majority if there are no guarantees of real political influence in the 
decision-making. The long history of conflict will not allow the ‘moderate’ 
Protestants to decide the lives of moderate and extreme Catholics. Such democratic 
designs are recipes for disaster, and will ensure a continuation of the conflict 
(Lijphart 2004). 
The consociational theory stipulates that the sharing of power will lead to 
stability, but inherit in the theory is the transitional nature of this stability. The 
original divisions which caused instability are blocked by the consociational regime, 
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leading to a reduction of their importance. If the original divisions become absent, the 
consociational regime is no longer needed. To defend elite cooperation when the 
elites no longer represent any coherent group is more characteristic of a depoliticised 
democracy, as arguably is the case in Colombia. The goal of consociational 
democracies is to create a society in which adversarial democracy can be introduced. 
Thus, the consociational democracies intend to bring stability to society, and when 
successful it reopens the doors of democratic competition. The model of democracy 
will thus fall for its own success, and is therefore inherently instable. Consequently, 
some authors claim that when the erosion of the cleavages reaches a certain level, an 
introduction of a more adversarial system of government is in order (Andeweg 2000). 
In Colombia, however, stability was never really reached in the first place and a 
prolonged instability was the outcome. The regime itself gave rise to new cleavages 
which gave rise to a new conflict. The ‘value’ of the consociational arrangement 
might then be measured by comparing the benefits of its instalment, and long-term 
consequences for the democracy quality.    
The ramification of the consociational regime could then arguable signify that 
the perseverance of the consociational democracy functions as an obstacle to the 
consolidation of democracy. The case of Colombia serves as a vivid example of these 
inherent dangers found in this particular institutional design. The grand coalition 
consisting of the different elites excluded all other political actors even after the 
original divides between the elites were mended. Cross- cutting cleavages came to 
fore soon after the National Front was inaugurated, but the cost of programmatically 
defining them in political manifests exceeded the cost of forming different coalitions 
that would keep the political power among the few. The exclusiveness of the regime 
legitimized and facilitated the creation anti-systemic forces who did not abide by the 
democratic rules of the game which were codified by the elites.        
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4.5 Theoretical dimensions and empirical variables  
In order to claim that the empirical phenomenon is relevant for the theoretical 
concept, the variables must be made measurable through a process of 
operationalzation. The variables used are chosen due to their relevancy of the central 
theory in question. I have identified four institutional dimensions and operationalized 
these in measurable variables. The aim of the task of choosing variables is to identify 
aspects which are both theoretically and empirically representative to the phenomena 
I seek to explore (Hellevik 1991).         
Consociational democracies are defined by their institutional arrangements which 
are either promulgated by law, or by implicit arrangements agreed upon by the 
different participating elites. The institutional arrangements are defined by Lijphart 
as: Grand Coalitions; Proportionality; Segmental Autonomy and Mutual Veto. To 
assert whether a regime possesses these are difficult due to the lack of rigidity in 
definitions as mentioned previously in this chapter. Nevertheless one can be positive 
in claiming that the regime know as the National Front in Colombia had all but one of 
these characteristics; segmental autonomy. Rather projects fostering national 
cohesion across divisive lines were implemented, and an integration of the national 
elites resulted as presented in the chapter 3.  
The independent variable is the structural reforms entailed in the Constitution 
of 1991, which intended to promote peace by enhancing political representation and 
participation, guaranteeing a comprehensive set of political, civic, economic, cultural 
and social rights, and is categorized along the four characteristics of the 
consociational democracy; a political system the reform intended to replace. The 
different aspects of the Constitutional reforms are organized under the four 
theoretical characteristics proposed by Lijphart; Grand Coalitions; Proportionality; 
Segmental Autonomy and Mutual Veto, and operationalised in measurable features 
connected to the institutional reforms.  The dependent variable by which the 
constitutional reforms are measured is the intensity of political violence. Political 
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violence is defined as acts of violence conducted by the illegal groups in Colombia 
and measured in:  
- Rates of homicide in Colombia 1945 – 1999 
- Guerrilla and Paramilitary activity. Measured in reported events 
- Civilian casualties related to the conflict 
- Number of massacres conducted from 1988 – 2003  
- Number of political assassinations conducted from 1958  - 2002 
- Numerical and territorial expansion 
 
Asserting the number of casualties in war is difficult, and data can often be 
divergent and contested, depending on the source. The total numbers of casualties 
derives from official government sources whose data sets are used. At least three 
problems can be identified in using these sets. First one can question the methods of 
categorizing victims as casualties of war and victims of common crime. Secondly 
there are known cases where the victims were ordinary citizens, but camouflaged and 
presented as guerrillas. Third the government may have an interest in exaggerating 
the numbers and present the results as consequences of their policies. However, in 
measuring the intensity of the conflict my purpose is to identify trends in violence in 
relation to political reforms which markedly is observed in the statistics. So even if 
the numbers of victims are actually lower or higher the fluctuation in these specified 
periods of time still stands out. To be more specific there are two kinds of very 
visible crimes which are unquestionable tied to the war; assassination of public 
figures and number of massacres. Intensity of military clashes between the different 
actors will be discussed in later parts. Both crimes have the intention of gaining 
territorial control. Last a figure presenting the relationship between the rate of 
common crime and the political violence. These indicators are often linked in 
societies which are in war, and make the differentiation between the two problematic.         
The thesis aims to answer whether and why the Constitutional reform of 1991 
led to an escalation in political violence. The members of the National Constituent 
Assembly intended to move the political system from being a consociational 
exclusive system to an adversarial and participatory one by a series of specific 
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institutional reforms.  In the analysis I shall consider the effect of a number of these 
and try to explain the observed changes in political violence.5
4.5.1 Grand Coalitions  
Grand Coalitions is the most prevalent feature of the consociational regime. The 
elites share power in government, in a manner where the political power is limited to 
the specific groups. The system is in other words exclusive for the dissenting forces, 
but inclusive and cooperative for the participating elites. The internal balance of 
power within the elites is manifested in the composition of the executive, and changes 
in the composition reflect the changes in balance of power between them. Gran 
Coalitions in Colombia was not a new feature as four different had existed before the 
National Front, but this was the first time it was protected by law. The exclusive 
nature of the arrangement led to dissent within the elites, and also outside of the elites 
in the form of armed resistance. The reform of 1991 intended to replace this feature 
of government with a pure majority principle in which the people could choose 
between several distinct political options. Several variables can be used to measure 
the political composition in state institutions. Elitist societies are very centered on 
families and a study of family relations within the political elites could help organize 
the structure and the evolution of society in relation to power in political institutions. 
In this study I have chosen to focus on a more aggregate level and have identified 
several actors who with some caution be dichotomized; the legal political elites, and 
the alternative socialistic political fractions. The first consist of traditional, regional, 
local and drug-elite that together control both an official army and to a certain extent 
a paramilitary army. The second entered legal politics first in 1986 as an independent 
force, and became an accepted part of the political sphere after the constitutional 
reforms of 1991. To measure the inclusiveness of the newly emerged political actors, 
political recognition and acceptance would be expected to correlate to political 
inclusiveness according to the consociational theory, while oppositional/positional in 
majoritarian theory. This dimension will be measured in three ways: 
                                              
5 Model of linkages between political structures and political violence in Appendix I 
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- Composition of the executive from 1958 – 2002 
- Degree of dissent to the consociational arrangement 1958 - 1974 
- Alternative political forces; the democratic left (1958 – 2002). 
- Effective number of parties   
 
The measures of grand coalitions intend to explore if the theory can be 
substantiated in the case of Colombia. If Lijphart was right the inclusiveness of the 
Grand Coalition should foster stability. Instability is expected in certain actors do not 
consider the views of the minority who is or is not party to the coalition.  
4.5.2 Proportionality  
Proportionality between the divisions in society and representation in political 
institutions is paramount in representative democracies. In Colombia this applies not 
only to purely political but also administrative institutions, which predominantly are 
politically appointed. The positions in legislative and coalitional executive bodies 
give the actors the power to appoint a certain number of people to certain 
administrative institutions. This system, which greatly diverges from the Weberian a-
political bureaucracy, was installed in 1958 and efforts to modify it by introducing a 
concept of a merit-based administrative career have not been successful.  
Representation can be understood in at least two different ways; politically and 
characteristically i.e ethnic social and economic etc. I will here only focus on the 
political aspect of representation because the original division between the party-
elites were based on this notion, and the characteristically features in most of the 
worlds consociational democracies were not present in Colombia. Acceptance of the 
political system can be measured by the rates of abstention. Non- participation in 
elections can be explained in various ways, and need not only be a response to 
political apathy. Infrastructural restraints can be expected in developing countries, 
and those countries in internal conflict violent threats may pose restrictions. In 
Colombia however the levels of voting have been stable over time, and the durable 
political apathy will better explain the lack of fluctuations after 1957. Introduction of 
new and more representative political actors would thus be expected to correlate with 
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a higher electoral turnout. To use abstention as a measure is laced with problems of 
validity due to the difficulties in establishing the cause of the non-participation. In 
Colombia there is a long tradition of using political abstention as a political tool as a 
means of protest and to de-legitimize the elected government. It was a electoral 
behavior used regularly by the traditional elites before the National Front, and 
dissenting forces during the National fronts. However other countries such as the 
USA have only a slightly higher electoral turnout. I will return to this in the 
discussion. Three variables will be applied to illuminate this dimension of the 
political system:   
- Composition of the legislative 1958 – 2002.  
- Party fragmentation: Number of lists presented for elections 1970-2002 
- Third party representation in Congress 1974 – 2006 
- Rates of electoral abstention 1957 – 2006  
 
Before the reform two parties were clearly dominant, and by 2002 more than 40 
political parties were represented in Congress. One could therefore expect a higher 
degree of proportional representation. However the proliferation of the parties can 
also be seen as a strategic move by the constellation of local elites to accommodate 
and gain strength in the new system. The level of proportionality between the rulers 
and the ruled can therefore by questioned in spite of widespread party proliferation. A 
last measure is therefore included to display the level of political inclusion by the 
third parties, which are clearly different from the two traditional parties. The lines of 
conflict in Colombia are defined by socialist guerrillas created in response to real 
grievance and strengthened by economic opportunities, and the official state. The 
level of insurgent influence in politics is found in the level of representation for the 
ideologically similar but legal representation; the so-called ‘democratic left’. 
According to Lijphart the proportionality in society should be observed in assemblies 
and executive. The leftist guerrillas are most definitely a significant actor I the 
Colombia society, but do not have a political outlets.        
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4.5.3 Mutual Veto  
Mutual Veto means the participating elites have the opportunity to veto legislation 
and policies contrary to their interest. The consociational system in Colombia secured 
this with a requirement of a two-thirds majority in Congress. The legislative 
immobilism as response to the proactive power of the president in proposing new 
legislation is interpreted as effective use of veto. Pre and post reform periods are 
compared to see behavioral change. Considering that the political system installed in 
1958 and refined in 1968 was written by the elites to serve the elites, one would 
expect very little change made to the rules of the game. Comparisons with legislative 
behaviors after the constitutional reforms of 1991 will be interpreted as a 
consequence of the reforms, and the changes made in the new document can be seen 
as a post-reform revisal of parts constraining the elites.  
The use of emergency powers of the president, which are widely considered as a 
response to fragmented congress who favored the existing realities, gave the president 
and his coalitional cabinet the power to make all decisions. By grand coalitions in the 
executive which were proportional to the political forces found in congress the elites 
excluded excluding alternative political forces from real power. After 1991 the 
presidential powers were reduced and declaration of emergencies is tested by judicial 
review conducted by the Constitutional Court, and must by renewed after 90 days. A 
coalitional government is expected to give the president the support because the same 
actors constituting the majority in Congress are also part of government. 
Governments who act exclusively will not find support in Congress, and use of 
emergency power will be reduced. Strong presidents before the reform made 
extensive use of this power which was practically. Strong president after the reform 
have the backing in Congress, and may not even need the power to rule by decree. In 
Colombia a government which can include a sufficient number of congressional 
fractions and is able to reward them will be more likely to gain autonomy and initiate 
change. Thus, the two variables indicative of the use of veto power for participating 
political minorities are:   
- Intensity in constitutional reform making 1958 – 1990 and 1991- 2003  
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- Use of emergency power 1958 – 1990 and 1991 – 2002 
 
4.5.4 Segmental Autonomy  
Segmental autonomy to the effect that each community participating in government 
has a degree of self-determinacy in certain areas of special interest. This dimension is 
problematic in the case of Colombia, and another term; decentralized power may be a 
better description. The societal model with static elites situated in a clearly 
hierarchical relationship with the masses as presented by Lijphart is not found in 
Colombia. Instead, an incoherent and fragmented society can be observed where 
society is organized under a multitude of different elites with varying degrees of 
cooperation and accountability within the elite hierarchy which was originally topped 
in the party leadership in the Liberal and Conservative party. Decentralization of 
power from the institutions controlled by the traditional elites to local institutions 
controlled by the rural elites gave the plentitude of local elites greater autonomy in 
their areas of influence The political elites have always been dispersed; rather a 
discrepancy between the national and rural elites was being segmented. The Liberal 
and Conservative communities in rural areas were controlled by elites close to them, 
and these elites shared the power with the national elites in government who 
appointed political leaders to run the executive at regional and local level. The 
process of decentralization gave the local communities and their elites increased 
autonomy, and thereby the powers to themselves elect their leaders and empower 
them with access to the administration and fiscal resources found at national level. 
Segmental autonomy in the fragmented Colombia is thus, best understood as the level 
of self-determinacy in the local communities. This consociational dimension was not 
present during the consociational regime, and was, as understood here, opened up in 
the late 1980s when the first steps of the process of decentralization commenced.  
One exception found in Colombian society can be seen in relation to Lijphart use 
of the term, but applied to an actor no identified by him; the Armed Forces. Not 
defined by any of the characteristics forwarded in the consociational theory, the 
Armed Forces in Latin America are exceptionally cohesive mutually recognizable 
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and politically active. With certain caution the Armed Forces can be considered a 
subculture which does have special interest in government, more than being an 
administrative tool of the government.  In Colombia the Armed Forces gained 
autonomy during the military regime led by Gen. Rojas, and the counter coup d’état 
segmented this role when codified in the consociational regime. A redefined role for 
the Armed Forces was one of the central reforms of in 1991 Constitution. The 
variables introduced to measure this dimension of the consociational regime and the 
degree of change after the reforms are fourfold: 
- Guerrilla - paramilitary infiltration in local political and administrative institutions: Presence 
of illegal actors. 
- Political, fiscal and administrative self-determinacy    
- Level of governmental transfers  
 
Infiltration into politics by the illegal groups is shown in the level of expansion. Upon 
seizing territory the illegal armed actors encounter local institutions. These may be 
security, political administrative which all have a role in society which the illegal 
actors are interested in controlling. For the illegal actors there are basically two 
options if they intend to remain in the territory conquered; co-operation/ co-optation 
or use of physical force. In either case the presence of these actors do have an effect 
on local government, and increased power and resources delegated to the local 
institutions present the both existing and new actors with incentives of augmenting 
their control over these. The local communities and the local elites facing these 
choices themselves have an interest in which of which of the illegal actors which best 
will serve them; both in the long term and short term. Increased power and autonomy 
through decentralization made local governments more attractive and more prone to 
violence.  
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5.0 Consociational  theory and development of conflict 
In this part of the thesis I will see whether the violence in Colombia can be related to 
the Constitutional reforms of 1991. The institutional evolution will be seen in light of 
the four dimensions of the consociational regime to see is my two hypothesis 
presented in the introduction are confirmed, or if other explanations have stronger 
explanatory power. 
5.1 The evolution of political violence in Colombia  
My dependent variable in this thesis is political violence. In the following I will 
present the data related to this variable and give a short comment on why each is 
included. How to understand the variance in the data will be discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter. There are several ways to measure the level of 
conflict in a given society, but to distinguish the level of ‘common’ and ‘political’ 
violence is more difficult. Political violence is defined as acts of violence conducted 
by the illegal groups in Colombia with the purpose of instigating political change.  
5.1.1 Total number of victims and number of civilian victims  
Graph I shows the homicide rate in Colombia from 1945 -1999. This graph displays 
the total number of violent death without distinguishing between the politically 
motivated murders and homicides committed due to other motives. Violent conflicts 
affect all members in society and not only those directly involved, and one could 
expect the increasing levels of political violence to positively correlate with the level 
of other violent acts. War breaks down the structure in society by targeting 
institutions vital to the stability of any given society, and those most affected are 
those related to security and justice. The latter in particular have great difficulties in 
democratic societies because the civil criminal courts are designed for solving crimes 
committed in societies in peaceful coexistence. Restrictions protecting individual 
from being convicted without due trial such as the presumption of innocence, due 
process, high standards for accepting evidence are all time-consuming and are require 
great resources in terms of educated personnel and money. Civil war break down the 
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structure in society by putting too much pressure on these institutions and this results 
in collapse or severely reduced capabilities. Of all cases involving violent homicide 
in Colombia only 6% are prosecuted and lead to conviction. 94% have no 
consequences for the perpetrator within the legal judicial system. Off all murders 
committed in Colombia only 10% are related to the internal conflict. 
Graph I: Rates of homicide in Colombia 1945 - 1999 
Source :National Department of Statistcs and National Police, cited in Brauer et. al (2002) 
Above we can observe the waves of violence and are able to easily identify the period 
known as La Violencia which commenced in 1948. During the period of the National 
Front the number is quite stable, but in the late seventies, early eighties a surge of 
violence commences. The violence peaks in 1990 – 1991 when the peace negotiations 
were being finalized and, the Constitution was in the making. By the mid-nineties the 
violence again was on the rise. In Graph II the number of total number of military 
activities conducted by the illegal actors are presented. In comparing the two one can 
see that the rate of homicide in Graph I roughly correlates with the politically 
motivated operations carried out by the three actors. As seen blow the operations 
carried out by the illegal actors were reported as early as in 1974, but only from the 
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mid-1980s did the intensity in operations significantly escalate. It enters a period 
relative clam in the first half of the nineties and reaches unprecedented levels by 2001 
before it drops sharply. 
Graph II: Guerrilla and Paramilitary activity. Measured in reported events    
   Source: Restrepo et.al (2003) 
The changing nature of the war being can be derived from Graph III which 
presents the variation of the civilian victims in the conflict. The numbers of civilian 
deaths correspond to the number of massacres being committed. As in the two graphs 
above a marked intensification is seen in the mid-nineties. From 1997 until 2002 the 
paramilitaries were rapidly expanding throughout Colombia, and the sharp rise in 
civilian deaths is the consequence of targeting local politicians and public official, as 
well as a means to displace large portions of the population in areas of special 
interest.   
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Graph III: Civilian casualties related to the conflict 1988 - 2003  
Source: Restrepo et.al (2003) 
5.1.2 Fight for influence and fight for land; assassinations and massacres. 
By further distinguishing the political violence from the common violence one can 
see on two specific violent expressions which are clearly related to the internal 
conflict; targeted assassinations of public officials and political candidates and 
massacres.  
Assassinations of political figures and employees of public offices serve at 
least two purposes. By physically removing elected members of political institutions 
the illegal groups can gain control over these institutions. The politics of fear of 
which the groups have become very experienced can direct policies through 
intimidation. The threat of physical abuse is a powerful incentive to do as one is told.  
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Graph IV Assassinations of Public officials from 1986 - 2001 
Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office (Sanchéz & Chacón 2005)    
Graph V: Assassinations of Candidates, 1986-2001 
Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office (Sanchéz & Chacón 2005)  
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Murder of elected officials is a means to control over the institutions from the 
outside, while the assassinations of candidates in a means to gain control from the 
inside. Removing certain candidates is favourable to other candidates, whereas 
murder of elected officials will not affect the political composition of the institutions.  
The other indicator which is tied to political violence is the rate of massacres 
reported. Massacres are defined as event in which more than three civilians are 
murdered, and are conducted to gain control over the population and the land. A 
reported 3 million people are displaced in Colombia, and many of them have fled due 
to threats and knowledge of such acts (UNHCR: 2007). In military operations these 
acts are conducted in a quite structural manner. The guerrillas make use of massacres 
as a tactic of population control in which traitors are put to ‘justice’ and politicians 
are ‘convinced’ to do the right decisions. The paramilitaries also target political 
actors, but instead of massacring the entire city council they pick people out for 
assassination as seen in the graphs IV and V. The massacres conducted by the 
paramilitaries are related to both political control and population removal. Using 
massacres as a strategic tool has enabled the rural elites to purchase more land for a 
cheaper price. In addition, the surge in massacres seen in the late 1990s is connected 
to the offensive operations being carried out by the AUC in which the incursions into 
areas formerly controlled by the guerrillas is followed with massacring portions of the 
population thought to have cooperated with their enemy. In graph VI we can observe 
that the number of massacres conducted by the paramilitaries. In the mid-nineties the 
number grew exponentially, and marks the beginning of a new phase in the conflict. 
While the assassinations of political candidates aim to control the political 
institutions, the massacres aim to control the territory and the population.     
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Graph VI: Massacres conducted from 1988 – 2003 by paramilitary forces*  
 
Source: Restrepo et. al. (2004) 
* Massacres are defined as killing four or more individuals in one act.  
 
If we compare the level of assassination, the level of civilian casualties and the 
level of massacres conducted they do correlate, and makes an inference of the 
motivation of these acts possible. 
A more detailed description of the intensity of the purely military aspect of 
internal conflict between 1988 until 2003 is presented in Table I which includes all 
reported armed exchanges between the guerrilla, paramilitary and government forces. 
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Table I: Intensity of military engagements  1988 – 2003 in absolute numbers 
Year Armed Forces 
vs. Guerrilla 
Guerilla  vs. 
Paramilitary 
Armed Forces 
vs. Paramilitary 
Total 
1988 200 - - 200 
1989 192 2 4 198 
1990 366 2 3 371 
1991 461 1  462 
1992 533 1 2 536 
1993 500 - - 500 
1994 468 4 - 427 
1995 382 1 1 384 
1996 459 3 2 464 
1997 388 13 3 404 
1998 328 30 6 364 
1999 311 20 1 332 
2000 498 61 2 561 
2001 560 74 1 635 
2002 768 124 4 896 
2003 767 57 12 836 
Source: Restrepo et.al (2004) 
The armed clashed between the soldiers controlled by the government and the 
fighters by the guerrillas stand out, and with the exception of a few years of decline 
the intensity is continuously rising, and since 1990 clashes between the Armed forces 
and the guerrillas have happened on a daily basis. Paramilitaries and the guerrillas 
confront each other militarily for the first time in the mid-eighties and the intensity of 
the fighting between them is continuously increasing until 2002. In 2003 the 
paramilitaries had established themselves in most of Colombia’s regions, and were in 
negotiations with the government to return to civilian life. Also worth noting is the 
number of clashes between the paramilitaries and the Armed Forces. The discrepancy 
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in the number of engagements between the Armed Forces and the paramilitaries are 
different than between the Armed Forces and the guerrillas. This would indicate that 
the relationship between the different actors is based on different terms.     
5.1.3 Numerical and territorial expansion of the illegal groups    
Intensity of clashes must be seen in relation to the relative strength of different 
groups. Graph VI displays the number of attacks carried out by the different guerrilla 
groups. The FARC-EP and the ELN stand out as the two most active. The EPL was 
partially demobilised in 1991, but some members continue fighting still today. After 
1991 the remaining elements of the EPL were targeted by the FARC-EP who sought 
to take control over the territory under their control. The intra-guerrilla war was over 
in a few years and the EPL was never able to re-establish itself. Many of their 
members became anti-insurgent fighter for the paramilitary organization AUC which 
gave them an opportunity to use their accumulated skills in insurgent warfare, get 
paid, and get revenge for the loss of their comrades by fighting the FARC-EP.   
Graph VII Numerical evolution of the FARC-EP 
Source: Departamento Nacional de Seguridad, cited in Sanchez & Chacón (2005) 
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Graph VIII: Numerical evolution of the ELN     
 
Source: Departamento Nacional de Seguridad, cited in Sanchez & Chacón (2005) 
The guerrillas were both established in the mid 1960 but not until the mid 1980s did 
they begin to gain strength sufficient to become a threat to the government and elites. 
From 1985 – 1990 the guerrillas were gaining ground in all of Colombia’s regions, 
and this security crisis faced by the official government spurred the initiation of 
peace-negotiations in 1989. Neither the FARC nor the ELN participated in these 
talks, and neither became party to the peace-agreement. A period of adjustment is 
seen as the demobilized guerrillas begin their political careers, but the numerical 
strength is rising as the level of violence is increasing in the mid-nineties. One can 
also note a difference between the guerrillas as the FARC seems oblivious to the 
political changes resulting from the peace agreement while the ELN levels out before 
rising sharply by the mid-nineties.    
The strength of both the paramilitary forces increased markedly after the new 
Constitution was installed, and there are difficulties in finding data before 1997. It is 
known the drugs cartels had a fighting force of more than one thousand men, but for 
the purely self-defensive groups organized by the other rural elites the data missing. 
One explanation of this is that the self-defence forces did not exist, but considering 
the history of Colombia this is not very likely. More likely is that as in the feudal 
times these forces were created ad hoc, and in response external threats to the elites 
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which the body-guards were not able to handle by themselves. More specific data is 
available for the paramilitary forces controlled by the Castaño Gil brothers who were 
able to organize all anti-insurgent militias in Colombia under one banner, the AUC. 
This organization were reported to number 3 800 in 1997, 13 000 by 2003 and 31 000 
by 2006 (Richani 2007). The explosive growth can be understood as inscription of 
new fighters, but also as incorporation of fighters belonging to the different self-
defence groups scattered across the country. Too which degree the number of 
paramilitary fighter has been stable, and the growth is due to incorporation to the 
AUC, or new soldiers have joined is difficult to establish.   
Finally, I present maps of Colombia which provides the reader with a visual 
display the expansion of the illegal armed groups and the severity of the conflict. I 
find this of great use in creating a picture on how the conflict developed, and, 
presupposing the institutional reforms had an effect, it can be fruitful for 
understanding why and how the conflict is connected to the Constitutional changes 
from 1991. 
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Maps 2, 3, 4:  Expansion of the FARC-EP guerrilla 1985 - 2002 
 
  
Registered FARC-EP presence in 1985   Registered FARC-EP presence in 1990   
Registered FARC-EP presence in 2002  
 Nacional de Planeación in Sanchez  & Chacón (2005) 
 
Source: Fundación Social, Departamento
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Maps 5, 6, 7: ELN expansion from 1985 - 2002  
 
 
 Registered ELN presence in 1990   Registered ELN presence in 1985   
Registered ELN presence in 2002   
 in  Sanchez  & Chacón (2005) 
 
Source: Fundación Social, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
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Map 8: Paramilitary expansion from 1985 - 2002  
          
Explanation: 1985 - 1991 yellow; 1992 – 1997 blue; 1998 – 2002 red   
Source: Centre for International policies (2004)  
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5.2. Fostering stability though Grand Coalitions 
Grand Coalitions is considered the most important feature of the consociational 
democracy, and is the dimension most easily recognisable. It entails both a restrictive 
element in its mandatory inclusive aspects and a behavioural one which results from 
practical cooperation (Lijphart 1977). Inclusiveness was in Colombia secured by the 
agreement to follow a principle of parity. The Liberals and the Conservatives were 
forced by law to work together for a period of sixteen years in the executive; sharing 
all power between them equally in all political and administrative institutions for 
twelve years. The consociational agreement National Front was negotiated and signed 
by the two national party elites who also constituted members of the traditional elites 
in Colombia. The political and characteristic differences between them were minimal, 
but the violent history had made relations sour (Hartlyn 1993). The principle of parity 
in all institutions was deemed detrimental for the success of the National Front. In a 
society where distribution of goods depended on patron-client relationships political 
and administrative exclusion was a very real threat for their continued existence. The 
elites depended on access to resources and influence in public offices, and the 
clientele depended on the patron who distributed the resources allocated. Political 
exclusion meant administrative exclusion, which effectively cut off the access to 
public resources. Consequently social unrest flared when the hands of power 
changed, and all employees in the administrative institutions were removed. This was 
ic resources were crucial 
for lives of the constituents.   
5.2.1 The cosociational puzzle: Exclusive inclusiveness  
The war between the elites ended with the agreement to form the consociational 
National Front; in effect a bipartisan hegemony which excluded all other political 
forces not aligned to either party. Negotiated and signed in exile, the traditional elites 
committed to a text which shared the power equally between the two parties. For the 
referendum which made the bill into law 72% of the electorate showed up, and 96% 
were in favour of it. This was the first election where women were allowed to 
participate the electoral turnout had never before been as high both in relative and 
especially evident in the rural areas in which the scarce publ
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absolute numbers (Instituto de Ciencia Políticas 2005). After the initial euphoria the 
he frictions between the elites were growing and the 
ociational regime 
was organised. Table II show the level of dissent increasing every year until 1974, 
tensions were raised. The traditional elites were highly successful in their cooperation 
and practically merged into one elite. Frictions were diverted to the relationship 
between these two traditional elites and the new rural elites who had been established 
in the late 1930s. Elements of the political forces outside of the parties materialized 
into guerrilla forces who opposed both of these groups of elites. The Grand Coalitions 
did initially have the intended effect of stabilising relations between the two 
traditional parties, and the violence in rural areas of Colombia was significantly 
reduced. In terms of intensity of the conflict, the civil war, as defined by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2001), ended. However, the violence did not disappear altogether and in 
areas in which neither party elite was in control the communities were still being 
attacked by elites who controlled the communities in the near proximity. Hence, only 
six years into the agreement the first guerrillas were established. As the patron had 
created small private armies to protect themselves from neighbouring threats, these 
patron-less communities established their own self-defence militias. It is important to 
note that the conflict followed a new dynamic. From elites fighting each-other, the 
elites were now targeting the communities who did not have political representation. 
Cosociational democracies are defined by elite-cooperation in which all relevant 
elites are included. Segments that are not aligned to any of the elites are by definition 
excluded.      
The cosociational regime was in statistical terms a success as seen in Graph I, 
but within the arrangement t
elements within both parties expressed opposition to how the cos
and the tensions were aligned to the traditional and rural elites within each camp. By 
being organized in the old party system these elites; Liberal and Conservative, 
Traditional and Rural were all included, while programmatic or ideological political 
alternatives were co-opted or excluded. As the years went, the rural elites grew 
relatively stronger, and through alliances with people from the party apparatus they 
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became a real challenge to the national elites. The power structures that had existed in 
Colombian society changed during the La Violencia and the National Front as the 
rural elites had taken over the clientele of the traditional elites. Whereas the national 
elites were striving to provide services though democratic institutions, the interest of 
the rural elites was to use the state resources to reinforce the networks of dependence; 
not engaging in national programmatic politics which did not have immediate 
positive consequences for their position in the community (Archer 1990). Even 
though the national and rural elites had diverging interests, they also depended on 
each-other. In presidential and senatorial elections the national elites depended on the 
electoral base controlled by constellations of local patrons, while the rural elites 
depended on the national elites for their access to the public resources.  
Table II : Support and dissent within the participating elites 1958 - 1978 
President Periode  Support % Dissenters %  Support % 
Alberto Lleras Camargo  1958 – 1962 
Liberal 
Liberal:          38 
Conservative:24 
Liberal          12 
Conservative:25 
62 
Guillermo León Valencia 
 
1962 – 1966 
Conservative
Liberal: 32 
Conservative:35 
Liberal 17  
Conservative 14 
67 
 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
 
1966 – 1970 
Liberal 
Liberal: 38 
Conservative:24 
Liberal 8 
Conservative 10 
Other: 18** 
62 
Misael Pastrana Borrero 
 
1970 – 1974 
Conservative
Liberal: 27 
Conservative:14 
Liberal 9 
Conservative 15 
Other 33** 
41 
Alfonso Lopez Micheslen 
 
1974 – 1978 
Liberal 
Liberal: 57 
Conservative:33 
Liberal  
Conservative 
90 
Other 7** 
Source: Hartlyn (1981); cited in Panchón (2006)  
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*Upon seizing office the congressional support for the first Lleras government was 82 percent but rapidly 
dropped to 62%.  ** In these elections the other category are two fractions within the traditional parties; Lopez 
Michelesen’s MRL and the Conservative ANAPO of General Rojas.  
The reforms of 1968 were central to this development, in which the traditional 
elites were secured representation and influence through participation in government 
while the rural elites were left with control of congress. The reform of 1968 was to 
define Colombian politics until 1991 with regards to grand coalitions by guaranteeing 
inclusion in the executive for the second largest party in Congress. In a two party-
system this naturally secured a continuance of the grand coalitions after the principle 
of parity was faded out. So regardless of who won the election both traditional elites 
would participate in government. Congress was secured a pass-way into government 
finances by funnelling centrally funded projects through the representatives of the 
rural elites (Hartlyn 1993). In addition the powers to politically determine 
appointments in strategic administrative posts were obtained by the members of 
congress, and these were consequently able
d. The appare vene pply al ide of 
th h e ortion of the 
electorate who did not b  a de  
The practical unanimous support in the national plebiscite in 1957 for the 
opposition within the parties. One fraction within the arrangement who sought to 
f th , action iscarded the coalitional 
le all together. In tab e latt s e 1970 elections 
highlighted the tensions and in the presidential elections the cosociational alternative 
G h n end sociat l regime that 
ad ousted him from as ut ironically the 
dissenters were composed just like the National Front. The opposition consisted of a 
coalition with elements from within the official Conservative Party, the official 
Liberal party and the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) in addition to 
Rojas’ Conservative fraction, ANAPO. The electoral defeat was widely seen as 
fraudulent, and became another evidence for the m political power which 
 to influence how central policies were 
effectuate nt inclusi ss did not a  to the politic forces outs
the two parties. In o er words t e political syst m excluded the p
elong to fined clientele.   
cosociational arrangement soon faded, and gave way to two different kinds of 
change the content o e coalitions  and one fr  which d
ru le II th er is defined a  the ‘other’. Th
almost lost to former en. Rojas w o sought a  to the co iona
h power. Roj  found widespread support, b
isuse of 
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excluded most of the Colombian people from real political representation and 
influence (Boudon 2001). As a direct result of the elections on April 19th 1970, the 
traditio
ultiple fractions were given 
complete autonomy from the official party line. In effect every single member of 
Congr
guerrilla Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) was founded.      
The leader of one of the dissenting fractions, the MRL, and member of the 
nal elite, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, was to become the next Liberal president. 
His father, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, had been the Liberal president before the civil 
war. Lopez Michelsen restored support in Congress through his coalitional politics 
which recognized and included the rural elites. Politically his government was only 
opposed by the ANAPO fraction of the Conservative movement, but the 
consiciational regime was by now increasingly contested by elements outside of the 
legal political institutions. With the co-optation  and later dissolution of the MRL the 
socialist sector of the electorate found themselves without any political 
representation. Socialist sectors of the electorate were not to be coherently 
represented in Congress until 1991.  
During the presidency of Lopez Michelsen an acceptable balance of power 
between the national and rural elites was reached. The internal divisions were by now 
so strong that little could hold the rural elites within the original party organisations, 
and the compromise that was reached gave the m
ess would from this point on only be responsible to his or her own electorate 
(Gutierrez 2007). Continued attachment to the parties made political handling easier 
for the rural elites, while the traditional elites continued to be the only national 
figures who could find sufficient support in a national electorate. This highly 
favoured the rural elites who wished for as little central control as possible, and as 
much control over their electorate as possible. Thus, the new cleavages between 
traditional and rural elites were temporarily over-come by a mutually beneficial 
arrangement, and bipartisan politics was allowed to continue but on new premises. 
The new system became vital in sustaining the clientelistic tradition which still is the 
base of all Colombian politics. This feature is still prevalent today, and members of 
Congress claimed during interviews that 90% of their colleges were elected due to 
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such clientilistic networks. The new power-sharing regime installed during Lopez 
Michelsen’s term thus changed from being between the Liberal and Conservative 
elites to becoming between the national and rural elites. However, the agreement 
continued to, or arguable reinforced the exclusive elements with the regime, and 
during his tenure several new guerrillas were formed he; t  armed anti-systemic 
opposition multiplied and gained momentum.  
t as these cross-cut both parties the 
Liberal/Conservative coalition was continued. The Liberal party had the 
congre
5.2.2 End of a cooperative era?  
Some authors claim that the consociational system in Colombia ended in 1974 
(Gutierrez 2007i), but if this system is measured in the characteristic of elite 
cooperation in government, the coalitional rule continued until 1986. By giving this 
characteristic sufficient importance it would be plausible to claim an implicit 
consociational regime replaced the explicit consociational regime. Despite the 
internal fragmentation in the parties the sectors within both worked together 
uninterruptedly. The variances of the governments were largely defined with regards 
to the rural and national division, bu
ssional majority from 1974 – 1991, but holding the congressional majority did 
not mean that they had control over congress. The interest of the representative often 
cross-cut with those for their political adversaries, and the political cleavages between 
the two traditional parties were difficult to identify. The Conservatives fared much 
better in presidential elections. Liberal dominance in Congress was fragile and 
increasingly dominated by the rural elite, making Liberal presidents dependent on 
negotiation with their own party members to pass legislation. As fragmentation 
increased the more difficult to find stable support, and all political forces that were 
not organized under the traditional parties’ labels were still effectively excluded (Roll 
2005:31).  
Table III: Composition of the executive cabinet 1991 - 2006 
Year President Composition cabinet % 
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Initial/ Mid-term 
1978 – 1982 Turbay Ayala 
Liberal 
Liberal: 56 / 46  
Conservative: 38 / 46 
Military 8 / 8 
1982 – 1986 Belisario Betancur Cuartas 
Conservative 
Liberal 54 / 39 
Conservative: 38 / 43 
Military: 8 / 8  
1986 – 1990 Virgilio Barco vargas Liberal: 85 / 77 
Military: 15 / 23  Liberal 
1990 – 1991* Cesar Gaviria 
Liberal 
  
Source: Cardénas et.al. (2006) 
*The first year of his term was marked by the efforts to convoke the constituent assembly and to write a new 
constitution. As a part of this process the elected Congress of 1990 were to be dissolved and a new one elected 
emergency power the whole period, and unconstitutionally bypassed Congress in order to reform the 
Constitution  
In Table III the composition of the following cabinets are presented. In the 
Liberal Turbay government 5 members chosen from and by the Conservative party 
were included. Turbay was one of the so-called professional politicians that had 
worked his way up in the party system as a functionary, and positioned himself as the 
primary representative for the rural elites. In the 1982 elections the Liberal party was 
split between the official part led by Turbay’s rural fraction, and a fraction called 
Nuevo Liberalismo which was led by Galán. After winning the elections President 
Betancur made the unprecedented step of using his mandated power to himself select 
his members of cabinet. He included an equal share of Conservatives and Liberals, 
but chose to include members exclusively from the Nuevo Liberalism. This choice 
indirectly ended the coalitional governments in Colombia, because when President 
Virgilio Ba
in 1991. It is therefore difficult to assert the level of support for his executive coalition as he governed under 
rco Vargas who belonged to the official Liberal party i.e. not the Nuevo 
Liberalismo, entered office in 1986 he chose to copy the practise of his predecessor. 
But instead of offering half the ministerial posts to the Conservative party, he 
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appointed only n the basis not 
 sufficiently inclusive for not being able t the 
members from within their own party (Guarín 2005).  
first non-coalitio ent since 1948 came into being as the 
internal conflict took proport  a civil war. The guerrillas began their expansion 
in the first half of the 1980s, and exploded onto the sc ast half of the 
om being self-def o cer  of colonized 
land, they expanded into th te controlled do reas of 
Colombia. As seen in graphs II, VII and VIII the guerr numbers and 
re active. In maps 2, 3 and 4, 5 we can obs
expansion of the guerrillas in this same period. Whether it was the split between the 
elites, or the guerrillas’ increasing support is difficult to determine but both factors is 
nce the devel  
een as long-lasting feature, so has the level of support for 
the governmental regimes. The support for the government is with the exception of 
rnally, but together the political representatives for the traditional and rural 
elites h
three. As a result the Conservatives declined; both o
being but also  to themselves selec
The nal governm
ions of
ene in the l
eighties. Fr ence groups restricted t tain territories
e tightly eli mesticated fertile a
illas grew in 
became markedly mo erve the explosive 
likely to have influe opments.  
As the dissent has b
the Barco government a quite stable, and very high. All fractions of the political 
parties have at one point participated and dissented and the balance of power has 
shifted inte
ave been remarkably stable.  
In Table IV one can read the official political support for the socialist 
candidates for presidential elections from 1974 – 1990. Compared to the expansion of 
the guerrillas the low stable support highlights the exclusive nature of the political 
system in place. From 1945 until 1986 these two parties received an average of 97.3 
percent of the total vote (Dix 1990). It is important to differentiate between the 
political and armed left, but until 1990 the political left was virtually non-existent, 
and according to consociational theory exclusiveness facilitates conflict. The 
hegemony of the two traditional parties is remarkably stable. As such the 
augmentation of the conflict is very well predicted by consociational theory.  
 90
Table IV: Percentage of votes for leftist candidates 1974 – 2002 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 
2.6 2.6 1.2 4.6 12.9 3.8 0.2 6.4 
Source: Observatorio Legislativo del Instituto de Ciencia Política Boletín No. 36 
Severa
d in the various internal fractions of the 
traditional parties, excluded by the rules of
ached such levels of support ever since 
(Shugart 1992). In Graph II we can observe that the failed attempt by the guerrilla to 
enter l
leftist forces. The socialist or other dissenting sectors of society were in this period 
l analysts point to examples such as Gaitan, Lopez Michelsen, and Rojas to 
find exceptions to the dominance, but even though presented as independent these 
parties originated within the Liberal and Conservative party respectively and returned 
to the official party shortly after the break. This is also confirmed by the fact that 
from 1970 to 1990 Colombia scored a 2.1 on the Laakso and Taagepera's formula for 
determining effective parties scale (Boudon 2000). In spite of significant social 
changes such as urbanization, the political co-operation between the different elites 
has been extremely stable. In sum, all attempts to present political alternatives failed, 
and in the 40 year period the two traditional parties were the only political 
alternatives. The political ‘left’ was co-opte
 the game and exterminated in some few 
cases in which they managed to capture a sufficient portion of the electorate. The last 
of which was evident in the elections of 1986 when the Unión Patriótica suffered 
extensive repression which led to the murders of more than 3000 of their leaders, 
members and suspected supporters. The party received no more than 4.6 percent of 
the vote in these elections, and have not re
egal politics was followed by a dramatic increase in activities. The massacre of 
the UP confirmed their conviction that the only viable solution to Colombia’s 
problems went though military victory. The exclusive elite-hegemony had once again 
proven that when threatened by alternative political forces, they remained in power 
due to fraud or though annihilation of the contenders. This perspective also supports 
the theory presented by Lijphart. The presidency of Barco was as such doubly 
exclusive, both for the elites and also by the continuation of excluding the political 
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from 1986 - 1990 turning to arms at increasing paste as seen in graphs VII and VIII. 
Consisting of all political colours the guerrillas were made up of everything from 
peasants to priests. The exponential growth of the guerrillas was a problem both for 
the national and rural elites, as the state was approximating the brink of collapse. The 
elites most affected by the 
had significantly increased their presence in rural Colo since eginn f 
the 1980s. These elites joined forces in the mid 1980s, and gave birth to the modern 
paramilitary forces in Colombia consisting of traditional self-defence groups and 
 drug-elites. The 
expansion were the rural- and the new drugs-elites who 
mbia  the b ing o
professional assassins who were part of the criminal networks of the
anti-military legacy in Colombia had given the central state little leverage on the use 
of force, and the Armed Forces were not capable to confront the guerrilla expansion. 
As before the National Front the rural elites had to rely on their own private armies, 
the paramilitary forces, to provide protection, and the drugs elite provided them with 
both money and expertise.   
5.2.3 Changing all so all can stay the same 
With the Constitution of 1991 the two-party dominance was to be broken. 
Adversarial politics intended to break the tradition of elite cooperation in grand 
coalitions. The process of opening up the democratic space did not begin in 1991, but 
this last reform was to have unprecedented consequences for the traditional parties. 
Much criticism of the coalitional rule in Colombia has been articulated as a 
democratic deficit in which the majority of the population is not represented at all. 
This group is commonly identified as those who cast blank votes and those who 
abstain from voting (Dix 1990). According to the democratic types identified by 
Lijphart the system which had been consociational democracy had turned into a 
depoliticized democracy (Bogaard 2000). The consociational precepts of ruling in 
grand coalition had in effect excluded oppositional forces and installed a political 
hegemony established and composed by the local, regional and national elites. 
The transformation from an exclusive political system to a system which recognized 
the right to be in opposition was central to the changes in the 1991 reforms. The 
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Consociational regime had developed into a system in which the electorate had to 
choose from political alternatives which were all similar and were all controlled by 
the elites. By presenting several clearly different political alternatives, the electoral 
turnout was expected to augment. The guerrillas did not only struggle for social 
change, but also for the right to represent and be represented. Social change was only 
conceivable if the promoters of this i.e. the guerrilla were represented in legislative 
bodies. An adversarial system encouraging governmental opposition was a return to 
the pre-consociational conditions which had enabled the civil war, but now 
introduced in a new context. The divisions in society were no inter-elite; rather anti-
elite and intra-elite.  
To ensure the effective change of the political system several measures were 
introduced in the new Constitution which would break the dominance of the 
traditional parties. Several legal restrictions on the establishment of political parties 
and movements were removed, and the constitution also removed restrictions on the 
eligibility of the representatives to participate in elections (Titulo IV, Chapter II). To 
ease the entry of new political actors the constitution prescribed new rules for 
facilitating electoral participation such as equal access to national media, support to 
ument prescribed mechanisms for 
active citizen participation such as; the right to be consulted, the right to present 
 of the 
finance electoral campaigns etc (Art. 109). The doc
legislative initiatives, and encouraged active involvement in all decision-making 
bodies (Titulo IV, Chapter I). New third forces were not only encouraged to enter into 
politics in the new Constitution, but were also guaranteed the right to be in opposition 
and openly criticize the government. Political parties and movements that did not 
participate in government were given the right to criticise and propose diverging 
legislation (Titulo IV, Chapter III). Moreover the political opposition has the right 
access all relevant information from the state, and have the right to participate at 
decisional level in collegial bodies according to their proportional representation in 
these.  
Table V presents the post reform president and the composition of the post- reform 
cabinets. Evidently the coalitional rule did come to an end and the composition
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executive cabinet has been largely unchanged. Somewhat ironic, the principle 
opponents to the executive coalitions entered the coalitional government in 1992. The 
leader of the ADM-19, Antonio Navarro Wolff, subsequently entered the executive 
cabinet, and once again the political left was seen as co-opted by the traditional 
parties. They remained in government the rest of the presidential period, and suffered 
an electoral defeat in the following elections. The Liberal government of Samper 
nevertheless offered the ADM-19 seats in government, but the party refrained form 
participating due to the moral dilemma of participation in a government rife with 
scandals due to irregularities in the funding of the presidential campaign. Politically 
the ADM-19 was diverse and aimed to create a mass political party which should 
capture a wide electorate from both of the traditional parties. During the years in 
power the conflict neo-liberal reforms were effectuated and leaving many ADM-19 
supporters disillusioned, security in the face of a criminal wave became worse, and 
the material redistribution was still being awaited. The violence continued to escalate 
and spread after a short lull in the first year of the new political system. The ‘other’ 
represented in the Samper and Pastrana governments did not pertain to any of the 
parties composing the democratic left.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V: Composition of the executive cabinet 1991 – 2006* 
Year President Composition cabinet % 
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Initial/ Mid-term 
1990 – 1994 Cesar Gaviria 
Liberal 
Liberal: 53 / 65 
Conservative: 23 / 23  
Military 15 / 14 
Other:  / 8  
1994 – 1998 Ernesto Samper 
Liberal 
Liberal 74 / 73 
Conservative: 27 / 20  
Other: 8 /  
1998 – 2002 Andrés Pastrana 
Conservative 
Liberal: 38 / 31 
Conservative 52 / 50 
Military 13 / 13 
Other  / 6 
2002 - 2006 Alvaro Uribe Velez 
Transtional** 
Liberal: 85 / 85  
Conservative 15 / 8  
Military: / 8 
Source: Cardénas et.al. (2006)  
* Discrepancies in the data are due changes in the composition over time.  
** The concept of transitional parties will be disc
 
ussed below  
 Table V the government of Uribe beginning in 2002 stands out as a less inclusive 
overnment, and close to all members of cabinet comes from the Liberal party. 
However, Uribe did not run for office as the Liberal candidate, and the official 
iberal party ended up as the opposition in Congress together with the leftist 
actions. The Liberals identified in the data set consist predominantly of so-called 
transitional parties which had broken out from the official party, and who had merged 
ith break-out fractions from the Conservative party. The executive cabinet still 
onsisted of all these elites and their respective political party labels, and the coalition 
is much more diverse than presented in this simplified data.   
The consociational executive ‘grand coalitions’ are, thus, still a part of 
Colombian politics, even though the traditional two-party system vanished as a 
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consequence of the constitut al fractions becam ised. 
A significant change of organizational behaviour was seen in 1998 when the 
 of parties left th itional parties in l minority. In 
2002 the Congress had changes from being controlled ex rties to 
being controlled by more than 40 different political frac  
independent of the former electoral giants. After the political parties multiplied in the 
last half of the 1990 difficulties arose as to how to label these. Several authors call to 
 the third parties were  
of both congress and the executive. Others are more ap ide the 
political parties in four groups; the Liberals, Conservative, Transitional and 
t. The last cons ocratic left a or Christian 
democratic parties. The so-ca
the traditional parties, but do not represent anything subs meaning the 
internal division in the traditional parties was transformed into the transitional parties 
the traditional parties are imp
1991. In the new Constitution the decision from 1968 of giving the largest party not 
aligned to the president’s party equitable representation in government was 
 political system the 
ystem the only way the political 
left have been in position of influence have been in cooperation with the elites. The 
tem in Colombia is still 
consociational, and even though the grand coalition was reintroduced in 1991, the 
ion. Intern e increasingly external
proliferation e official trad  congressiona
clusively by two pa
tions who were formally
all new parties as third parties, and as such  by 2002 in control
prehensive and div
Independen ist of the dem nd some min
lled transitional parties consist of break-out groups from 
tationally new 
and the traditional parties. The ‘new’ kind of coalitions between the transitional and 
licit, not explicitly institutionalised as they were before 
overturned, but the practice continued. As in the previous
political left is still excluded, and as in the previous s
consociational dimension of grand coalitions has thus continued, and the political left 
have been either co-opted or excluded from governmental positions.  
5.2.4 Implications for cosociational theory  
Cosociational theory presents a political system which is designed to induce political 
stability, and in extension prevent conflicts. The defining and also most easily 
recognisable characteristic of such a regime is the grand coalitions in which all 
important sectors of society are to be included according to the proportional size and 
represented by their respective elites. As such the political sys
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conflic
oportionality in 
odern states, Colombia does not 
have an independent public administration. Consequently representation in legislative 
t continued. Political stability has not been forthcoming in the sense that the 
same actors included in the original arrangement are still dominant in the current 
arrangement. The dimension of the coalitional governments does not explain the 
variance in the political violence in Colombia. Supporting the theory on social 
stability and power – sharing can be found with the marked increase in violence as 
the Barco government is in power. However, the violence does not seem to be 
affected by the reintroduction of the grand coalitions in the early – to mid 1990s 
when the violence again is on the rise as seen in Graphs I, II, and III. The relative 
calm experience initially can be explained in terms of having a coalition which 
included the democratic left for the first time in Colombian history, and as such is a 
true grand coalition. The data is not conclusive with regards to relationship between 
social stability and grand coalitions. One possible reason for this is that the true 
contenders to the political elites in Colombia have never been included in any 
government. This in effect has some consequences for the consociational nature of 
the arrangement altogether.  
5.3 Proportional representation  
The consociational dimension of proportionality’ refers to the balance between size 
of the sub-groups in society and effective participation in the political institutions 
(Lijphart 1977). Proportionality is not a well defined measure, has many aspects and 
can apply to several institutions. For Lijphart this dimension predominantly concerns 
the ‘method of allocating civil service appointments and scarce resources’ (Ibid: 51).  
Representation in proportion to community strength in ‘decision-making organs’ is 
perceived as less important as such representation does not guarantee minority 
interests. In this section of the discussion I will focus only on pr
legislative institutions in Colombia. Unlike most m
bodies is equal to representation in public administration and political institutions are 
vital to the distribution of the scarce resources. The clientelist linkages produced and 
reproduced over time has made the public offices a political marked, and the interest 
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groups have since long dominated all public institutions ranging from security, 
judicial to social and health.   
For Lijphart the proportionality in political institutions is defined by the propositional 
composition of represented subcultures. Ethnic, religious, and other definable groups 
should be represented by their elites in the political institutions proportional of their 
numerical size in society (Andeweg 2000). Less focus is given on how representative 
these representatives of these subcultures are. Do they consist of the ‘natural’ leaders 
in the community? Are they representing the different economic and social realities 
within the communities? In a social context in which the patron-client relationships 
have been cemented the linkage established between state and citizens is affected by 
strong local actors. The divisions in society in Colombia are today defined regionally 
and locally rather than ideologically and the members in Congress each represent a 
very restricted local electorate which is understood as the different sub-units of the 
different groups found in society.  
5.3.1 Proportional representation and strong political institutions  
The two traditional parties have since the consociational National Front had been 
tification with political parties have been 
significantly reduced (Dix 1980). The representative is today elected in his or her 
weakened as divisive symbols and iden
region with the help of local elites who have strong ties with the surrounding 
population. After the reforms of 1968 this aspect has been strengthened continuously. 
As such the different subgroups of rural elites have become increasingly autonomous 
from the national elites. The reform of 1991 intended to make the political institutions 
more proportionally representative, but successful results are still in coming and the 
political violence was not reduced.  
Table VI show the composition of Congress from 1958 until 2006, and one can 
clearly observe that the two traditional parties have suffered in elections since 1998. 
This does however not necessarily mean that the totality of elites have been loosing 
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political power. But something did happen after the Constitution of 1991 was 
introduced which changed the political landscape.   
Table VI: Political composition of Congress 1958 – 2006 
Year  Liberal Conservative Other 
 Senate House Senate House   
1958* 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 - - 
1974 58.92 56.78 33.03 33.16 8.00 10.00 
1978 55.35 55.77 43.75 41.70 1.00 5.00 
1982 55.26 57.78 42.98 41.20 2.00 1.00 
1986 56.l4 52.76 37.71 40.20 6.00 7.00 
1990 57.89 59.79 34.21 32.36 8.00 8.00 
1991 56.00 54.03 24.00 26.08 20.00 20.00 
1994 56.00 54.65 29.00 30.43 15.00 15.00 
1998 48.00 54.03 25.00 23.60 27.00 22.00 
2002 29.00 33.10 19.00 12.60 58.00 54.21 
2006       
Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil and Gutierrez (1998) in Roll (2005) 
*Number corresponds to the new assembly elected after the inauguration of the new constitution.  
 
The perceived deficit in proportionality in political representation was a major 
concern to the authors in the NCA, who were certain that alternative political actors 
would successfully contest the political hegemony of the traditional parties if able to 
freely present their political alternatives. The reform of 1991 included mechanisms 
which intended to reduce the clientelist bonds found in contemporary politics and 
democratic institution (Revista FORO 1991).  
make the political parties programmatic. The reformed Congress was to ensure a 
larger degree of proportionality and its mandate was increased to have a significant 
impact on national politics which should result in greater legitimacy for this 
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The reforms of 1991 reflected the need to increase the proportional and inclusive 
nature of the system by guarantees for minority representation. The previously 
excluded indigenous minorities were given guarantees of political inclusion in the 
Senate, and electoral districts were redefined to create more representative electorates 
which would impede the effectiveness of nges regarding 
nancial liberty of the ers of Congress were introduced leading to a 
duction in strategic resources available for divi embers to redistribute 
 their own limite torat the S an e al refo  in favo  of 
al interest over local special interest was introduc ma  Colo nto 
ational district. T in en vote andi cou t rely
on or part of region; rather need to target their p  
electorate (Nielson & Shugart 1999).  
al measures were  to r ce the legislative, and several incentives to 
 a more coherent national policy were  The ess me divided in 
 specialized com s, t ncouraging professionalism. Selection for 
o m
determined by elections within the entire legislature, thus favouring party cohesion. 
o-active, representative and responsive to 
ational electorat  Previous  reactive to the initiatives fro
trengthening this role, its mandate to supervise and control the president’s use of 
emergency powers was greatly enhanced. The time allocated to legislative decision-
making in Congress was doubled, and the number of representatives reduced. The 
clientelistic networks. Cha
the fi  memb
re  the in dual m
within d elec e. In enate lector rm ur
nation ed by king mbia i
one n o obta ough s the c dates ld no  only on 
one regi cam aign on a national
Sever  taken einfor
foster made.  congr  beca
seven mittee hus e
membership in the c mmittees is done by appoint ent within each party, and 
The role of congress was to be socially pr
the n e. ly m the executive the 
congress had not been involved in matters of national ramifications. In addition to 
s
new political system gave the representatives in the national assembly an increased 
role in national politics, and its representatives were made increasingly responsible 
for their use of power (referanse).  
5.3.2 Fragmented to cohesion; stable elites and re-marginalised 
opposition  
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Representative democracy can be organized in many different ways, and the 
proportionality of the system indicates how representative the political system is. The 
two-party system in Colombia represented all elites from all regions in the country, 
and gave opportunities for the different elites to allocate resources to the local 
as much as possible to be able to capture all 
sectors in society which in return are represented in the political institutions. When 
on the traditional party leadership, and the 
fragmentation of the traditional parties accelerated as a consequence .  
communities. The effect on the electoral system was that the rural interests were 
highly overrepresented when compared to the size of the electorate, but this 
overrepresentation could be perceived as unproblematic due to the special 
developmental needs of this part of the population. Most states do skew the 
representation in favour of the regions (Nielson & Shugart 1999).  
The formula for converting seat into votes in Congress have been the Largest 
Remainder Hare system (LR Hare); a highly proportional system which allows for a 
very small number of voters to elect a representative. Lijphart holds the Hare system 
as the most proportional of all systems for vote conversion (Lijphart 1986). However, 
in Colombia this system had become somewhat perverted by the political actors. The 
formula intends to disperse the vote 
Lopez Michelsen entered the presidential palace in 1974 the two traditional parties 
were beginning to disintegrate. Local and regional political leaders themselves 
presented their own party lists before elections. The effect was the parties were 
presenting numerous different and competing lists, which as we will see favoured the 
patron-client structure for the elites. The electoral tactic called ‘Opercaion avispa’, 
whose translation is a ‘swarm of wasps’, enabled the local electoral barons to 
transform the proportionality of the system. The electoral tactic is not entirely rational 
for the political parties as a whole as the total number of seats in Congress can be 
reduced as a consequence. For the individual political actors using the tactic on the 
other hand it is rational in the sense that it increases the autonomy of each elected 
member of Congress. Even though it was the former president who introduced the 
tactic, he had no interest in doing so as he belonged to the traditional and national 
elite whereas the benefactors of this tactic were the regional and local elites. As such 
the electoral tactic was forced 
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In the Colombian context the LR Hare resembled more the Single Non- Transferable 
Vote which is regarded as much less representative (Nielson & Shugart 1999). Table 
displays the number of list presented for House and Senate elections, and in 
observing the data there has been a constant proliferation of the number of lists. An 
exception in seen in 1991 from which we can infer that the elites were still adjusting 
to the new system.  
Table VII : Number of lists presented for elections 
Year Senate House of representatives 
1970 206 316 
1974 176 253 
1978 210 308 
1982 225 343 
1986 202 330 
1990 213 351 
1991 143 486 
1994 251 628 
1998 319 692 
2002* 321 906 
Source: Pizarro 2002: La Atomización Partidista en Colombia: el Fenómeno de las Micro-
empresas Electorales 
* Source: Cardenas et al 2004  
 
 The LR-Hare formula was not among the topics discussed by the NCA. Explained to 
me in an interview with a member of the PDA the authors wanted to make it more 
proportional not less, so why change the most proportional electoral formula which 
exists?   By presenting multiple competing party lists within one party, the number of 
voters per representative needed to secure a seat was reduced, giving the local and 
regional elites with limited electoral bases the opportunity to secure enough votes to 
get their representatives elected. As a result of this electoral system 60% of the total 
vote went to lists who did not obtain the sufficient number of votes to be represented 
in the national legislative bodies (Rodriguez-Raga 2003). In terms of proportionality 
this means the 60% of the electorate that voted were not represented in the 
legislature, and the proportionality of the political representation is thus questionable.   
Table VI presented the level of third parties in Congress from 1974 until 2002. With 
the exception of the results in 1991, the apparent increase in representative nature of 
 102
the political system must as noted be viewed with caution. The electorate have more 
alternatives to chose from, but the alternatives are still very much undifferentiated. 
The election of 1974 is clearly influenced by the party headed by Gen. Rojas who 
was able to present an option to the traditional elites. Nevertheless, during his 
military regime he had included sectors from the official Conservative party in 
government, and his political party the ANAPO, was formally a part of the 
Conservative party. To which extent this really is a measure of third parties in 
Table VIII present an overview over the proliferation of parties in Colombia from 
1974 – 2002. A complete implosion is seen after the inauguration of the new 
Constitutio om e 
landscape i tered in the 2002 electio
 
 
 
Colombia politics, or an elite fraction is difficult to determine. To consider these 
parties as third parties is problematic for several reasons. These parties tendency to 
gravitate back into the traditional parties are just one. Once the democratic left was 
rendered to insignificance in 1994 the traditional actors did undergo significant 
organizational change, and the new transitional parties came to fore (Gutierrez 2007).  
n. Fr  including a few new parties in the first three elections, th
s shat ns. 
 
Table VIII: Composition of the Other in the House disseminated 
Transitional (elites) Democratic Left (independent socialist parties) 
1974: ANAPO 9% National Opposition Union (UNO)              3. 1% 
1978: ANAPO 9.0% Uinon Nacional de Oposicion 9.0%, Frente Unido del Pueblo 
10.2% 
1982: -  Frente Democratico 1.5, Frente Unido Popular 3.8% 
1986: Nuevo Liberalismo 6.6 % Unión Patriotica 2.0% 
1990: AD-M19 0.4% 
1991: Nueva Furerza Democratica 7.5%, Movimineto Nacional 
de Salvacion 7.5%, Others 11.8% 
ADM- 19 9.3%, Unión Patriotica 1.2% 
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1994: Movimineto Nacional de Salvacion 1.2%, Indigenous 
parties 1.2%, Minority parties 1.2%, Others 6.2% 
ADM-9 1.2 %                                         
 
1998: Indigenous 1%, Other 17.5 %    Other 1.5% 
2002: Coalicion 2.8%, Cambio Radical 3.8%, Equipo Colombia 
2.3%, Convergencia Popular Cívica 2.2%,  Apertura Liberal 
2.0%, Movimiento Popular Unido 1.5 %, Movimiento de 
Frente Social y Politico 0.8%, Movimiento Unionista 0.5%  
Salvación Nacional 1.4%, Colombia Siempre 1.3%, 
Movimiento de Participación Popular 1.3%, Moveimiento de 
Renovación Acción Laboral 1.1%, Voluntad Popular 1.1%, 
Fuerza Progresista 1.0%, Convergencia Ciudadana 1.0%,  
Progresismo Democrático 0.8%, Nuevo Liberalismo 0.5%, 
Movimiento Integración Popular 0.5%, Movimiento Unionista 
0.5%, Movimiento Huella Ciudadana 0.5%, Movimiento 
Politico Comunal y Comunidad Colombiano 0.7%, Movimiento 
Integración Regional 0.5%, Movimiento Nacional 1.1%,   
Vía Alterna 0.9%, Movimiento Republiciano 0.7%, 
Conservatismo Independiente 0.7%, Reconstrucción 
Democrática Nacional 0.5%, Participacion Comunidad 0.6%, 
Cívico Seriedad Colombia 0.5%, Partido Nacional Cristiano 
0.4%, Nueva Fuerza Democrática 0.3%, Movimiento Nacional 
Progresista 0.3%, Partido Vanguardia Moral y Social Vamos 
Colombia -%, Partido Unidad Democrática -%, Autoridades 
Indigenas de Colombia -%, Partido Socialdemócrata 
Colombiano -%, Partido Popular Colombiano -%, Unete 
Colombia -% 
2006: Partido Social de Unidad Nacional 16.7%, Cambio 
Radical10.7%, Movimiento Alas Equipo Colombia 4.3%, 
Convergencia Ciudadana 4.6%, Apertura Liberal 2.3%, 
Polo Democrático Alternativo 8.2 % 
 
Movimiento Integración Regional 1.1%, Partido Colombia 
0.1%. 
Demócrata 2.5%, Movimiento Nacional 2.0%, Movimiento 
Popular Unido1.5%, Por el País que soñamos 1.1%, Huila 
Nuevo y Liberalismo0.9%, Movimiento Mira 2.7%, Partido de 
Acción Social 0.6%, Movimiento Renovación Acción Laboral  
0.4%, Movimiento de Salvación Nacional 0.3% Movimiento de 
Participación Popular 0.2%, Movimiento Nacional Progresista 
 
With certain notable exceptions, such as within the independent parties, the new 
nown personalities. The parties proliferated, 
but continuation of the political class was obvious. The current President Alvaro 
ribe Veléz, was elected under the party-banner Primero Colombia. Before running 
for presidency had been a senator for the Liberal party from 1986-1990, 1990-1994, 
and subsequently elected Liberal governor in the Antioquia department from 1995-
parties are under the leadership of well k
U
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1997. Germán Varg  the grand son of 
iberal ex-president Carlos L al Front 
6–70). Founder of the Partido
antos family is the pr mbia’s largest newspaper, 
po, of which Santos personally has been t ditor in chief. The president’s 
scobar, also came from the Liberal party, and now leads the 
ais  former Liberal 
e Peñalosa who openly supported the Uribe in the 2002 
of 
4) Simon Gaviria.  
 is quite clear, and the bonds between the 
ng, even genetic. During the Uribe presidency 
iberal party belonged to the opposition in 
he president. However, 
uestioned. On the face of it, great changes 
representation in Congress from 1974 – 
g seats in Congress and new parties are 
r of parties to the number of lists presented 
 outnumber the parties. In the Colombian 
re not cohesive entities, rather made up of 
   
erlines the elite’s 
 first elections after the Constitution was 
andidates were focusing more on national 
ws an increase in lists presented which in 
 to be elected because the votes are more 
jority of the lists only had one senator 
up of 42 different parties sharing 102 seats 
as Lleras, leader of the Cambio Radical is
Colombia’s L leras Restrepo, the third Nation
president (196  Social de Unidad Nacional, Juan Manuel 
Santos, belongs to the traditional Liberal elite and his family has ties back to the 
party’s creation. The S oprietor of Colo
El Tiem he e
cousin, Mario Uribe E
Partido Colombia Democratica. Por el P  que Soñamos is led by the
mayor of Bogota, Enriqu
elections. In this party we also find the so
the Liberal party Cesar Gaviria (1990 – 199
The continuation of power-sharing politics
government and the opposition are stro
n of former president, today the leader 
(2002 – 2006), the remnants of the official L
Congress, while these transitional parties are supporting t
nature of the opposition can seriously be q
can be seen when comparing the level of 
2002. The traditional parties have been loosin
now in majority . By comparing the numbe
we can also observe that the lists greatly
context this means that these new parties a
representatives who represent different limited electorates.    
The experience from the structural changes
ability to adapt to the structural reforms. Th
introduced showed great progress and the c
issues. However the following election sho
effect reduced the number of votes needed
dispersed. The result was that the great ma
elected, and that the senate now was made 
 in the Senate further und
e
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(Rodriguez-Raga & Botero 2006). The proliferation of the lists has enabled the 
regional electoral barons to regain the ground they lost in the 1991 elections.  
In these terms no real change has taken place with regards to political representation 
for the political actors closest to the armed leftist insurgents since the introduction of 
the 1991 Constitution (Roll 2005). The new third parties which entered the scene are 
best understood as consequences of reorganization within the elites to maximize their 
influence in the new political system. After the introduction of the new constitution 
the proportional relationship in Congress is unchanged if one interprets the 
transitional parties as part of the old elite constellation.  
5.3.3 The quality of the representative democracy 
Problematic aspects of the democratic political system was recognized since the 
philosophical discourse on how best to rule emancipated in the ancient Greek 
cultures. In modern terms is can be understood as a discussion between a formal and 
substantive democracy; a discussion on striking a balance between the distribution of 
political power and distribution of financial resources. The problem of the 
uncontrollable masses identified by the philosophers represents a true threat to the 
 clien ele is reated by 
distribution of materialistic and other benefits. As the Patron is able to increase his 
state, the elites and even the masses themselves. An all inclusive democracy based on 
majority rule would lead to the disintegration of the state. A better solution was to 
find an institutional equilibrium, in which the best possible outcomes with regards to 
distribution of resources were reached (Malnes & Midgård 1993).  
Clientelism can be seen as one manner in which the elites protect the masses. Not 
only from themselves, but also from external physical and financial threats which are 
both prevalent in rural Colombia. Patron-client relationships are two-sided and 
unequal, and in which both the Patron and the Clients benefit. The Patron will gain 
political power and access to political institutions and public resources, and the 
clients will benefit from their Patrons control over the resources. The existence of the 
Patrons is dependent on the existence of on clientele, and the t  c
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representation in the political institution he will have access to more funds which he 
can then distribute to his clients, or electorate (Archer 1990).  The dependence on 
such local ‘men of respect’ is paramount to understand why the political system in 
Colombia has been so stable in a context of social instability.  
Questions on proportionality in consociational theory do more than say something 
about a fair political representation in society. It also presupposes that the 
participating elites are also mutually benefiting from the political inclusion. Political 
systems in which political representation is not coupled by political influence, one 
could expect little confidence in political institutions. It is an issue of redistribution 
al allegiance of their patron 
(Hartlyn 1993). The elites found in rural Colombia connected to the regional elites 
and to the national who began to invest state funds for building and maintain 
entation as representation 
eir patrons could 
contribute something tangible and often material to the local constituency. In turn the 
and the need to observe change according to the political choices decided in elections. 
A rational electorate votes for the candidates who are most likely to have a positive 
impact ones life. Political parties have traditionally represented the workers, specific 
ethnic groups, businessmen peasants etc, but mass politics have never exisited in 
Colombia. Political affiliation was decisive for one allegiance in the civil war, but by 
proxy. The warring parties were organized by the rural elites who pertained to one or 
the other party, and the clientele followed the politic
clientelist networks. By interpreting the proportional repres
of different local communities, then the proportionality is quite high in the sense that 
the sub-units in society are represented by the elites. Consociational democracy is 
after all defined as elite-cooperation (Lijphart 1977). Colombian Congress is, thus, 
proportional to the dispersion of elites spread out in all regions and municipalities in 
Colombia.  
A series of institutional changes were intended to weaken these bonds of dependence. 
The new constitution also abolished the institution of ‘pork-barrel funds’, a practise 
which had been widely seen as an instrument for fostering client-patron relationships 
and primarily been used to secure the re-election (Raga 2007i). These ‘pork-barrel 
funds’ strengthened the electoral barons who on behalf of th
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constituency would continue to be grateful for the services provided by the patrons. 
The abolishment of this practice met with stiff resistance from the professional 
politicians, but the make up of the National Constituent Assembly managed to force 
through the necessary legislative changes. Another contentious institution was the 
congressional supplants; a practise which effectively meant that for one seat in 
Congress, two people shared it. This was a practise that was heavily used by the 
patron client networks to increase their influence in national politics and strengthen 
their personal position. This institution, though the use of ‘brokers’ enabled the local 
and regional elites created a foothold within the Congress (Duncan 2006). An 
example of the dangers inherit in this institution is that the undisputed leader of the 
Medellin drugs cartel, Pablo Escobar Gaviria,  was elected into Congress in 1982, and 
consequently received benefits reserved national politicians such as congressional 
immunity.  
Although increasingly fragmented, a centralizing feature within the legislature 
defines the power of each legislator. Due to the internal rules of congress the role of 
the parties in enhanced and power re-centralized in a few hands. Parties are crucial 
for accession to specific Committee membership, hierarchical positions (presidents 
and vice-presidents of the senate, house, and their respective committees), and 
strategic roles (sponsor of key bills). The president of the committee appoints one or 
several sponsors for each bill. Sponsors, in turn, have a decisive role in the legislative 
process, and are very influential in what is finally approved in the floor and act as 
political brokers between the executive and other legislators. The relative position in 
this hierarchy determines the amount of pork that a legislator receives in the form of 
positions in the national government, bureaucracy, and funds for investment projects 
(Cardenas et. al 20006). 
5.3.4 Continuation of traditional politics 
The president of the republic has somewhat redefined his role in relation to Congress 
since the inauguration of the 1991 charter. Having lost much authority to the 
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Congress; especially with regards to the ability of declaring ‘states of emergencies’, 
he has largely retained the fiscal power and hold great sway in the distribution of 
public positions, and the specific use governmental transfers. The fiscal authority was 
d where the appointments are decided. The constitution of 1991 did not 
alter the political dominance over public administration, and the practise continues 
preferential treatment in directing the funds transferred, and offering appointments 
somewhat reduced in the constitution with the introduction of the automatic 
transferrals to the departments and municipalities, but the president still had a say in 
where the transferred money was to be spent (Dillinger & Webb 1999). Successive 
administrations after the 1991 have used other forms of ‘pork’ to get the approval of 
key reforms. Cardenas (2004:20) offers this description on how the president 
encourage the continued use of clientelist practises: “Rather than involving direct 
budget allocations to legislators, the system now favours the channelling of funds to 
investment projects at the level of municipalities and departments were legislators 
control the administration, or at the very least convene with mayors and governors 
the final use given to these funds. … In practice, it has been impossible to deal with 
congress without the use of pork”.  
The power to appoint personnel to central administrative positions within the state 
institutions was a central theme and the National Front stipulated a principle of parity. 
In addition the creation of an ‘Administrative Career’ which was to replace the old 
system of political appointments was contemplated. The issue of an administrative 
career did not lead to significant changes in practise of political appointments 
(Hartlyn 1993). The necessary reforms have yet to materialize, and much power can 
still be foun
today. During my interviews with both academics and members of Congress this was 
confirmed. Only exceptionally do the administrative institutions have a certain degree 
of independence. Institutions central to the continuation of patron-client relationships 
such as service, security and justice institutions are in the hands of the executive 
branches at all levels. 
 Thus, in legislative cases in which the president favours a certain outcome, he can 
use these two tools to secure the necessary amount of votes needed in return for 
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that favours the representatives in Congress. The clientilistic networks may in this 
way upheld by the need for the president to secure votes for important legislative 
projects. 
5.3.5 Political violence and political abstention 
s the between 1974 and 2002, 
d its electoral results significantly. 
In observing the variance in the composition of Congres
we can see that the democratic left has not improve
However, that the ‘democratic left’ in Colombia can openly participate in politics is a 
gigantic improvement in the case of Colombia where previous attempts to challenge 
the traditional parties have led to massacres. The new political system does however 
not seem to have changed the behaviour of the electorate; both with regards to how 
many that vote and for whom. Table present the level of abstention in legislative 
elections (in addition to two referenda) from 1957 – 2006  
Table IX: Percentage of electoral abstention 1958 – 2006 
57* 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 91** 91 94 98 02 06 
18 42.1 55.5 48.1 42.9 66.6 59.3 56.4 44.7 74% 67% 63.9 55 56.8 59.5
Sources: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Fernandez (1998), IDEA 
* National plebiscite for the National Front 
** Election for National Constituent Assembly  
 
The rate of abstention is stable and shows only a small variance in elections of 
special importance. One can observe that the elections of 1957, 1970, and 1990 have 
a higher electoral turnout. The first election contributed in ending the civil war, the 
second was perceived as fraudulent and multiple guerrillas were created, the last 
included the guerrillas created in the 1970s. To us the measure of electoral abstention 
as data to measure the democratic quality is problematic. However, if we understand 
the electoral abstention in relation to the political history of Colombia there are 
certain implications. First, the elites have an interest in low turnouts as this will 
reduce the number of votes needed for elections. When new political forces are 
elected, there are no visible results due to the clientelistic nature of doing politics in 
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Colombia. In fact, the democratic left has been elected into several local political 
governments, but once elected they are forced to cooperate with a legislature and an 
administration completely dominated by the elites. Second, electoral abstention has a 
long tradition in Colombia and did not commence with the consociational regime in 
1958. The traditional parties had often used this as a tactic of de-legitimizing the 
incoming government if they predicted an electoral defeat. Abstention is as such an 
active political act. Third, the rate of abstention must also be seen in relation to the 
representation is clearly found in the new political system, and proportional 
according to balance of power between the elites has been upheld, which in extension 
 voting for programmatic 
parties can only give uncertain results in a distant future. Proportionality for Lijphart 
is concerned with allocating and redistribution of scarce resources, and as such the 
clientelist networ or redistribution 
e ns nt ro tio ity he se o ia s r in un ng  
and as the violence has con d s te t s s f ti  
n assertion is viable 
presented at all. 
ongoing war. The largest guerrilla FARC-EP does not support any elections and 
encourages their supporters not to participate.       
In relation to the discussion of the consociational dimension of proportionality 
the data are again difficult to interpret. Proportionality understood with regards to 
territorial 
is proportional to the sub-units in society. The clientelistic structure in society 
together with a highly disproportional electoral system has impeded the leftist 
political forces to be represented. The data on political violence does not give any 
clear answers of this dimension of the cosociational democracy functions as a 
stabilizing factor in the case of Colombia. A certain drop in violence was seen in the 
first years after the constitution was installed and the political left did achieve some 
representation in both legislative and executive offices, but did not lead to prolonged 
stability. Other factors such as the existence of the patron-client relationships have 
immediate and direct effects on the electorate while the
ks found in Colombia has proven the best strategy f
for th  co titue s. P por nal  in t  ca of C lomb  ha ema ed cha ed,
tinue  to e cala  con inuou ly ha  not unc oned as a 
stabilizing force. On the other hand one can question if such a
given that one side in the conflict is not re
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5.4 M
its legislative development. 
The majorities can not force through new reforms favourable to them at the expense 
of som
the executive in executing policies, but little power in making policies. Given the 
mutual veto leads to immobilism, one could expect that the executive will use other 
utual veto: Segmenting power in traditional relationships  
Mutual veto is an institutional dimension of the consociational democracy which is 
vital to the stability of the regime. Lijphart’s best solution for divided societies 
included measures to limit central power, and avoid the fusion between the executive 
and legislative as found in some majoritarian model (Lijphart 1977). The intention is 
to protect the special interest for the different subcultures in society. Even if the elites 
of these communities are represented in the legislative and even the executive, there 
is no guarantee if the majority decides. Political inclusion does no automatically 
translate to influence, and to avoid future crisis the consociational regimes make use 
of a variety of rules that protect the interest of the electoral minorities. Decisions 
which are thought to benefit the nation as a whole can be against the interest of the 
local communities. Minorities may be discriminated against if the majority can decide 
over the faith of the minorities (ibid). The mechanisms that can be used are multiple. 
Guarantees of self-determination on specific issues important to the different groups 
are often used in societies which are divided between ethnic and religious lines. 
Protection of these guarantees needs to be codified by law, and eventual changes 
subject to special majorities is the content of the guarantees are to change. Mutual 
veto prescribes the use of an institutional tool that inhib
e communities, which means a continuation of existing legislation. The level 
or the intensity of changing or introducing new legislation will therefore be indicative 
of the use of mutual vetoes.  
Critics of the consociational theory point to the most likely consequence of the 
mutual veto, namely immobilism and ineffectiveness. The regime makes it 
impossible to adjust to the changes in society if legislation has no prospects of being 
passed. In the parliamentarian systems in which the executive is responsible to the 
majority in Congress, the executive will be scrutinized by every decision and 
effectuation of politics. Presidential systems on the other hand give greater power to 
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means at his disposal to govern throughout his or her tenure. Democratic 
parliamentarian systems normally do not include such special powers, but as the 
president is elected directly by the entire nation the executive office has been 
endowed with special powers in matters of national interest. Laws needed to be able 
to govern can be made by decree if the president perceives these as necessary. To be 
ruled by decree is not something unfamiliar to most people in Latin America, and the 
tradition of strong presidents is still very much alive. However, the decrees do not 
constitute normal law, and are subjected to several restrictions; both to certain areas 
of legislation but more importantly also by time. In a sense they are temporary laws 
which automatically vanish unless renewed or included into normal law. When the 
president decides or leaves office, all things are the same, and all initiatives taken that 
were not passed into law by Congress will return to its original position. High use of 
ative 
immobility and is a consequence of the use of mutual vetos.       
emergency powers by strong presidents can therefore be understood as legisl
5.4.1 Immobility and volatility in Congress; keeping the balance of 
power 
In Colombia mutual veto was secured by subjecting all legislation to a two-thirds 
majority. The special needs of communities such as the religious ones in the 
Netherlands did not exist in Colombia. There were no divisive characteristics 
between the Liberals and Conservatives except political adherence. The two groups 
mixed in all social and economic and cultural sectors of society (Hartlyn 1993). They 
worked in the same place and went to the same schools, and the separation between 
the two is mostly seen by the territorial dispersion. On regional level the two groups 
mixed, but on community level they were separated and lived often in adjacent but 
not the same communities. Studies show that from 1931 – 1982 only 12% of all 
municipalities in Colombia switched party affiliation (Dix 1990). The clientelist 
tradition offers a possible explanation for this in that the political adherence of the 
Patron in the community decided the adherence of the population in the community. 
As the generations passed, the powerful families in the communities remained that 
same, and the population remained loyal to their protector and benefactor. 
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From 1945 – 1990 the Liberal party almost continuously held a clear majority 
in Congress, but the two-thirds mechanism forced them to include at least half of the 
Conservative party in all legislative matters. From this perspective it is not 
surprisingly that the efforts to pursue necessary reforms were few and that those that 
were passed had been severely diluted. The immobility the first years of the National 
Front m
n observing 
the distribution of resources in a historical perspective the political stability is 
to the 
ies found in 2000.  
ade the party-leadership concerned about how to confront a post-National 
Front era. The single majority principle was reinstated in 1968, but restricted to few 
areas of legislation which could facilitate effective government. That the parties were 
able to come to an agreement on this issue was due to the mutual beneficial outcomes 
which they could predict. Effective government is vital to economic growth, and 
consequently of vital interest to all elites. Laws of more structural character such as 
constitutional law and election laws still had to be passed by a special majority 
(Nielson & Shugart 1999).  
Executive coalitions do not need to translate into legislative coalitions. 
Multiple proposals of structural reforms written by the executive have not been 
passed and included in law in the legislative. This contradiction can be seen as a 
consequence of the presidential system in which the president can not be revoked by 
Congress, but theoretically this would be compensated for by the executive 
coalitions. Members of cabinet are appointed due to their position in their political 
party and support in Congress. The Colombian two-party system was, however, 
extremely fragmented and consequently the legislative reforms were consequently 
difficult to pass. However, one could also interpret the immobilisim in terms the 
rational choice of not changing a preferential system of government.  
The immobility in Congress has prevented needed development favouring the 
poor sectors in society while benefiting the upper sectors in society, and i
reflected. The inequalities found in society in 1951 are virtually equal 
inequalit
Table X: Inequality in Colombia 1951 – 2000 (GINI Index) 
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Year 1951 1964 1971 1978 1988 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 
score 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.56 
Source: Ramirez & Bravo 2002  
In measuring the poverty rate in Colombia one can find similar results, especially in  
rural areas. Table XI shows the poverty rate from 1978 – 1999, and one can see that 
the rate has remained stable.   
Table XI: Poverty timeline 1978 - 1999 
Year  1978 1988 1995 1999 
Total  80%  65% 60% 64% 
Urban 70% 55% 48% 55% 
Rural 90% 80% 79% 79% 
Source 
d 1990 is filled with failed attempts to reform the 
constit
Ramirez & Bravo 2002 
Social reforms had long been a constant theme for the political elites, in 
particular the long awaited agrarian reforms which is one of the main concerns for the 
remaining guerrillas; the FARC-EP in particular. Nearly all governments in Colombia 
have stressed the need for such reforms, but their efforts have been circumvented in 
Congress. Even though close to all congresses since the National Front have 
expressed been presented and publicly expressed support for such change, no 
substantial reforms have been made (Hartley 1993). The interests the members of 
congress they never allowed for such reforms to be effectuated. Shugert & Nielson 
(1999: 321) write ”…any constitutional amendment that might serve to undercut the 
ability of politicians to cultivate personalistic relations with their own electorates 
would be doomed to defeat. Indeed, the history of Colombia between the end of the 
National Front (1974) an
ution”. The national elites in control over government were voted in on 
campaign promises of programmatic character, but while in office forced to 
individually negotiate with the representatives from the rural regions. These failed 
attempts to reform were generally introduced in mid-terms when chances for success 
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were reduced, so one could also question the sincerity of the promised proposals for 
reforms. 
The Constitutional reforms of 1991 presented the elites and their candidates 
for Congress with a new political reality. Responding to social needs was no longer a 
political issue, but a legal issue. Economic and social rights were included and 
guaran
local and regional elites who had a strong interest in how 
and to whom the public resources were to be distributed.  
W he -a en h t -19 ril s reached the insurgents 
 o rev on ong  an  co ati  a titu sse  
in which they could and later also were heavily represented. However, when the 
Constituent assembly was dissolved, and a new Congress was elected the combined 
The previous constitution had favoured the elites, and 
immobilism can be seen  changes that will reduce 
ower and c  over resour
If the new Constitution was contrary to the interest of the elites, the rational 
or their re tatives in C ess would b e-reform the  document 
 beneficia ects from the old would not disappear. High intensity of 
ld indicate an absence of mutual veto for the sectors 
favoured in the constitution, 
teed in the constitution, and through this the state was made legally responsible 
for the well-being of all citizens. The document was described a rigid system of 
micromanagement; a document heavily influenced by the social agenda forwarded by 
the demobilised guerrillas in the NCA (Alesina 2000). Bringing the state back in 
presented a challenge to the 
hen t  peace greem t wit he M  guer la wa
insisted n a ocati of C ress, d the nvoc on of cons ent a mbly
elites were again in a clear majority at least 85%, and a maximum of 98.8% if the 
ADM-19 is regarded at the only independent party and thus not aligned to any of the 
elites (see: Table III and IV). 
as a consequence of this. Why make
ones p ontrol ces?  
thing f presen ongr e to r  new
so the l asp
constitutional reforms wou
and whose representatives are defeated in Congress. On 
the other hand one could also see a high number of reforms as the use of a delayed 
veto against the 1991 Constitution. Institutional theory teaches us two perspectives on 
the effect of institutions. The neo-institutional schools perceive institutions as agents 
of change, and by reform of institutions one can guide behaviour and implement 
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lasting change. The path-dependent school hold that institutions are products of pre-
existing conditions, and are abstract notions of rules. As Pierson (2004) notes, the 
institutions are the functional consequences for those who made them. His ‘critical 
juncture theory’ which includes aspects from both of the schools, is well 
demonstrated in Colombia. The elites that participated in the NCA cooperated with 
the demobilised guerrillas, and these in turn were able to include most of their 
demands into the final text (Cepeda 2004). However, the compromises were mutual 
and the elites managed to insert favourable conditions with regards to the rigidity of 
the document. When normality was restored the elites had full freedom in reversing 
the decisions made by the NCA.    
To understand why the reforms were initiated in the first place one must keep 
in mind that the whole process was unconstitutional. Congress had under the 
Constitution of 1886 the complete power to reform the constitution. But the executive 
stretched his executive powers and included unconstitutional referenda in the 
presidential elections of 1990. The electorate voted with an 88% majority for the 
proposal of calling for elections and convoking a National Constituent Assembly 
(Nielson & Shugart 1999). The composition of the NCA ensured a wide and deep 
reform and has been hailed as one of the most liberal in the world with regards to 
inclusion of individual and group rights.   
Table XII :Number of changes made to the Constitution 1992 – 2003 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2  3 2 1  1 2 4 6 31 
Source:
The first year into the new political regime the constitutions remained largely 
guarantees to the people, but the governments were not financially capable or willing 
mid-1990s continued into the new millennia; culminating in 2003 when an electoral 
 Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University 
unchanged, but soon the content became problematic. The new individual rights gave 
to fulfil their obligations. The number of changes made in the Constitution from the 
reform, which was both initiated and written in Congress, was passed. The political 
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violence became ever more prevalent in this period of time, and the political system 
continued to by vigorously contested by the guerrillas and the democratic left who 
had lost almost all representation in Congress. When Lijphart presents his theory on 
consens
on in Congress has made them completely 
impotent. In interviews with PDA representatives in Congress they highlighted this as 
the big
us democracies he holds one characteristic as particularly beneficial; 
constitutional rigidness (Lijphart 1999). The number of reforms after the Constitution 
of 1991 seen in Table XI tells us that this constitution is not.  
Nevertheless, the changes made to the political system closer to that of a 
consociational one rather than adversary. Use of mutual veto did not lead to stability 
in Colombia. By favouring the status qou and introducing new legislation that could 
have negative ramifications for one place in society the immobile Congress was met 
by an increasingly forceful contender outside of the political system. When the veto 
power is not effective Lijphart expect instability, and in the case of Colombia he 
seems to be correct as the political reforms were met by increasing levels of violence. 
However, if one perceived the multiple reforms as a delayed use of veto, then this has 
implications for his theory. The subgroups of importance, i.e. the elites were not well 
represented in the NCA and were consequently not able to use their right to veto, but 
once back in Congress the veto was invoked against central elements of the 
constitution.   
The small majority of leftist parties in congress have all opposed these 
reforms, but their level of representati
gest problem regarding the constitution. The Constitution of 1991 had given a 
shimmer of hope, and it gave the people a prospect of living in dignity. But the 
authors gave away the keys to a promising future, and subsequent congresses have 
peeled away the substance in the laws. Mutual veto in legislative matters is therefore 
not straightforward to either to measure or interpret in the case of Colombia. The 
leftist sectors in society, including both the illegal and legal expressions have never 
had the ability to veto any decisions made that affects ‘their’ electorate.      
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5.4.2 form 
n majoritarian by nature”  
on y on win er. G nd alit  in uch ste  is ss e cti because the 
e merely advisory (Lijphart 
expressed an interest in a coherent national agenda. The period between the National 
Nielson 1999). Table XII shows that the president has since the end of the 
consoc
If one were to take the temperature of the Colombian society by observing the 
charts. Figure XIII shows the percentage of presidential terms which are subjected to 
tion of 1886 was introduced to make 
Colombia a unitary and sovereign state, and the regional interest which predominated 
 State of Emergency; a means to stem institutional re
Presidential systems of gover ment are “  in which there is
l e n ra co ion s  sy ms le ffe ve 
members of cabinet are appointed by the president and ar
2004: 101). But in the Colombia’s presidential system the executive coalitions were 
not a result of ‘random’ appointments by one man. Rather the result of negotiations 
between different groups of elites in which the composition of the cabinet was often 
planned before the elections. In fact, from 1958 until 1982 the appointments were not 
even made by the president, but by the opposite party.  
The legislative branch of government had before 1991 increasingly been 
diverted into an arena of regional and local interests, and only exceptionally 
Front and the new constitution was characterized by an apparent chaos in congress; a 
chaos which produced immobilism. Party discipline was not existent; and the 
fragmentation of Congress made effective governing extremely difficult (Shugart & 
iational regime increasingly used his emergency powers. The fragmentation 
absence of party cohesion in the legislative either forced or enabled the president to 
allocate emergency powers by declaring a situation known by many names in 
Colombia; ‘estado de sitio’, ‘estado de excepcion’, ‘estado de emergencia’ and 
‘estado de conmoción interior’. The control on presidential power was all but absent 
in Congress, and between 1974 and 1991 the some kind of state of emergency was 
the rule rather than the exception in Colombia. (Palou 1993). 
rate of emergencies the country has experienced, the readings would fly off most 
his right to rule by decree. The constitu
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the conflicts were to be subjected national supervision. To an extent this is also 
beneficial to the local and regional elites who can give more attention to their own 
internal affairs, and be less preoccupied with possible threats from neighbouring 
municipalities. Authorizing the government to have extraordinary powers can prevent 
a complete collapse of the state and thus be beneficial for all actors in society 
(Uprimny 2002).  
Table XI1I: Use of emergency power 1958 - 2002 
President / Period  Type of regime Duration  % p
offi
( in 
eriod in 
ce 
months) 
Lleras Camargo  
1958-1962 Liberal led bipartisan government  
4 8.3 Explicit consociationalism 
Valencia  
1962-1966 
Explicit consociationalism 
Conservative led bipartisan government 
14.5 30.2 
Lleras Restrepo  
1966-1970 
Explicit consociationalism 
Liberal led bipartisan government 
30 62.5 
Pastrana Misael  
1970-1974 
Explicit consociationalism 
Conservative led bipartisan government 
39 81.3 
Lopez  
1974-1978 
Implicit consociationalism 
Liberal lead bipartisan government 
34 70.8 
Turbay  
1978-1982 
Implicit consociationalism Liberal led bipartisan 
government 
47 97.7 
Betancur  
1982-1986 
Implicit consociationalism Conservative led 
bipartisan government 
27 56.3 
Barco  
1986-1990 
Break from implicit consociationalism 48 100.00 
Liberal government 
Gaviria I National Front. 11 100.00 
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1990-1991 Liberal lead bipartisan government 
Gaviria II  
1991-1994 
Post-reform 
Liberal lead coalitional government 
14.9 39.5 
Samper  
1994-1998 
Post-reform 
Liberal lead coalitional government 
9 18.8 
Pastrana Andrés 1998-
2002 
Post-reform 
Conservative led coalitional government 
0 0.0  
Source: Uprimny 2002 
The use of such powers markedly dropped after the inauguration of the new 
constitution. At least two explanations can be found. First the institutional one in 
which the constitutional reforms placed more restriction on the executive’s freedom 
to declare states of emergencies. By comparing the presidential proactive power from 
1958 to 1991 and comparing them to the new rules introduced in the 1991 
constitutions we find significant changes. In the first period the president yielded high 
degrees powers, could issue urgency petitions, have ex-post judicial review, have 
areas of exclusive in ost importantly no 
cla stricted state of siege and state of economic 
emergency. In the 1991 Constitution the power was restricte th the ri  rule by 
decree, permanent committees had to be appointed to along petitions, and the 
lare cies were subject for appr  by the 
nal Court,  could be prolonged for a maximum of 
 (Cardenas e
Table XIV: Use of emergency powers 1958 – 2002 
troduction of legislation (from 1968), and m
constraints in de ration of unre
d wi
 urgent 
ght to
power to dec states of emergen oval
Constitutio  restricted to 90 days, and
180 days t.al 2006).  
Decades Duration in months Percentage per decade 
1958 – 1970 48.5 33.7 
1970 – 1991 206.0 82.1 
1991 – 2002 23.6 17.5 
Source: Uprimny, Rodrigo 2002 
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However, the most common justification given historically for the declaration 
s of emergenc ore rule of law and order, 
 to override Congress (Alesina 2000). The second explanation can thus be 
the absence h decla ns of em ncy, and 
 expect a m  of emergency powers as the conflict escalated. 
Nevertheless, the relatively low use of emergency power from 1991 to 2002 
contradicts this notion. As seen in all data on the dependent variable presented in the 
hapter which clearly show a surge of violence in this period. One 
nderstand th  contradiction is to percei he use rgency 
 proactive, in face of violent social unrest. In this 
e the states cy declared from 1958 – 1991 were a mechanism to 
erning an al changes. After the reform the 
uent use for rdinary powers can be exp ined by lites self 
 getting leg order to reverse certain elements 
5.4.3 Mutual veto a
d the intensity in constitutional reforms, 
there i
decree in eight out of ten days even though the levels of violence did not become 
of state y by the President has been to rest the 
rather than
found in of situations which justifies suc
ore frequent use
ratio erge
one would
beginning of this c
way to u is apparent ve t of eme
powers as and not merely reactive 
perspectiv  of emergen
enable gov d in extension prevent structur
less freq  the extrao la the e
interest in islation passed in Congress in 
of the Constitution.  
nd violence 
Comparing the data on political violence an
s a marked correlation; reform is coupled with political violence. To explain 
the relationships in terms of a worsening of condition for the excluded sectors will 
however not be viable as the reforms yield very different results. Extensive rights to 
and effective use of vetoes to sustain the status qou can explain why the violence 
increased. This would contradict the notion of stability which mutual veto is 
supposed to foster. On the other hand the multiple reforms after 1991 in which the 
democratic left had no opportunity or right to veto seems to confirm Lijphart’s 
theory. If we choose to interpret the changes in the 1991 charter as a delayed use of 
veto by the elites, then Lijphart’s theory will be weakened as violence did coincide 
and escalate in the same period of time. The frequency in declaring states of 
emergency does however indicate a relationship between the level of (in)stability and 
mutual veto. In the period from 1974 – 1991 Colombia was ruled by presidential 
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threatening until the late-eighties. After 1991 the levels of violence have been much 
higher and use of emergency powers would be much easier to defend. The 
discrepancy between the two latter periods of time in declaring states of emergency 
compared to the prevalence in violence acts in the same periods do not correlate. This 
ate that the use of
 to maintain statu u. In post-reform Colombia such powers were no 
ed to be invoked as the Congress now had an interest in making structural 
 draw a conclusi om this restricted data is not called for both for the 
ry variables and the problem of determining if there is a 
cause 
though it is not necessary. Colombia is a unitary state, but in 
contrast to Lijphart pure majoritarianism in which power is highly centralised 
alised. Lijphart writes (1988: 79) “Colombia is a 
could indic  emergency power was not related to the conflict, rather 
as a means s qo
longer need
changes. To on fr
plenitude of other explanato
and effect and if so in which direction.          
5.5 Territorial segmental autonomy  
Consociational theory was discovered in, and is recommended for states which are 
divided. The divisions in society were found along religious, ethnic and other 
permanent characteristics. These different groups or subcultures have a strong interest 
in continuing to live by their traditions, and find it necessary to have a guarantee of 
self-determination over certain institutions in order to cede authority to the central 
government. With regards to the institutional design that can best secure such 
segmental autonomy he states: “The principle of segmental autonomy means that 
decision-making authority is delegated to the separate segments as much as 
possible.” (Lijphart 1979: 500). As territorial segmental autonomy is predominantly 
organised in a federal arrangement, one can infer that a federal decentralised solution 
would be the preferable manner in which secure self-determinacy for the different 
groups in society, al
Colombia has become highly decentr
‘decentralized unitary state’ in which decentralization is maintained by ‘the strong 
demands for autonomy that exist in some of the major provinces”. In 1988 the 
decentralization process was in its initial phase, and direct elections for mayors have 
been introduced the same year. After 1991 the process accelerated. The authors of the 
new constitution intended to make the political system more representative, 
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participatory and accountable, and the most profound reform included in the charter 
was the process of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. The intention 
was to deepen democracy by giving the local communities right to self-
determination; bring democracy closer to the people.  
As for the five characteristics regarding the federal- unitary dichotomy 
presented by Lijphart in 1999, Colombia is today as follows: 1) Government is 
unitary but decentralised. 2) The legislative is bicameral, and the houses are 
differently constituted. 3) The constitution of 1991 is not rigid. 4) The constitutional 
court does have the power to render new laws unconstitutional, i.e. judicial review. 5) 
The central bank of Colombia is independent. What makes Colombia different from a 
‘pure’ federal state is thus the lack of constitutional rigidity which a discussed in the 
previous section.  
The critics of Lijphart point to the dimension of segmental autonomy as 
particularly problematic. To a certain extent they agree with Lijphart with the effect 
of territorial segmental autonomy in that increased autonomy will lead to greater 
cohesion within the sub-groups. They differ as to whether this foster stability or will 
lead to conflict. Whereas Lijphart perceives strong independent sub-cultures as 
necessary for effective elite-co-operation, his critics find that the segmental autonomy 
e (Barry 1975). In 
 forwarded by any of the contending 
will lead to territorial secession and disintegration of the stat
Colombia secessionist claims has never been
groups; instead they fight for control over state itself, which means fighting for or 
against the government.  
5.5.1 Rethinking segmental autonomy in Colombia   
The favourable condition of ‘Segmental isolation of the subcultures’ was in Colombia 
not present during the national Front. The elites mingled in all levels of society, and 
mingled in all the country’s 33 departments. However, on municipal level the 
condition can be argued to be present. As seen in the remarkable stability of party 
allegiance in the communities in which 88% has voted for the same party in a period 
spanning half a century. To use the dimension of segmental autonomy is problematic 
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in Colombia because of the nature of the societal cleavages. One can question the 
existence of different characteristically separable communities. The original division 
in society, understood as the Liberal/Conservative, was artificial not inherit as ethnic 
subcultures are for example. However, these relationships were cultivated for 
generations and the different clienteles ended up identifying themselves with the 
party label in the same manner as they identified themselves in terms of religious 
conviction, nationality etc, and the party allegiance was dependent on which party the 
Patron adhered to (Hartlyn 1993). As such party allegiance was not political, but 
allegiance to the local Patron. Elite – electorate relationships in democratic societies 
are by nature hierarchical, but when organized on national levels it is problematic to 
perceive the national elites as the exclusive elites. Lijphart use of elites as the natural 
leaders of a community is problematic as the elites are not unchangeable, and even in 
societies with great elite continuity as Colombia, the balance of power between and 
within the different elites have undergone change. Thus, on a national level the elites 
are the aggregated expressions of the multip
ont. The two traditional parties are not very different politically, 
and the political differences are predominantly found on national, not regional or 
local level where the inter-par
le regional and local elites, from whom 
they derive their power. Overarching national elites depend on the regional and local 
elites to direct the electorate. The relationship is thus not straight top-down, but rather 
like a pyramid in which the national elites are placed on top.  
If we look at Colombia, the pyramid has to a certain degree been broken down, 
and the regional and in particular local elites have increased their power since the end 
of the National Fr
ty violence was located during the civil war. This helps 
explain with which ease the different parties have formed executive coalitions the last 
60 years. It also helps explain that the divisions in society which led to the civil war 
was not a result of political disagreements; rather constant frictions produced between 
local and regional elites which often were economically motivated. Indeed, many 
scholars agree that the national political leadership, the national elites, were not even 
informed of the intensity of violence, and notably the violence never reached the 
cities (Davila 2002).  
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With the process of decentralization the local and regional elites were given 
increased autonomy, strictly speaking not in terms of special needs to continue to 
exist as a community, but in political, administrative and fiscal self-determinacy. One 
by Barry secession, but 
this dimension of the 
consociational regime from 1958 – 1988; rather the state was highly centralized. 
After all, the experience from before and dur
possible consequence of this increased autonomy is as noted 
in Colombia where the lines of divisions were not based on constant characteristics 
territorial secession was never a threat. The time of the regional feudal lords who 
acted like autonomous kings are long since gone. Instead a political secession 
observed in the atomization of the political parties which have given more power to 
the elites located in the rural areas. Territorial segmental autonomy is has been the 
result of the constitution, and with the administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralization the power has been increasingly transferred to the different sub-units 
in society. These sub-units, thus, are defined by the not by ethnicity or party 
adherence, but territorial adherence in which the population is organized under and 
strongly tied to the local and regional elites.      
5.5.2 Self-determination as condition for peace 
Consociational democracies are defined in terms of four dimensions of which the 
“two most important of these are the complementary principles of grand coalition and 
segmental autonomy” (Lijphart 1979: 500). Political stability and peaceful co-
existence is thus best preserved if these two dimensions are present. Contrary to this 
theory the constitution of 1886 heavily emphasized the need for a strong central 
power to integrate the different conflicting regions. Before 1886 the regions 
(departments) had had the freedom to set their own fiscal policies, print their own 
money, and maintain their own militias (Eaton 2006). There existed an abundance of 
regional and local conflicts; an anarchic situation uninhibited by the absence of a 
legitimate coercive power derived from central government. The constitution of 1886, 
thus, gave great powers to the executive both politically and financially to strengthen 
the governability of the state. Colombia did not have 
ing the La Violencia had taught the elites 
that regional and local conflicts had to be controlled centrally. The strategy of 
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centralising power in Colombia, together with the dimension of grand coalitions 
seemed to function quite well initial, and the National Front has been hailed as a very 
successful Consociational regime. As the dynamic of the conflict changed the 
stability came to an end, and beginning in 1988 the dimension of territorial segmental 
autonomy was introduced into the Colombian context.  
The demand for increased self-determination came from several of the actors 
in the ongoing conflict, and as early as Turbay presidency (1978 – 1982)  did the 
FARC-EP set the condition that any peace negotiations with the government was to 
include the topic of decentralization. More specifically, the FARC proposed the direct 
electio
nt Assembly as an integral part of the 
project of deepening the Colombian democracy, and a direct answer to political 
 decade before. The intended 
n of mayors, and the transfer of 40 percent of central government revenues to 
the municipalities (Eaton 2006). Turbay refused to enter negotiations with FARC. His 
position in the political hierarchy was one of being a professional politician, or a 
‘broker’ between who connected the local elites to the national state institutions. 
Decentralisation meant that his role in the process would become extinct because the 
resources would no longer be funnelled through the professional politicians, rather be 
transferred directly to the local municipalities. But already during the peace 
negotiations with the following Conservative Betancourt government, constitutional 
reforms were passed to this effect in spite of great resistance from the some sectors of 
the traditional elites and the professional politicians within his party, and became 
effective by 1988 (ibid). Only three years later, in the National Constituent Assembly, 
this process was continued by the inclusion of direct election for governors, a 
substantial fiscal decentralization and administrative administration. The issue of 
decentralization was thus seen by the Constitue
demands forwarded the remaining guerrilla more than a
deepening of democracy was codified in Chapter two of the new constitution which 
confirmed the autonomy of the departments, the value of local democracy, and 
ensured a set amount of financial transfers to all the regions. Three aspects with the 
decentralisation in the 1991 document is identified as particularly important; the 
Government had to transfer to local governments half of all resources allocated 
centrally; the bulk of the resources had to be spent on health and education; elected 
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governors and mayors had to administer their own resources and improve their fiscal 
situation (Sanchéz & Chacón 2005).  
5.5.3 The effects of decentralization; comparing the data 
Before the Constitution the local governments had been appointed by the 
regional Governors who were appointed by the President. In the new situation the 
population in the municipalities were to elect their own leader, and by this change the 
office of mayor was within the reach of the local elites. Needless to say, the rural 
elites viewed the process of decentralization as a positive development, and in the 
NCA they managed to reinforce this process in cooperation with the demobilised 
guerrillas. The first step in the decentralization process was effectuated in the 1988 
with the introduction of direct election of the mayors. The same year the ‘dirty war’ 
in Colombia commenced by the practically complete annihilation of the political 
wing of the FARC-EP; the UP. Observing the data presented in Graph IV and V we 
can observe a surge in violence against political candidates, politicians, community 
leaders and public officials. UP politicians from local to national level were murdered 
by the paramilitary forces who were directed by the rural elites , and the FARC-EP 
gained control over institutions by targeting elected officials in their areas of 
influence. As political decentralization began, the political institutions became of 
importance and were targeted by both.  
The process was widened and deepened in 1991, and the importance of 
controlling the political institutions became increased accordingly. With the 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation the institutions were not only of symbolic 
value, but increasingly also economic value. The governmental transfers guaranteed 
in the Constitution were to continuously increase until half of all public resources 
were controlled by regional and local governments, making the economic incentives 
for the actors in the exponentially stronger. Below I have presented a graph showing 
how the financial autonomy increased from 1982 -2002 measured in percentage of 
GDP. Certain clauses were included by law which guaranteed that the transfers were 
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to be spent on health and education, but as discussed in the previous sections the 
distribution of the funds continued to rely on the patron- client networks.        
Graph IX: Governmental transfers measured in percentage of GDP 
Source: Sanchez & Chacon (2005)   
    
From the mid-1990s the intensity of the conflict is beginning to take new and 
unprecedented proportions, and to understand why the escalation came at this point in 
time it is necessary to study the structural changes within the elites. In the late 1980s 
the Medellin drug-elites had declared war on the government due to its efforts in 
pursuing and capturing their leader Pablo Escobar in order to extradite him the United 
States. The former member of Congress was eventually tracked down and killed by 
the security forces in cooperation with rivalling cartels. The Medellin cartel was 
partially dissolved, and the remained of its leaders were either captured or dispersed 
to quieter and easily controllable environments in rural Colombia. The leaders of the 
other dominant cartel, the Cali cartel, followed suit a few years. Having cooperated 
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with s
 Armed 
Forces or the paramilitaries of the rural elites. As the guerrillas were rapidly 
When getting settled in the rural areas they were met with the same problems as the 
other rural elites; an increasingly presence of guerrillas who extort anyone with 
businesses or farms of certain sizes. The guerrillas had four main sources of income: 
the drugs trade in which it placed ‘taxes’ on cultivation refinement and in their areas 
of control collected protection money from the drugs-elites who had their laboratories 
located in these distant regions, extortion of medium and large businesses, 
kidnapping for ransom, and since 1991 they had been able to control the 
governmental transfers which was a direct result of the Constitution. The drugs-elites 
and the rural elites had an interest in controlling the first and last, while preventing 
the second and third. The common interest of drug elites and rural elites made join 
forces to regain the control of the land. The rural elites had access to manpower, and 
the drugs –elites had the financial capability to equip them. 60% of the total revenues 
for the paramilitaries came from this trade, while the remained can in the form of 
voluntary financial support, and later also by the less voluntary ‘vacunas’ or vaccines 
to prevent the return of the guerrilla and also the 
intenance of law and order in the local communities (Castaño 2001).      
ecurity forces under the liberal president Gaviria, they became the main target 
for the subsequent Liberal president Samper. Immediately after entering office, he 
became entangled in a scandal involving the entry of illicit money from the Cali 
cartel into his presidential campaign. The legal process which ensued vindicated the 
president, but his campaign manager and former minister of defence Fernando Botero 
Zea was convicted. From 1993 – 1996 the two major cartels in Colombia were forced 
out of the cities, and they were relocated in the rural areas they had purchased since 
the mid-eighties. Coinciding with the physical relocation of the elite, the second surge 
in violence in 1994 correspond a significant expansion of the guerrillas. Seen in Maps 
2-7, the guerrilla increased their presence all over the country between 1990 and 
2002, and most of this territorial expansion was not countered by either the
expanding, the government focused on dissolving the drugs-cartels in the cities. 
imposed on local businesses 
ma
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5.5.4 A new innovation; armed clientelism 
However, the reinforced paramilitaries did not restrain themselves to the land 
traditionally controlled by the elites, but with increasing financial and military 
capabilities began enter new areas; in particular areas of strategic financial and 
military importance. The paramilitary expansion signified a new phase in the conflict, 
and as the guerrillas they changed from being predominantly self-defensive to 
becoming offensive. The process of decentralization enabled to a new form of 
clientelistic relationship to develop; the armed clientelism. Armed clientelism is the 
concept used in describing how the armed actors entered political institutions in a 
large scale. Like traditional clientelism, armed version aims at appropriating good 
and resources and target institutions able to deliver these (Eaton 2006). By 
controlling both legislative and executive bodies the armed actors could decide which 
kind of projects to initiate, how they were to by carried out, and also the control over 
deciding on who get the contract. As transfers from the state increased every year, in 
particular between 1999 and 2001, the incentive for controlling the distribution of 
resources increased. 
       In 1997 the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) was created, and 
soon it had managed to convince or co-opt nearly all local and regional elites. By 
entering through the back door of local politics in cooperation with the rural elites 
the, drugs-elites and the leading paramilitary commanders became a political force at 
all levels of government. By 2002 they controlled one third of all municipalities in 
Colombia as well as 30% of Congress6.  As the drugs-elite became more influential 
in the organization, a rift between the original supporters made up of the regional 
elites and the drugs-elite was opened again as it had in the last years of cartels’ 
existence. The paramilitary force that swept through Colombia by the turn of the 
millennia made great progress and forced the guerrillas out from their conquered 
areas, and even their traditional areas of control (Gutierrez 2006). The increasingly 
                                              
6 Claim made by the AUC commander Salvatore Mancuso in an interview with the magazine Semana 
18.8.2003.  
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important role of the narcotics trade redefined the AUC, and its historical leader was 
eventually assassinated by rivalling commanders in 2004. Commanders with the 
largest access to revenue became of increasing importance due to their financial 
capability to hire and equip their armies.  
In cooperation with sections of the army, the rural elite and increasingly the 
drugs-elite the AUC took over the guerrilla areas of greatest economic importance; 
areas of production of coca and main transport routes used by smugglers. Transition 
of power however, is extremely bloody and the number of massacres reported shown 
ctics taken by the paramilitaries in 
ry and 20% state agents. The trend continued to materialize and 
in the year 2000 as mu
found guilty of such charges; including highly decorated soldiers and generals. 
Fractions within the armed forces coordinated their actions with the paramilitaries, 
in Graph VI vividly present the new changes of ta
their period of expansion. The entry into politics by the armed actors is best described 
by statistics. Between 1988 and 2001 the numbers of assassinations which targeted 
political institutions included 131 mayors, 461 councillors, 291 local political leaders, 
185 union leaders and more than 550 State functionaries. By 2002 the AUC were 
operating in 28 different departments of a total 33 (Sanchéz & Chacón 2005). 
One of the reforms of 1991 had been the submission of the military under 
civilian supervision. From 1958 - 1991 the defence minister had been appointed 
internally in the Armed Forces. In the new situations the elected government would 
be held accountable for the abuses conducted by the army. Not having the previous 
operational freedom the human rights record of the armed forces increasingly 
improved after its introduction. In 1993 more than 50% of the acts of political 
violence were attributed to state agents, and 20 percent attributed to the 
paramilitaries. A significant change in behaviour was observed already by 1996 when 
the numbers of abuses attributed the legal and illegal state forces were the opposite, 
that is 50% paramilita
ch as 80% of the abuses were attributed the paramilitaries, only 
5% the state, while the remaining 15% was attributed the different guerrillas groups 
(Gallón-Giraldo 2001). There has been found no evidence of agreements made by the 
military central leadership and the paramilitaries, but many of its personnel have been 
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gave them intelligence, free corridors to avoid direct meetings, and militarily 
supporting the paramilitaries when these engaged the guerrillas. During my 
interviews in Bogota, a leading expert on the topic claimed that without the help of 
the Armed Forces the guerrilla war machine would quite easily have vanquished the 
paramilitary forces.  
5.5.5 Decentralization and conflict escalation 
Introduction of the dimension of segmental autonomy has been found to be the 
primary explanation for the escalation of the conflict (Sanchéz & Chacon 2005). This 
is clearly contrary to the claims by Lijphart that political stability will be enhanced. 
He is however not alone in including such a measure into conflict scenarios, and 
decentralization has been forwarded as the most important institutional tool in 
reaching, and preserving peaceful relations
The critics of Lijphart claimed that the dimension of segmental autonomy 
would lead to increased sense of i
strict control on the political development.   
. What made Colombia take a turn for 
worse after introducing conflict reducing institutions is not clear. The shifting power 
of the elites may explain some of the developments. Increased governmental 
transferrals to the municipalities are another explanation for why the escalation 
occurred in this period of time. In any case the conflict intensified and all indicators 
display a marked escalation. The number of massacres multiplied as the paramilitary 
forces entered the lad controlled by the guerrillas, assassinations of public officials 
skyrocketed, the general activity of the armed actors increased as they were gaining 
control over entire municipalities from where they could operate.  
ndependence within the subculture, and this would 
lead to conflict. In Colombia this is not what happened; rather the independence 
reached was hijacked by the illegal armed actors who actively sought after the 
beneficial aspects of the decentralization process. Instead of creating more cohesive 
and self-conscious communities in which local democracy could be fostered the, the 
local community was either attacked by the guerrillas and paramilitaries who placed 
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6.0 Conclusion 
“Colombia is a country of contradictions”. This is a sentence often used by 
Colombians when talking about their place of birth. One can find snow and burning 
temperatures within less then two hours, it is a democracy but has never experience 
peaceful co-existence, it produces more food than it can consume yet people die of 
hunger, and with regards to the political class, as the famous comedian Jaime 
Garzón,7 noted; in Colombia it is the civil servants that are being served. In line with 
the contradictions found, it might not be surprising that the process of deepening the 
democracy led to a worsening of the democratic conditions.   
 In this thesis I have tried to answer whether and why the internal conflict in 
conflicts been part of Colombian society since the state’s independence. This makes 
it difficult to establish when the old conflicts ended and the new ones began.  
Colombia intensified in the 1990s. I asked why the conflict ‘intensified’ because the 
The consociational democracy was presented by Lijphart as the only viable 
solution for divided societies, and the case of Colombia seemed especially appealing 
to study due to its institutional history. The country has experienced the problems of 
the adversarial political system, of elite-dominated consociational system, and quite 
recently the return to the adversarial system.  
 The conflict did definitely intensify in the 1990s, and this has been thoroughly 
documented in the first part of the analysis. With regards to why the conflict 
escalated I found it natural to focus on the four dimensions of the consociational 
regime which are claimed to foster stability, and analysed specific institutional 
reforms related to these. The findings are divergent and have been difficult to 
interpret within the consociational framework, as the institutional reforms did not 
have any significant impact on the political system. Grand Coalitions were perceived 
as one of the main obstacles for political inclusion and the Constitution of 1991 
                                              
7 Assassinated in 1997; allegedly by the AUC.  
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includ
ve also observed that the only period in 
which the executive was not composed by a grand coalition coincided with an 
augmentation of the conflict. In favour of consociational theory one can claim that the 
consociational rupture was responsible for the intensification of the conflict, as the 
numerous power-sharing failures before the National Front. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that the grand Coalitions from 1991 – 2006 have not been able to contain the 
conflict and restore stability.    
 The dimension of Grand Coalitions is intimately connected to the dimension of 
Proportionality, but not restricted to it. In order to secure representation and influence 
for all relevant groups in society the proportionality should found not only in the 
executive and legislative, but also the administrative institutions which are of 
paramount importance for the allocation and distribution of resources. Lijphart, thus, 
emphasises the importance of proportionality in institutions other than the political in 
order to secure the minority interests. The consociational regime in Colombia secured 
the interest of the minority through the principle of parity, in which all position in all 
political and administrative institutions were divided equally. Thus, in effect the 
political system initially was not proportional but skewed in favour of the 
Conservative minority. After the National Front was dissolved the system became 
more proportional, but the Conservatives were secured continued influence through 
the participation in the grand coalition. In addition the institutions included in the 
1968 reforms gave guarantees with regards to influence in guiding appointments to 
the administrative institutions as well as institutions which guaranteed each individual 
representative a fixed amount of resources to distribute to his or her constituents. The 
dimension of proportionality, especially with regards to the allocation and 
ed several new innovations to prevent this practise. The data tells us that the 
practise has continued, and the adversarial political system was never really 
implemented. The problem that arises with this finding is that if the consociational 
dimension of Grand Coalitions remained the same as before the reform then the 
reforms can not have any explanatory value. Executive coalitions alone did not foster 
durable stability; rather the dimension gave the sectors excluded from the 
consociational arrangement only one way to assert influence on political decision; 
armed insurgency. On the other hand we ha
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distribution of resources 
clientelistic networks. Propor
had profound effects, and enabled the continued existence of 
tional representation in Colombia has been secured both 
ing the results and to 
positively assert the existence of this dimension in Colombia derives from who is 
of Colombia it has become evident that the nature of the elites may be equally 
import
minorities can have, and is not only a prerequisite for entering a consociational 
nges which are perceived as 
threatening to these. It is a guarantee which preserves the status qou. In the analysis I 
proportional to the groups included in the consociational arrangement, and elites 
representing the groups were not able to veto decisions contrary to the interests of 
hen the opportunity presented itself after the 
through proportionality through political adherence, but also through proportionality 
in territorial representation. The different subgroups are concentrated territorially and 
the institutions introduced have guaranteed access both to resources and civil service 
appointments. To assert whether the dimension of proportionality has fostered 
stability is more problematic. The local political elites have been remarkable stable, 
indeed almost unchangeable for more than half a century. Their proportional 
representation in Congress has also been stable. However, the realities on the ground 
have been anything but stable. The problem of interpret
being proportionally represented. The population is being represented by their elites, 
but the question is if the elites really represent the different segments of the 
population. Consociational democracy is defined by elite cooperation, but in the case 
ant in explaining the variation of the political violence.    
 The dimension of mutual veto is first and foremost the best guarantee the 
arrangement, but also a guarantee against future cha
presented data indicating that the dimension of mutual veto did undergo change with 
the constitutional reform. Until 1991 Congress had been in a permanent deadlock due 
to the strong institutional restrictions included, such as the need for a two-thirds 
majority. The removal of the right to veto did also coincide with the escalation of the 
violence seen when the new constitution was introduced. Apparently, the data does 
support the theory, but again the contradictions in Colombia make this positive 
assertion problematic. In introducing the new constitution, the right to veto was 
removed in a process that was unconstitutional. The composition of the NCA was not 
their community, or themselves. W
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constitution was installed the elites changed the unfavourable aspects, and as such 
made use of a delayed veto. The changes in the constitution meant a return to the pre-
reform conditions. In this perspective the dimension of mutual veto have not had a 
positive effect on the stability as the violence escalated when the elites were actively 
using their veto before 1991, and the violence continued to escalate after 1991 when 
the delayed veto was used.  
 Segmental autonomy has been the dimension easiest to evaluate as it clearly 
did not exist before the reforms of 1991. The process of decentralisation meant the 
introduction of territorial segmental autonomy to a state which was highly 
centralised. Lijphart is not alone in asserting that certain levels of self-determination 
is the basis for peaceful co-existence, and both federal solutions as well as 
decentralisation has been introduced to many plural states marred by internal 
conflicts. If the theories are valid; Colombia is certainly the exception that proves the 
rule, and its experience highlights the problem of decentralising power in a weak and 
agmefr nted state. The decentralisation did not bring the power and resources closer to 
the people; rather it was intercepted or wrestled away with violent means. As the 
level of autonomy increased every year, the levels of violence followed suit. 
Segmental autonomy had the opposite effect of what was predicted; indeed the 
escalation in violence can best be understood a consequence of the opportunities 
presented. The decentralisation had the ironic effect of transferring money to all 
actors in the conflict, and the government had no tools at their disposal to intervene, 
and as the years went by the government transferred increasing amounts of resources 
to the illegal actors who controlled the municipalities. 
The thesis has been guided by two interrelated hypothesis: 1) The 
consociational regime excluded the vast majority of Colombians from the political 
institutions. 2) The constitution of 1991 did not alter the balance of political power, 
rather the institutional changes led to an escalation in the conflict. 
My first hypothesis is partially confirmed, and today most Colombian does not 
have contact with or access to political institutions. The political system has 
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segmented the patron-client relationships, and access to the political institutions is 
reserved a few who have direct links to at least one of the different elites. For the 
electorate there has effectively been no other political alternative to chose from, and 
this exclusiveness can be found in the institutional makeup of the National Front, and 
it was continued until 1991. Clientelistic networks are however neither entirely 
unrepresentative nor closed to the citizens, and the bonds to the patron is often based 
on feelings as well as needs. It is a mutual relationship in which the elites are elected 
by the constituents to represent them, and the elites redistribute public resources back 
into the community. The different groups in society are geographically concentrated, 
and the territorial representation in Colombia has been quite good. But clientelistic 
networks also impeded political alternatives to become realistic, and are exclusive for 
those who chose not to enter into such relationships. Formed over generations, the 
networks are extremely strong and have ties to all political and administrative 
institutions. Alternative political actors enter an arena in which he is confronted with 
the elites, and where the resources have a clear destination no matter who is formally 
in charge.     
The second hypothesis contains two elements of which one must be rejected. 
After the constitution was installed the balance of power was altered, but not to the 
intended effect. The shift in power was observed within the elites, and it was the 
constitution that enabled this development. The invention of the armed clientelism 
strengthened the drugs- and parts of the rural elites in comparison to the national 
elites and the professional politicians. They managed to assert control over new areas, 
increase their influence in the centres in almost all departments, and their confidents 
were elected to the highest positions in the political and appointed to the most 
important administrative institutions. The introduction of the segmental autonomy 
made this possible, and the paramilitaries were not the only ones benefiting from the 
new arrangement. The guerrillas also profited from this in the areas under theirs 
control, and they were strengthened before the paramilitaries in cooperation with the 
army managed to push them back to their historical areas.  
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In conclusion a few words of caution must be included with regards to the 
democratic nature of the state of Colombia. Lijphart himself expresses some 
reservations. I have argued that Colombia does include all aspects of the polyarchy 
presented by Dahl but reservations about the democratic quality should be made. 
Freedom House has classified Colombia as a democracy from 1974 – 1991, but only 
a partial democracy from 1991 until today. The implication for consociational theory 
is that the dimension of segmental autonomy was the principal factor for the 
deterioration of the democratic conditions.  
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